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Recent Cases
THE EIGHTEEN YEAR OLD VOTE CASE: THE POWER OF




In a decision delivered December 21, 1970, the United States Supreme
Court passed on the key provisions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments
of 1970.2 The ruling consists of five separate opinions, none of which rep-
resents a majority of the Court.3 The report of the case runs to 185 pages
in the United States Reports. This proliferation of opinions was probably
due in part to the fact that a rapid judgment was required to avoid un-
certainty in the results of various local elections scheduled for January, 1971.
A. The Holding
The Court passed on three separate provisions of the Act:
(1) Section 1973aa, which suspended the use of literacy tests to qualify
voters for any state or national election until August 6, 1975, was upheld
by a unanimous Court. Five Justices found congressional power to legislate
in this area granted by section two of the fifteenth amendment.4 The re-
maining Justices relied on either the fourteenth amendment or the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments.
(2) Section 1973aa-1 of the Act "forbids States from disqualifying
voters in national elections for presidential and vice-presidential electors
because they have not met state residency requirements." 5 This provision
was approved by an 8-1 margin. Six members of the Court seemed to agree
that this provision was within congressional power because it insured a
citizen's "fundamental right" to unencumbered interstate travel.6
(3) Sections 1973bb et seq. of the Act sought to reduce the voting age
to eighteen in all federal, state and local elections. It was the judgment of
the Court that this provision was valid as applied to federal elections but
was outside the constitutional power of Congress as applied to state and
local elections. Only Justice Black would have reached this judgment in-
dependently. Four members of the Court thought Congress was wholly
1. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973aa-1973bb-4 (Supp. 1971).
S. Opinions were written by Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, Stewart (joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun), and Brennan (joined by Justices
Marshall and White).
4. The opinions of Justices Stewart, Black and Harlan embrace this position.
5. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.).
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without power to alter the minimum voting age by simple legislation;7 four
would have allowed Congress to legislatively determine the voting age for
both local and federal elections.8
B. Was the Holding Significant?
The judgment of the Court regarding the eighteen-year-old voting
provision of the Act is, of course, no longer the law. On June 30, 1971,
the twenty-sixth amendment to the United States Constitution became
law, and citizens between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one now will
have the right to vote in all elections. Yet, despite this fact, and despite
the confusing array of opinions delivered, Oregon v. Mitchell will continue
to be a significant decision because of what it has to say about Congress'
power to legislate under the fourteenth amendment.
Section five of the fourteenth amendment grants Congress the "power
to enforce" its broad substantive provisions "by appropriate legislation."
Section two of the thirteenth amendment, as well as section two of fifteenth
amendment, uses similar language. Not until the last several decades, how-
ever, has Congress or the courts seriously treated these provisions as sources
of substantial legislative power. In recent times, the Court has appeared more
and more willing to find congressional legislative power in these "Civil War
Amendments." Katzenbach v. Morgan,9 decided in 1966, was thought by
many to give Congress new, even broader powers in this regard. In fact, it
was the language in Morgan which lead Congress to believe that the voting
age could be lowered to eighteen in all elections by simple legislation. 10 As
has already been seen, the Court in Oregon v. Mitchell found that Congress
lacked the power to change the minimum voting age in state and local
elections.'" The following discussion will attempt to assess the impact of
this decision upon the controversial and widely discussed doctrines an-
nounced by the Court in Morgan. It is therefore necessary to examine the
Morgan decision in some detail.
II. KATENBACH V. MORGAN
The statute under examination in Katzenbach v. Morgan was a por-
tion of the Voting Rights Act of 196512 aimed primarily at certain New
York statutes. The Act provides "that no person who has successfully corn-
7. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun.
8. Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall.
9. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
10. Engdahl, Constitutionality of the Voting Age Statute, 39 GEo. WASH. L.
Rzv. 1, 2-4 (1970). See .statute quoted note 40 infra.
11. This was arguably the first time since the commerce clause cases of
the 1930's that the Court had found Congress lacking in power to legislate.
It should be noted that there has been a line of recent cases dealing with the
constitutionality of legislation establishing court-martial jurisdiction in which it
is unclear whether the controlling decisional basis is a lack of congressional power
or the application of a specific constitutional limitation. See O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U.S. 258 (1969); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281(1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 861 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel.
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 854 U.S. 1 (1957); United States
ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (e) (Supp. II, 1967).
1971)
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss4/5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
pleted the six primary grades in [an accredited Puerto Rican school] in
which the language of instruction was other than English shall be denied
the right to vote in any election because of his inability to read or write
English."' 8 A seven-man majority' 4 held that this statute was "a proper
exercise of the powers granted to Congress by [section five] of the Four-
teenth Amendment"' 5 and, therefore, overrode the New York statute. The
Court's reasoning was not altogether dear. Most writers identity two an-
alytically distinct rationales, and it is difficult to determine whether the
opinion stands on one or the other or both of these.' 6 However, it is very
important that these rationales be carefully identified and distinguished.
A. The First Morgan Rationale
Under the first Morgan rationale the Court viewed the legislation as
essentially remedial in nature. The statute in question was viewed by the
Court "as a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community residing
in New York non-discriminatory treatment by government-both in the
imposition of voting qualifications and the provision or administration of
governmental services."' 7 Discriminatory treatment by governmental agen-
cies has always been judically construed to be prohibited by the equal
protection clause. Therefore, Congress was said to have the power to remedy
this discriminatory situation by legislation. By using this rationale the
Court could neatly uphold the legislation without being forced to recon-
sider prior cases which held that literacy tests, in and of themselves, do
not violate fourteenth amendment protections.- s In fact, in Cardona v.
Power,'9 a companion case to Morgan, the same New York literacy statute
was challenged directly on the grounds that it violated the equal protec-
tion clause. Only two Justices were willing to so find.
To restate the first Morgan rationale: Congress may legislate to bar
state activity A, if the Court finds that barring activity A is an appropriate
means to stop or prevent activity B (activity B having been judicially con-
strued to be a violation of the equal protection clause). This is true not-
withstanding the fact that the Court might not be willing to hold that
activity A, in and of itself, violates equal protection.
What standard does the Court use to determine if a particular con-
gressional act is an appropriate means for reaching activity prohibited by
the equal protection clause? The standard seems highly permissive. Pro-
fessor Cox points out that [c]ondusory but qualifying phrases like 'rea-
13. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 643 (1966).
14. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, Clark, White, and Fortas.
15. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 (1966).
16. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. R:EV. 79, 96-101; Burt,
Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. Rav. 81, 101-118;
Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HtMv.
L. REv. 91, 103-08 (1966); Engdahl, supra note 10, at 8-15; Comment, Power to
Abolish the States, 55 CAL. L. Rlv. 293, 308-09 (1967).
17. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966).
18. Lassiter v. Northampton Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); Guinn v.
United States, 288 U.S. 347 (1915).
19. 384 U.S. 672 (1966).
[Val. 36
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sonable relation' and 'rational' are notably absent from the opinion."2 0
In Morganr the Court stated quite simply:
It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of [the] fac-
tors [to be weighed in determining if this is a proper means for
insuring fourteenth amendment protections.] It is enough that we
be able to perceive a basis upon which Congress might resolve the
conflict as it did.1
Even this language is misleading. It purports to refer and defer to a deter-
mination of fact and a balancing of conflicting interests by Congress, result-
ing in a finding that the provisions of this statute would reach some specified
invidious discrimination. In fact, it is highly conjectural that Congress
ever made such a finding.22 Rather it seems to be "read-in" by the Court.
While the propriety of such a permissive test has been questioned,2 3 the
approach is not unique. The same approach, perhaps with a few more
qualifying words, has been applied to support congressional legislation
under sections two of the thirteenth 24 and fifteenth 25 amendments. Also, a
strong parallel is apparent in the operation of the commerce dause in
conjunction with the necessary and proper clause to reach local activity
which in some manner influences interstate commerce.26
B. The Second Morgan Rationale
It would appear that the first-Morgan rationale is sufficient to answer
any challenge of Congress' power to legislatively abolish New York's English
literacy requirement. The Morgan Court, however, appeared to announce
a second, seemingly alternative rationale, when it stated:
[W]e perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate ajudgment that the application of New York's English literacy re-
quirement to deny the right to vote to a person with a sixth grade
education in Puerto Rican schools . . . constituted an invidious
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.2=
In short, the Court appeared to say that to deny the vote to New York's
non-English speaking Puerto Rican community is itself a violation of the
equal protection clause. Being so characterized, there is no question that
it was a proper subject for attack by congressional legislation. 28
However, the crucial question is: Who determined that this particular
activity was in violation of the fourteenth amendment? The opinion is not
20. Cox, supra note 16, at 104.
21. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966).
22. Id. at 669 (dissent of Harlan, J.).
23. See Bickel, supra note 16, at 98-100. "[S]uppose Congress decided that
aliens or eighteen-year-olds ... are being discriminated against in New York." Id.
at 100. But see Burt, supra note 16, at 102; Cox, supra note 16, at 104-05; Engdahl,
supra note 10, at 12 n.58.
24. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 592 U.S. 409 (1968).
25. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
26. Cox, supra note 16, at 102; Engdahl, supra note 10, at 10.
27. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966).
28. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
1971]
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altogether clear, but the majority language strongly suggests that Congress
initially made this determination. 29 Furthermore, the opinion suggests
that the Court is bound to accept this determination as long as it can per-
ceive a basis upon which such a determination could be made. As Profes-
sor Burt has put it:
The central premise... is that Congress had authority to define
the substance of equal protection and that the courts will defer to a
congressional judgment even if it is not persuaded that, acting inde-
pendently, the court should have come to the same result.
3 0
As is no doubt apparent, when taken at face value the second Morgan
rationale is almost revolutionary. Not surprisingly, it has been subject to
much questioning and criticism.31 It is said that this logic undercuts the
principle, first announced in Marbury v. Madison,3 2 of judicial supremacy
in the interpretation of the Constitution.3 3 It has even been suggested that,
taken to its logical extreme, this rationale would permit Congress to "inter-
pret with finality (so long as it has "some basis") the meaning of every con-
stitutional power conferred upon itself or any branch of the federal gov-
ernment" 34 It should immediately be noted, however, that as broad as
the congressional power to legislate under the fourteenth amendment seemed
to be after Morgan, it was not without limits. Both rationales required that
the Court be able to "perceive a basis" for the congressional action. This,
however, is not much of a standard, and it is difficult to see what it might
preclude. Another limitation of a more substantial nature is set out in foot-
note 10 of Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion. The footnote answers a charge
29. It should be remembered that in a companion case to Morgan, Cardona
v. Power,' 384 U.S. 672 (1966), the Court specifically declined to make such a
finding.
30. Burt, supra note 16, at 83.
31. See Bickel, supra note 16, at 97-98; Engdahl, supra note 10, at 15-25.
32. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
33. The Morgan Court gave several reasons for abdicating to Congress the
power to determine the scope of the fourteenth amendment:
(1) Historically the draftors of the amendment intended to augment the
power of Congress. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966). See Bren-
nan, Landmarks of Legal Liberty, in Tim FOURTEENmTH AIMvNDZ.=r 1 (B. Schwartz
ed. 1970). However, this argument has been criticized. See Bickel, supra note 16, at
97; Burt, supra note 16, at 84-100; Engdahl, supra note 10, at 15-25.
(2) The Court is willing to defer to Congress' judgment since Congress has
a greater ability to resolve the essentially factual issue of whether a specific ac-
tivity is injurious to fourteenth amendment rights. Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra
at 652. See Cox, supra note 16, at 107. This rationale has also been criticized. See
Burt, supra note 16, at 105-10.
(3) Professor Burt suggests a third rationale is implicit in the decision. He
argues that:
Congress can make distinctions among classes that the Court itself would
be hard put to explain on principled grounds both because Congress is
more sensitively tuned to the competing social interests that demand
accommodation and because the institutional legitimacy of a legislative act
depends not so much on the rational persuasiveness of its decisions
as on the simple fact that a majority of "responsible" elected officials
were willing to vote for the proposition. Burt, supra note 16, at 113-14.
34. Engdahl, supra note 10, at 21.
[Vol. 36
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by the dissent that the majority holding would allow Congress to enact
"statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions
of this Court:"8 5
We emphasize that Congress' power under [section five] is limited
to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment;
[section five] grants... no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute
these guarantees as judicially construed.3 6
Yet even with these limitations,3 7 and with the added qualification that in
the above exposition of the case overanalysis may have led to overstatement,
the Morgan opinion must be read as a recognition of an extremely broad
congressional power to legislate under the fourteenth amendment.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE EIGHTEEN YEAR OLD VOTE
CASE ON THE MORGAN RATIONALE
A. Placing the Eighteen Year Old Vote in Perspective
At this point the reader may well be wondering: (1) Is there really
a significant logical difference between the first and second Morgan
rationale, and, (2) if so, does this distinction have any practical im-
portance?
Congress' attempt to lower the minimum voting age to eighteen pro-
vides an excellent vehicle to demonstrate the logical difference between the
first and second Morgan rationale. First, it seems fairly safe to assume the
courts would be disinclined to find that denying citizens between eighteen
and twenty-one the right to vote in and of itself constitutes a violation of the
fourteenth amendment. Therefore, the question becomes whether either
one of the Morgan rationales will provide a basis for legislative power.
It is difficult to imagine that there is any activity that violates the equal
protection rights of the class of citizens between eighteen and twenty-one-
at least any activity which would be remedied by giving these citizens the
right to vote.38 Hence, the first Morgan rationale is probably inapplicable.
The second Morgan rationale may well apply, however, as long as Congress
is willing to make a fact finding that denying the right to vote to citizens
35. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 284 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (dissent of Harlan, J.).
36. Id. at 651 n.10. See also Brennan, supra note 33, at 3. Professor Engdahl
argues that the "footnote 10 limitation" indicates that the Court really never
understood its own rationale. Engdahl, supra note 10, at 22. Professor Burt notes
that this limitation undercuts the reasoning he perceives for the decision. See
note 33 supra, 3; Burt, supra note 16, at 119-22.
37. Professor Burt identifies a third limitation. He argues that in the area
of "fundamental rights-which are not as such constitutional rights"--the Court
reserves the right to overturn legislation -which it considers a "restriction of exist-
ing rights" as opposed to "reform" measures. Burt, supra note 16, at 116-18. He
concludes that:
[T]he Morgan opinion appears a tour de force. To regulate activities the
Court wishes to reach .... but cannot itself justify regulating, the Court
has enlisted congressional assistance. But the Court will set the basic
terms. Congress can only fill in the blanks. Id. at 118.
38. Professor Engdahl has argued, however, that such legislation is sus-
tainable under the first Morgan rationale. Engdahl, supra note 10, at 25-41.
1971]
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between eighteen and twenty-one constitutes a violation of their right to
equal protection of the law.
As a matter of fact those sections of the Voting Rights Act Amendment,
of 1970 which attempted to lower the voting age to eighteen in all elections
demonstrated a conscious, calculated attempt to invoke congressional power
under the second Morgan rationale.39 The Act made a specific finding that
denial of the vote to citizens between eighteen and twenty-one years of age
was a violation of due process and equal protection provided by the four-
teenth amendment.40 This attempt to legislate under the fourteenth amend-
ment failed. Five members of the Court found that, in this area, the four-
teenth amendment was no source of congressional power.41 One of the five,
Justice Black, found congressional power to set the voting age for federaL
elections elsewhere in the constitution,42 but no other member of the Court
agreed. With Justice Black acting as the "swing man," the Court announced
the unusual ruling that the statute was valid for federal elections but ultra
vires for state elections.
B. The Second Morgan Rationale Revisited
Clearly then, Congress' attempt to use the second Morgan rationale
to establish its power to set a minimum voting age failed, having been re-
jected by a majority of the Court. What is the status of the second Morgan
rationale today? To declare it overruled would be premature; however, it
is clear there has been a decided shift in the weight of opinion on the Court
as to congressional power to legislate under the fourteenth amendment.
Three of the seven Justices who signed the Morgan majority had retired
39. See Engdahl, supra note 10, at 1-4 (for a history of the Act).
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973bb (Supp. 1971) provides (in part):(a) The Congress finds and declares that the imposition and applica-
tion of the requirement that a citizen be twenty-one years of age as a
precondition to voting in- any primary or in any election-(1) denies and abridges the inherent constitutional rights of
citizens eighteen years of age but not yet twenty-one years of
age to vote-a particularly unfair treatment of such citizens in
view of the national defense responsibilities imposed on such
citizens;(2) has the effect of denying to [these] citizens . . . the due
process and equal protection of the laws that are guaranteed
to them under the fourteenth amendment... ; and(3) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling
State interest.
(b) In order to secure the constitutional rights set forth in subsection(a) .... the Congress declares that it is necessary to prohibit the denial
of the right to vote to citizens of the United States eighteen years of age
or over.
41. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black, Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun.
42. The power found by Justice Black was in U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, which
reads:
The Time, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature there-
of; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regula-
tions....
Apparently Justice Black's reading of this section is rather unorthodox. See Ore-
gon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 119-24 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.).
[Vol. 36
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by the time Oregon v. Mitchell was decided.4 3 And another, Justice Black,
apparently no longer subscribed to the Morgan majority's opinion. At any
rate he too has now retired.
As a starting point in analyzing the Court's decision on the eighteen
year old vote issue, it must be remembered that Congress was clearly at-
tempting to invoke the second Morgan rationale. It was thought that after
Morgan, Congress had the power to make an independent determination,
binding on the judiciary, that a certain state activity violated fourteenth
amendment equal protection. In Oregon v. Mitchell, a majority of the
Court was unwilling to abdicate its traditional judicial function of deter-
mining the ambit of equal protection. Unwilling to be bound by the con-
gressional finding, five members of the Court independently examined the
question of whether a state-established minimum voting age is a proper area
for equal protection scrutiny, and decided it was not. An analysis of why
the ambit of the equal protection clause does not extend to this type of
voter qualifications is beyond the scope of this note. The point is that a
majority of the Court, by making the determination that this particular type
of state activity is not a proper subject of equal protection scrutiny, served
notice that they rejected the second Morgan rationale. Even those four
Justices who would have upheld the legislation in its entirety discourse at
length about the ambit of equal protection rights before, presumably, de-
ferring to the congressional determination.
How was a majority of the Court able to avoid the apparent holding in
Morgan? Justice Harlan simply believes Morgan a bad precedent which
should be overruled 4 4 Justice Stewart's opinion states that Morgan never
established such unusual congressional power. He states that, "assuming"
Morgan was "rightly decided," 45 it only says:
[T]hat Congress could conclude that enhancing the political
power of the Puerto Rican community by conferring the right to
vote was an appropriate means of remedying discriminatory treat-
ment in public services; and that Congress could conclude that
the New York statute was tainted by the impermissable purpose of
denying the right to vote to Puerto Ricans, an undoubted invidi-
ous discrimination.... The Court's opinion made dear that Con-
gress could impose on the states a remedy ... which elaborated on
the direct command of the Constitution, and that it could over-
ride state laws on the ground they were in fact used as instruments
of invidious discrimination, even though a court in an individual
lawsuit might not have reached that factual conclusion.4 8
Justice Black characterizes Morgan as a case essentially concerned with con-
gressional remedy of racial discrimination, 47 an area where Congress' "an-
43. Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Clark and Fortas.
44. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 200-09, 217-19 (1970) (opinion of
Harlan, J.).
45. Id. at 293 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
46. Id. at 295-96 (emphasis added).
47. Justice Black applies the same reasoning to explain South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 801 (1966).
1971]
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thority is enhanced." 48 He expresses concern that if Congress is allowed
free reign to legislate under the equal protection clause, the states will cease
to have any independent power at all.49
It is fairly dear that Justices Brennan and Douglas would follow the
second Morgan rationale. But Justice Brennan is careful to point out that
under the eighteen year old vote statute
[wje are not faced with an assertion of congressional power to reg-
ulate any and all aspects of state and federal elections.... [n]or...
the assertion that Congress has plenary power to set minimum ages
for voting throughout the States.50
Justice Brennan also makes clear that he might well find a state statute
setting the voting age at twenty-one an equal protection violation on a
purely judicial challenge.5 1 He and Justice Douglas proclaim the fourteenth
amendment "applies on its face to all assertion of state power, however
made."52 They find the congressional conclusion that the present state
laws serve no substantial state interest as a reasonable finding of fact.
IV. CONCLUSION
Where does the Supreme Court's decision in Oregon v. Mitchell leave
us? First, it must be concluded that the validity of the second Morgan
rationale, which would have permitted Congress to define the ambit of
equal protection, is too uncertain to rely on-at least for the time being.
Four Justices dearly rejected it. Of those four, Justice Harlan has recently
retired. Four fairly dearly accepted it. Justice Black, if not wholly re-
jecting it, severely limited its effectiveness.5 3 Since Justices Black and Harlan
left the bench it is impossible to predict what the future vitality of the
second Morgan rationale will be. At the present we know with some cer-
tainty that four Justices are favorably disposed towards the second Morgan
rationale and three do not accept it. The ultimate fate of the second Morgan
rationale will probably be very uncertain for some time. On the other hand,
48. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 126-29 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.).
49. Id. at 126-31. Justice Black sets out three limitations on Congress' power
to legislate under the Civil War amendments:
First, Congress may not by legislation repeal other provisions of the Con-
stitution. Second, the power granted to Congress was not intended to
strip the States of their power to govern themselves or to convert our
national government of enumerated powers into a central government of
unrestrained authority over every inch of the whole Nation. Third,
Congress may only "enforce" the provisions of the amendments and may
do so only by "appropriate legislation." Congress has no power under
the enforcement sections to undercut the Amendments' guarantees of
personal equality and freedom from discrimination, see Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966), or to undermine those protections
of the Bill of Rights which we have held the Fourteenth Amendment made
applicable to the States. Id. at 128-29 (footnote omitted).
50. Id. at 240 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
51. Id. at 241-46.
52. Id. at 251 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Id. at 141 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
53. See note 49 and text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
[Vol. 36
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the first Morgan rationale is dearly acceptable to a majority of the Court.
(Both Justices Black and Stewart distinguished Morgan from the instant
case on grounds that Morgan only stood for the first rationale.5 4) Congress
will continue to have the power to legislate to remedy situations which
violate the fourteenth amendment as judicially construed. As has been seen,
this first Morgan rationale was conceptually the sturdier of the two and
was supported by substantial precedent. In the future, when Congress at-tempts to legislate under the fourteenth amendment and the other Civil
War amendments, it would be prudent to attempt to remain within the
ambit of the first Morgan rationale.
PETER C. BAGGERMAN
PRETRIAL CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN WITNESS
AND ACCUSED
State v. Walters'
In 1967 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Wade2 and Gilbert v.
California, held that an individual is constitutionally entitled to be repre-
sented by counsel 4 at all "critical stages" of a criminal proceeding against
him. A post-indictment lineup was held to be such a "critical stage."5 In
establishing this new right-to-counsel ruling, however, the court left several
questions unanswered. For example, it is not clear whether the ruling was
limited only to lineups occurring after indictment, or applied to any lineup
whether before or after indictment. Similarly, it is not clear whether it
covered all pretrial confrontations between the witness and the accused or
was limited only to confrontations occurring after indictment.
In State v. Walters6 the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted Wade and
Gilbert as applying only to post-indictment lineup situations.7 Defendant
Walters had been convicted of assault with intent to rape. Walters asserted
on appeal that a lineup which was conducted 20 days after the crime, but
before information or indictment, at which the victim identified him as her
54. See text accompanying notes 45 and 46 supra.
1. 457 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1970).
2. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
3. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
4. As used in this note, right to counsel includes providing a criminal sus-pect with the opportunity to have counsel of his choice present or, if the suspect
is unable to afford counsel, having counsel appointed to represent him. But see
State v. Lacoste, 256 La. 697, 237 So. 2d 871 (1970), which held that the presence
of an assistant district attorney for the purpose of advising persons in a lineup
of their rights served as substitute counsel and prevented the defendant from being
deprived of his constitutional rights.
5. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-7 (1967); Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
6. 457 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1970).
7. Id. at 819.
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assailant, violated *his constitutional right to have counsel present at a
pretrial lineup. The court held that Wade and Gilbert apply only to post-
indictment lineups and that Walter's right to counsel was not violated
because the allegedly illegal *lineup occurred before information or indict-
ment.8 The court also held that the lineup was not conducted in a manner
that was likely to result in a mistaken identification and that Walters,
therefore, had not been denied due process of law.9
One of the questions left unanswered in Wade and Gilbert was the
extent to which the holdings in those cases, both of which involved post-
indictment lineups, apply to other pretrial confrontations between witness
and accused. 10 For example, one type of case in which Wade and Gilbert
are frequently discussed involves confrontations between witness and
accused which take place before indictment and within minutes after the
crime." In this factual situation some courts have found these confron-
tations to be a critical stage of the prosecution and have held that the
suspects were entitled to representation by counsel.' 2 Other cases have
found that the need for immediate identification is necessary for effective
law enforcement and have held that Wade and Gilbert do not apply to the
factual situation involved.' 3 A second type of case in which Wade and
Gilbert are frequently discussed involves factual situations similar to
Walters where the confrontation takes place before indictment but not until
a period of hours or days has lapsed since the crime was committed.' 4 Most
8. Id.
9. Id. Defendant Walters assigned two points as error. The first was that he
was denied due process of law because the lineup had been conducted in a manner
that was likely to result in mistaken identification. Here, the court held that the
police had not been unduly suggestive and that the witness had sufficient inde-
pendent basis for her identification of defendant Walters. The second point was
that he was denied the right to counsel at a pretrail lineup in violation of the
sixth amendment. This note is concerned only with this alleged violation of the
sixth amendment.
10. See generally Quinn, In the Wake of Wade: The Dimensions of the Eye-
witness Identification Cases, 42 U. CoLo. L. R.v. 135 (1970); Note, Constitutional
Law-Right to Counsel-Extension of the Critical Stage to Pre-indictment Identifi-
cations, 19 DEPAur L. Rav. 789 (1970).
11. See Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Rivers v.
United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Kinnard, 294 F. Supp.
286 (D.D.C. 1968); State v. Singleton, 253 La. 18, 215 So. 2d 838 (1968); Com-
monwealth v. Bumpus, 354 Mass. 494, 238 N.E.2d 343 (1968); State v. Hamblin,
448 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. 1970); State v. Thomas, 107 N.J. Super. 128, 257 A.2d 377
(1969); People v. Franklyn 59 Misc. 2d 431, 299 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Dist. Ct. 1969);
State v. Madden, 461 P.2d 834 (Ore. App. 1969); Johnson v. State, 47 Wis. 2d
13, 176 N.W.2d 332 (1970).
12. Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Kinnard, 294 F. Supp. 286 (D.D.C. 1968); State v. Singleton, 253 La. 18, 215
So. 2d 838 (1968).
13. Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969); McPhearson v.
State, 253 N.E.2d 226 (Ind. 1969); Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 354 Mass. 494,
238 N.E.2d 343 (1968); State v. Hamblin, 448 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. 1970); State v.
Thomas, 107 N.J. Super. 128, 257 A.2d 377 (1969); People v. Franklyn, 59 Misc.
2d 431, 299 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Dist. Ct. 1969); State v. Madden, 461 P.2d 834 (Ore.
App. 1969); Johnson v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 13, 176 N.W.2d 332 (1970).
14. See Long v. United States, 424 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States
v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969); Ellington v. Cox, 310 F. Supp. 129
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courts, in this factual situation, have found these confrontations to be a
critical stage of the prosecution and have held that the suspects were en-
titled to representation by counsel;1 5 however, a few courts, as the court
did in Walters, have held that Wade and Gilbert apply only to post-indict-
ment situations and that there is no right to counsel at any pre-indictment
confrontation between witness and accused.' 6
Courts which have applied Wade and Gilbert to pre-indictment con-
frontations have followed a number of distinct paths of reasoning. First,
the language of Wade and Gilbert has been said to imply an intention to
require counsel at other than post-indictment confrontations.' 7 Second,
there is nothing in the language of Wade or Gilbert which requires limiting
the right to counsel to post-indictment lineups, and pre-indictment lineups
are as fraught with danger of misidentification as post-indictment lineups.18
Third, the Supreme Court has attached the right to counsel to other pre-
indictment situations,19 thereby indicating an intent to apply the rule to
any pretrial confrontations between witness and accused.20 Fourth, in his
dissent in Wade, Justice White, with Justices Harlan and Stewart concur-
ring, stated that the Wade rule should apply to any lineup regardless of
whether it occurs before or after indictment or information.2 1 Fifth, Justice
Douglas, dissenting in Biggers v. Tennessee,2 2 stated that Wade and Gilbert
would dearly apply to that pre-indictment confrontation were it not for
the prospective ruling of those cases. 28 Sixth, Stovall v. Denno,24 a case
(W.D. Va. 1970); People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363(1969); People v. Palmer, 41 Ill. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969); Commonwealth
v. Guillory, 254 N.E.2d 427 (Mass. 1970); In re Holley, 268 A.2d 723 (R.I. 1970).
15. Long v. United States, 424 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v.
Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969); Ellington v. Cox, 310 F. Supp. 129(W.D. Va. 1970); People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363(1969); Commonwealth v. Guillory, 254 N.E.2d 427 (Mass. 1970); In re Holley,
268 A.2d 723 (R.I. 1970).
16. State v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964 (1969); Perkins v. State, 228
So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1969); People v. Palmer, 41 Ill. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969).
17. United States v. Wilson, 283 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D.D.C. 1968).
18. People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 342, 461 P.2d 643, 648, 82 Cal. Rptr.
363, 368 (1969).
19. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), holding that a suspect is
entitled to presence of counsel at a police interrogation once police investigation
has begun to focus on a particular suspect; and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436(1966), involving the right to counsel at a custodial police interrogation.
20. United States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610, 649 (E.D. Pa. 1968); People v.
Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 342-43, 461 P.2d 643, 649, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 369 (1969).
21. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 250 (1967) (dissenting opinion). The
following courts have used as a reason for adopting a post-indictment rule, the
fact that Justices White, Harlan and Stewart stated that the Wade rule should
apply to any lineup regardless of whether it occurs before or after indictment or
information: Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935, 939 (5th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Wilson, 283 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D.D.C. 1968); People v. Fowler, 1 Cal.
3d 335, 343, 461 P.2d 643, 649, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 369 (1969).
22. 390 U.S. 404 (1968).
23. Id. at 406 (dissenting opinion). Justice Douglas's views in Biggers were
given as one reason for adopting a post-indictment rule in Rivers v. United States,
400 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1968).
24. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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decided the same day as Wade and Gilbert which limited those cases to
prospective application, implies that Wade and Gilbert would apply to the
facts in Stovall (pre-indictment confrontation), were it not for the fact that
the confrontation occurred before the effective date of Wade and Gilbert.2 5
Seventh, the police can easily circumvent a post-indictment rule by con-
ducting all lineups before indictment.26 Finally, a suspect is less likely to be
alert to the need for safeguards when he has not been formally charged.2 7
The courts which haye chosen to limit Wade and Gilbert to post-
indictment lineups have not been able to formulate as many reasons for
their rulings as have the courts which have chosen to apply Wade and Gil-
bert to pre-indictment confrontations. The Walters court relied in part on
the fact that a number of other states have expressly limited Wade and
Gilbert to post-indictment lineup situations,28 and in part on the concurring
opinion in Hays v. State,29 a Wisconsin case, which stated that the require-
ment of counsel at early stages in the prosecution would create formidable
problems of appointing and arranging for the presence of that counsel.30
Other courts have chosen to limit Wade and Gilbert to their facts by adopt-
ing a narrow interpretation of the Court's language.8 ' As stated earlier,
many of the cases where courts have chosen not to apply Wade and Gilbert
involve confrontations within minutes after the crime; in those cases the
courts, instead of adopting a post-indictment ruling, have merely held
Wade and Gilbert do not apply to the factual situations involved. 2
One point of controversy among the courts limiting Wade and Gilbert
to post-indictment confrontations and the courts which have chosen not to
limit Wade and Gilbert to post-indictment confrontations centers on the in-
terpretation of the language in the majority opinion in Wade. One passage
of the Wade opinion reads as follows:
25. Id. at 298-99. The following cases have used the implication of Stovall
as a reason for adopting a post-indictment rule: Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d
935, 940 (5th Cir. 1968); People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. d 335, 343-44, 461 P.2d 643,
650, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 370 (1969); In re Holley, 268 A.2d 723, 726 (R.I. 1970).
26. People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 344, 461 P.2d 643, 650, 82 Cal. Rptr.
363, 370 (1969); In re Holley, 268 A.2d 723, 726-27 (R.I. 1970).
27. Long v. United States, 424 F.2d 799, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
28. 457 S.W.2d at 819.
29. 46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970).
30. Id. at 109, 175 N.W.2d at 633 (concurring opinion).
31. People v. Palmer, 41 Ill. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969). Apparently the
courts which have chosen to limit Wade and Gilbert to post-indictment lineups
are not alone in their belief that those cases should be so limited. See S. REP. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1968), where the Committee on the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 stated:
The use of eyewitness testimony in the trial of criminal cases is an es-
sential prosecutorial tool. The recent case of United States v. Wade...
struck a harmful blow at the nationwide effort to control crime.... To
counter this harmful effect, the committee adopted that portion of title II
providing that eyewitness testimony is admissible in criminal prosecutions
brought in the Federal courts and that portion of title II that denies the
Federal courts the power to review the final State court and Federal trial
court decisions declaring eyewitness testimony to be admissible.
32. See cases cited note 13 supra.
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[T]here can be little doubt that for Wade the post-indictment
lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution at which he was "as
much entitled to such aid [of counsel] ... as at the trial itself."33
This passage has been interpreted to imply an intention by the Supreme
Court to limit Wade to post-indictment lineups. However, this intention is
not as clear when the Wade opinion is taken as a whole, and jurisdictions
adopting a pre-indictment rule have found an implication in Wade and
Gilbert indicating that the right to counsel exists at pre-indictment con-
frontations. 34 Justice Brennan, in the majority opinion in Wade, stated:
When the Bill of Rights was adopted, there were no organized
police forces as we know them today. The accused confronted the
prosecutor and the witnesses against him, and the evidence was
marshalled, largely at the trial itself. In contrast, today's law en-
forcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused
by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might
well determine the accused's fate and reduce the trial to a mere
formality. In recognition of these realities of modern criminal
prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guar-
antee to apply to "critical" stages of the proceedings.35
The opinion then provided a brief summary of how the right to counsel
has been expanded to various stages of the proceedings and then concluded:
In sum, the principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases
requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the ac-
cused to determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary
to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by
his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him
and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself. It calls
upon us to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to de-
fendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the
ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.3 6
At least four Justices on the Court felt that the language of the majority
opinion was intended to apply to pre-indictment confrontations.3 7 A reason-
able interpretation of the above quoted passages would support the con-
33. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967).
34. See United States v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351, 1354 (7th Cir. 1969);
Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 1968); Ellington v. Cox, 310
F. Supp. 129, 132 (W.D. Va. 1970); United States v. Kinnard, 294 F. Supp. 286,
289 (D.D.C. 1968); United States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610, 630 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 342, 461 P.2d 643, 648, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 368(1969); Palmer v. State, 5 Md. App. 691, 696, 249 A.2d 482, 486 (1969); Common-
wealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 208, 266 A.2d 738, 740 (1970); In re Holley, 268
A.2d 723, 725 (RI. 1970); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 97, 175 N.W.2d 625, 627
(1970).
35. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
36. Id. at 227.
37. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
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clusion that the Court intended to apply the "critical stage" test to all
pretrial confrontations. Many courts have adopted this interpretation. 3
Although it is possible to draw an inference from Wade and Gilbert
indicating that the holdings in those cases should be limited to post-indict-
ment lineups, it is also possible to draw a much stronger inference that the
Court intended its right to counsel ruling to apply to all pretrial confronta-
tions that meet the "critical stage" test. Notwithstanding the sound reasons
for not applying Wade and Gilbert to on-the-scene identifications, the rea-
sons favoring adoption of a post-indictment rule in all situations appear out-
weighed by the arguments in favor of adopting a pre-indictment rule. Put
another way, perhaps Wade and Gilbert should not be applied to all pre-
trial confrontations; however, they should not be arbitrarily limited to post-
indictment confrontations. Furthermore, most of the cases which do not
apply Wade and Gilbert to confrontations between witness and accused
involve on-the-scene identifications within a relatively short time after the
crime. Walters, with its time lapse of 20 days, is the exception rather than
the rule, and the case loses the benefit of the argument made in the on-the-
scene identification cases that effective police work requires immediate
action. Finally, the post-indictment rule of Walters is a poor result in that
(1) it places administrative problems over the need to provide a criminal
suspect with the formal safeguard of representation by counsel at a pre-
indictment confrontation, and (2) a post-indictment ruling is contrary to
the better interpretation of Wade and Gilbert and contrary to the view
taken by the only four Supreme Court Justices who have spoken on the
subject. Since there is a split of authority both in state and federal courts
as to the scope and application of Wade and Gilbert, Missouri law enforce-
ment officials should be warned that Walters may not be the final word
on the constitutional right to be represented by counsel at pre-indictment
confrontations in Missouri.
DONALD G. CHEvER
38. See United States v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351, 1353 (7th Cir. 1969);
Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935, 939 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Clark,
289 F. Supp. 610, 626 (E.D. Pa. 1968); United States v. Wilson, 283 F. Supp. 914,
915 (D.D.C. 1968); People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 385, 847, 461 P.2d 643, 652, 82
Cal. Rptr. 863, 372 (1969); State v. Singleton, 253 La. 18, 29, 215 So. 2d 838, 841
(1968); Commonwealth v. Guillory, 254 N.E.2d 427, 429 (Mass. 1970); Hayes v.
State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 97, 175 N.W.2d 625, 627 (1970).
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STUDENTS' RIGHT TO CHOICE OF PERSONAL
APPEARANCE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Bishop v. Colawl
This case, like many in recent years, involved the suspension of a
student from a public high school because of the length of his hair. The
student and his parents sought an injunction against application of the
high school dress code and damages for his suspension. The dress code
involved was revised as of December 23, 1969, upon recommendation of the
student council; it had been approved by a parents' committee and faculty
supervisory committee, and adopted by a majority vote of the faculty.2 On
February 27, 1970, the Principal informed the 15 year-old plaintiff, Stephen
Bishop, that he would be suspended if he failed to comply with the code.
When he did not comply, he was suspended and his parents were notified
of the necessity for compliance. On March 12th the Superintendent of
Schools extended the suspension to the end of the semester.
On March 10, 1970, suit was filed in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri against the Superintendent, the Prin-
cipal, the Board of Education, and the School District of St. Charles,
Missouri, seeking injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. section
1983.3 Jurisdiction was claimed under 28 U.S.C. section 1343 (3).4 The
petition alleged that the suspension had violated the rights of the plain-
tiff under the first, fourth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution. Relief was denied on a finding that the
regulation was reasonable and not "such an invasion of privacy that re-
quires protection by the United States courts."5
There was no claim that the regulation or suspension was unau-
thorized by state law.6 The court found no evidence to support a claim
1. 816 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
2. The applicable provision in the dress code reads as follows:
All hair is to be worn dean, neatly trimmed around the ears and back
of the neck, and no longer than the top of the collar on a regular dress
or sport shirt when standing erect. The eyebrows must be visible, and no
part of the ear can be covered. The hair can be in a block cut. Id. at 447.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964) (in part):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action...
(8) to redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or im-
munity secured by the Constitution of the United States_...
5. 816 F. Supp. at 449.
6. Section 171.011, RSMo 1969, authorizes school boards to "make all needful
rules and regulations for the organization, grading and government in the school
1971]
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that this case fell within the first amendment symbolic-speech doctrine
enunciated in Tinker v. Des Moines School District.7 Likewise, no re-
ligious belief was involved. Since no violation of procedural due process
nor any evidence of unfair enforcement of the regulations was found,
the court considered the two basic issues: (1) whether or not an individual
has a right to wear his hair in the manner he prefers (apart from any right
arising out of the first amendment); and (2) if such a right exists, what
sort of justification is required before a limitation of that right is proper.
The court found that a constitutional right to privacy was involved
but that it was permissible for school officials to adopt reasonable regula-
tions in this area with which, in the absence of a compelling reason, a
court will not interfere.8 From the testimony the court found problems
of discipline (long-haired students tended to congregate and stay to
themselves, were rowdy and belligerent, failed to observe lunchroom rules,
were inattentive in class, and made poorer grades), safety (in shop and
wrestling classes), and cleanliness (in the swimming pool and with driver's
training helmets) which provided a reasonable basis for the regulations to
which plaintiff objected. 9
In cases brought under section 1983, plaintiffs must show they have
been subjected to "the deprivation of... rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution ... ."10 Where the issue is violation of pro-
cedural due process, discriminatory application of the law, or deprivation
of the right to free speech the case will proceed in accordance with estab-
lished precedents for those respective areas of law. However, the issue
is much more difficult to resolve when the long-haired plaintiff's claim
relies solely on the theory that a student has a constitutionally protected
right of personal appearance with which a school may not interfere.
No one would question that the adoption of regulations by a school
board or a principal constitutes "state action" for section 1983 purposes."
A school system, however, functions in loco parentis in regulating its stu-
dents,' 2 and courts are reluctant to interfere with the relationship between
students and school administrators unless conflicts arise which "directly
and sharply implicate basic constitutional values."'s Courts will not review
the wisdom of a regulation,' 4 and school officials are given wide discretion
district," and § 167.161, .171, RSMo 1969, allows suspension of pupils "for conduct
which is prejudicial to good order and discipline ... or which tends to impair
the morale or good conduct of the pupils."
7. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
8. 316 F. Supp. at 448-49.
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), quoted note 3 supra.
11. Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706, 709 (D. Minn. 1969).
12. Id. at 710.
13. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). Accord, Jackson v. Dorrier,
424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419
F.2d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); Farrell v.
Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732, 737 (D. Me. 1970); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp.
248, 251 (D. Neb. 1970).
14. Brownlee v. Board of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
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in drawing' them, bound only by the requirement that the regulation be
reasonable.15
On the other hand, students do not leave fundamental rights at the
schoolhouse gate,16 and a state does not have the right to refuse educa
tional opportunities on an arbitrary basis or by the imposition of unreason-
able conditions."- The power of the school and the right of the student
represent two basic interests that come into conflict when the parents dis-
agree with the school officials as to what is best for the child. In such situa-
tions the school must, according to the seventh circuit case of Breen v.
Kahl,1s share its power in loco parentis with the actual parents, "especially
over intimately personal matters such as dress and grooming."1 9
The question thus becomes: How is the conflict between the two
interests, the power of the schools and the rights of students, to be weighed
-and hopefully resolved? The courts have tended to use one of three
basic approaches: (1) the traditional or economic equal protection analysis,
(2) a "fundamental right or interest" equal protection analysis, or (3) a
substantive due process analysis. (These approaches frequently involve
in addition a determination of the source and nature of the student's right.)
Those courts which have applied the traditional equal protection
analysis uphold the regulation unless the opponent of the regulation can
carry the burden of showing that it is purely arbitrary, .e., without any
reasonable basis. Any set of facts, reasonably conceivable, that will sustain
the rule will be assumed; the lack of mathematical precision in its effect
will not defeat the regulation.20 The court in Bishop was apparently adopt-
ing this approach when it said the school has a right to "adopt reasonable
regulations [without court] interference in the absence of a compelling
reason .... ,"21 When a court uses the traditional equal protection approach
the cases indicate that the school district will usually prevail;22 in some
cases, however, the courts have found hair regulations to be unreasonable
and arbitrary.28 Other courts have placed the burden of showing a rational
15. Calbillo v. San Jacinto Jr. College, 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex. 1969),
remanded to determine if moot, 434 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1970).
16. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Reichenberg
v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248, 251 (D. Neb. 1970).
17. Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449, 452 (D. Mass. 1969), affd, 424
F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60, 62 (M.D. Ala.),
afrd in part, 425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1969) (reversed to extent decree extended
beyond plaintiff's case).
18. 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
19. Id. at 1037.
20. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1957); Lindsley v. Natural Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
21. 316 F. Supp. at 449.
22. See Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Brownlee
v. Board of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); Schwartz v. Galveston Ind.
School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 306
F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969), affd, 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
957 (1970); Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969); Davis v. Firment,
269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967), afrd, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969).
23. Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 705 (5th Cir. 1968) (dis-
senting opinion); Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Griffin v.
Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969), aff'd in part, 425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
1970); Zachry v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
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basis upon the school before they will sustain regulation of personal ap-
pearance, but these courts have not required a demonstration of a compel-
ling state interest.24
Some courts presented with a case of this type have found or assumed
that a fundamental right is involved, and thus have applied a "fundamen-
tal right or interest" equal protection analysis. These courts require a show-
ing of a "compelling state interest," or at least the meeting of a "substan-
tial burden of justification" by the school authorities before they will
sustain the contested regulation.25
Other courts choose to follow a substantive due process analysis. 28
They approach the issue by inquiring whether there is a constitutional
right of free choice of appearance immune from state governmental in-
fringement under the fourteenth amendment.2 7 Courts which utilize either
the "fundamental right or interest" equal protection analysis or the sub-
stantive due process approach must first decide if there is a constitutionally
protected right of personal appearance. When courts find such a right,
they have not always been clear as to the basis of their finding.
Long-haired plaintiffs have frequently relied upon Justice Douglas'
majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,2 8 and the concurring opinion
in that case by Justice Goldberg.29 Justice Douglas, in examining the ques-
tion of marital privacy, found a zone of privacy created in the penumbra
of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. 30 Justice Goldberg relied
upon the ninth amendment to find that fundamental rights, other than
24. See Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir. 1970), affg, 304
F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969) (finding that the burden had not been met); Neu-
haus v. Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192, 193 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (finding defendants dis-
charged the burden of showing a rational basis); Calbillo v. San Jacinto Jr. College,
305 F. Supp. 857, 859 (S.D. Tex. 1969), remanded to determine if moot, 434 F.2d
609 (5th Cir. 1970).
25. Finding that a compelling state interest had to be shown: Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 892 F.2d 697
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 893 U.S. 856 (1968); Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732
(D. Me. 1970); Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969), -ev'd on other
grounds, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970).
Finding a failure to meet the substantial burden: Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d
1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310
F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970); Sims v. Colfax Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp.
485 (S.D. Iowa 1970).
26. Finding the right involved to be an aspect of personal liberty, but not
unreasonably infringed: Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732 (D. Me. 1970); Brick
v. Board of Educ., 805 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Colo. 1969).
Finding no violation of due process: Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th
Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
Holding long-hair plaintiffs protected by due process clause: Olff v. East Side
Union High School Dist., 805 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Breen v. Kahl, 296
F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis.), afl'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 937 (1970).
27. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 36 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (con-
curring opinion).
28. 881 U.S. 479 (1965).
29. Id. at 486-99.
30. Id. at 484. See also Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 893 U.S. 856 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari).
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those enumerated in the first eight amendments, were protected from in-
fringement.3 ' Some courts have seemed to follow the Griswold approach
in the area of personal appearance, but their language is not too clear. In
Breen v. Kahl, the seventh circuit declined to choose between the Douglas
or Goldberg approaches, but said the right clearly existed and required
a substantial burden of justification.32 A federal district court in Reichen-
berg v. Nelson,33 citing Breen, found the "right to wear one's hair at any
length or in any desired manner [to be] an ingredient of personal freedom
protected by the United States Constitution. . . ." One federal district
court merely cited Griswold,3 4 while another, in Crossen v. Fatsi,36 found
that the right involved was the individual's right of privacy as protected
by the ninth and fourteenth amendments.
On the other hand, some courts have felt no comparison can be made
between the right of marital privacy found in Griswold and the free choice
of appearance asserted by long-haired plaintiffs.3 6 The first circuit preferred
to find the right within the sphere of personal liberty established by the
due process dause,3 7 paralleling the rights of foreign travel,38 interstate
travel,39 teaching a foreign language,40 and educating children in secular
schools.4 ' Similarly, other courts refer only to the general concept of "per-
sonal liberty."42 Still others merely refer to a right of privacy,43 or a free
choice of appearance under the fourteenth amendment.44
Under the "fundamental right or interest" equal protection analysis or
the substantive due process analysis, after determining whether or not a
fundamental right exists, courts will consider the interest of the state. If
no fundamental right is involved, the regulations need merely bear a
rational relationship to the interest of the state. If a fundamental right is
31. 381 U.S. at 491 (concurring opinion).
32. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 937 (1970).
33. 310 F. Supp. 248, 252 (D. Neb. 1970). See also Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d
1259 (7th Cir. 1970), in which the seventh circuit strongly reaffirms Breen.
34. Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 305 F. Supp. 557, 559 (N.D.
Cal. 1969).
35. 309 F. Supp. 114, 118 (D. Conn. 1970).
36. See Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Jackson v. Dor-
rier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Miller v. Gillis,
315 F. Supp. 94, 100 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La.
1967), affd, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969).
37. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284 (1st Cir. 1970).
38. Aptheker v. Rusk, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958).
39. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
40. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
41. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
42. See Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968); Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732 (D. Me. 1970);
Brick v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Colo. 1969).
43. See Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969); Crews v. Cloncs,
303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th
Cir. 1970).
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involved, however, a "compelling interest" must be displayed if the
regulation is to be upheld. Courts disagree whether the standard required
to justify restriction of a student's rights is the same as would be required
for regulation of the rights of adults. 45
What sort of state interest is involved in the regulation of hair length
by a school? School boards have asserted a wide range of justifications.
Most frequently they offer evidence of actual or anticipated disruptions.
Testimony on this question follows two basic patterns: (1) that disruptive
incidents will occur between students with long hair and other students;
and (2) that there is a correlation between long hair and disruptive
behavior.
In Bishop the court, in sustaining the regulation, relied on testimony
of teachers that long-haired boys tended to stay to themselves and were
rowdy and belligerent. There was also evidence of a minor disturbance
involving the plaintiff (a student refused to wear a driver's training helmet
after him) and of several squabbles away from school between students
with long hair and those with short hair.48 In other cases similar evidence
of disruption has been found sufficient to sustain regulation of grooming.47
The dissent in Breen v. Kahl said no proof was necessary for something
so "obvious" as the disruptive influence of long-hair.48 However, some
courts require the school to present evidence of actual disruptions; 49 and
other courts have found that the regulation involved was not reasonably
designed to prevent disruption.50 Still other courts have stated that an
individual can not be denied his constitutional rights because of the dis-
orderly reaction of others.5 1
There was testimony in Bishop and "expert" testimony in Livingston
v. Swanquist5 2 to the effect that there is a direct correlation between good
grooming and good behavior. This was apparently used by the courts to
justify grooming regulation. School officials in Bishop similarly tried to
45. See Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
937 (1970) (allowing different justifications); Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94
(N.D. 111. 1969) (finding students have the same rights); Crossen v. Fatsi, 309
F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970) (cannot compare rights of students with adults in
the area of personal grooming). Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
46. 316 F. Supp. at 448.
47. See Brick v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Colo. 1969); Crews v.
Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 432 F.2d 1259
(7th Cir. 1970).
48. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
937 (1970). Accord, Brownlee v. Board of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Tenn.
1970) (placing the burden on the plaintiff to show not disruptive).
49. See Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Calbillo v. San
Jacinto Jr. College, 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex. 1969), remanded to determine if
moot, 434 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1970); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn.
1969).
50. Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist.. 392 F.2d 697, 705 (5th Cir. 1968) (dis-
senting opinion); Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd,
424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
51. Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114, 118 (D. Conn. 1970); accord, Crews
v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Griffin v. Tatum, 425 F.2d 201 (5th
Cir. 1970).
52. 314 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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show a correlation between long hair and academic performance.53 How-
ever, it does not necessarily follow that long hair causes disruptive behavior
or poor grades. It is difficult to accept the proposition that merely allowing
one's hair to grow will alter ones behavior or academic performance; rather,
it seems more likely that students who have poor attitudes toward school
in general, resulting from independent causes, are also those students most
likely to be umilling to style their hair so as to meet the approval of their
teachers. In short, poor grooming, poor grades and poor behavior may all
be symptoms of the same basic problem, and it is not clear how forcibly
preventing students from wearing long hair can reasonably be expected to
solve this problem.
The other state interests, relied upon in Bishop to justify grooming
regulation, were safety (shop and wrestling classes) and cleanliness (swim-
ming and use of driver's training helmets).54 These interests have been
found by different courts to be sufficient, insufficient, or better met by
alternate means or more narrowly drawn rules.5 5 Other courts have con-
sidered arguments that long hair distracts other students in the classroom,56
interferes with teaching or school efficiency,5 7 adversely affects the economic
welfare of students in job placement,58 or affects the image of the school
and offends a sense of propriety.59 Some courts found sufficient justifica-
tion in the argument that grooming rules are a part of citizenship training
or help to teach self-discipline.60 Even grooming requirements for athletes
53. 316 F. Supp. at 448. See also Brownlee v. Board of Educ., 311 F. Supp.
1360 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
54. 316 F. Supp. at 448.
55. Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969), revd on other
grounds, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970) (sufficient); Sims v. Colfax Community
School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa 1970) (insufficient); Westley v. Rossi,
305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969) (better means). The courts in all these cases
used the "compelling state interest" test.
56. See Brownlee v. Board of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Tenn. 1970);
Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 426 F.2d 1154
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970) (both finding for the school); Crossen
v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970) (finding for the student).
57. See Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 856 (1968); Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969), revd
on other grounds, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970) (both finding for the school);
Sims v. Colfax Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa 1970) (the
school argued it was necessary to see students' eyes to teach typing in a suit by a
female student against a grooming rule; held insufficient justification).
58. See Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732 (D. Me. 1970) (finding for a state
vocational school); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970) (find-
ing insufficient justification).
59. See Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Reichenberg v.
Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970); Zachry v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 1360
.(N.D. Ala. 1967) (all three holding personal dislike or adverse effect to theimage of the school insufficient); Brownlee v. Board of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360
(E.D. Tenn. 1970) (commenting favorably on the use of aesthetic considerations
in holding for the school).
60. See Schwartz v. Galveston Ind. School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex.
1970), and Brick v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Colo. 1969) (in both
cases students had participated in drafting the regulations); Stevenson v. Board of
Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert.
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have been upheld because the court found a rational basis in the purported
adverse effect of long hair on performance in track, swimming, gymnastics,
wrestling, and baseball and on team spirit and morale. 61
As has been demonstrated, courts have treated the question of the
right of a school to regulate personal appearance in such diverse ways and
have reached such different results that the entire area of student-admin-
istration relations in public high schools is extremely confused. 62 Though
many would disparage the importance of the Supreme Court considering
such cases in view of crowded court dockets, 6 3 these cases do not merely
involve the question of whether a few students may wear nonconforming
hair styles. There is a much more basic question here which involves the
very essence of the relationship between school authorities and pupils. It
arises at a time when student awareness of constitutional rights and un-
willingness to submit to improper regulation are at high levels. It is time
for the Supreme Court to provide the proper guidelines to lower courts
so that they may determine the nature of the right of personal appearance
and the quality of state interest required to justify regulation by school
authorities.
With a clear guide from the courts school authorities hopefully would
frame rules to meet the constitutional requirements. The standards estab-
lished should be definite enough to prevent any judge from basing a
decision on his personal belief that cutting an individual's hair makes him
better behaved and more studious (as the court may well have in Bishop).
As the situation stands now, a court can find authority somewhere to sup-
port any approach it might wish to take. Continued denial of certiorari by
the Supreme Court may discourage judges even from seriously considering
complaints by students against such rules. This is apparently the attitude
in the western district of Missouri. 64
DAvm C. CHu~ismi
EDrroR's NoTE: After this casenote went to press, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision in
Bishop v. Colaw on the grounds that the regulation in question violated
plaintiff's rights under the ninth and fourteenth amendments. Bishop v.
Colaw, No. 20,588 (8th Cir., filed Oct. 27, 1971).
denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); contra, Sims v. Colfax Community School Dist., 307
F. Supp 485 (S.D. Iowa 1970).
61. Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
62. Compare, e.g., Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); Griffin v. Tatum, 425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1970);
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d
213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); and Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School
Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968). As can be seen,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in all of these cases in which it was sought.
63. See Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd,
426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970).
64. See Columbia Tribune, Oct. 6, 1971, at 1, col. 1 reporting on Clemente v.
Dabbs, Civil No. 1750 (W.D. Mo., decided Oct. 5, 1971).
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DISCOVERY IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NLRB
NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc.'
In proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board,2 Interboro
was adjudged to have improperly discharged certain of its employees for
engaging in protected labor activities.3 Subsequently, the Board instituted
this proceeding to determine the amount of back-pay due the aggrieved
employees. Prior to the back-pay hearing, Interboro made application with
the Board's regional director to take depositions of the back-pay claimants.
It was admitted the application "amounted to a request for pre-hearing dis-
covery.'" 4 This initial application was denied on the ground that Interboro
had failed to show "good cause" for its request within the meaning of NLRB
rule 102.30.5 On the day of the hearing Interboro renewed its request for
leave to take depositions, but the trial examiner also denied this request,
stating that "section 102.30 does not provide for the taking of discovery
depositions .". ." The hearing closed without the submission of Inter-
boro's case, and Interboro was held liable for the amount of back-pay speci-
fied in the complaint.
The Board affirmed the trial examiner's ruling. On appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Interboro's primary
assignment of error7 was that the denial of its applications for leave to take
depositions had prevented it from receiving a fair hearing and therefore
constituted an abuse of discretion. The Board asserted that it had exer-
cised no discretionary authority in its denial, inasmuch as rule 102.80 "was
never intended to provide for the taking of depositions for discovery pur-
poses when witnesses will be available for trial."3 The court of appeals
agreed with the Board's interpretation of rule 102.30 and affirmed the de-
cision denying Interboro's request for discovery.
1. 432 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1970).
2. Hereinafter referred to as the "Board."
3. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, enforced, 388 F.2d 495
(2d Cir. 1967).
4. 432 F.2d at 857.
5. 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1970). The rule provides (in pertinent part):
Examination of witnesses; depositions-Witnesses shall be examined orally
under oath, except that for good cause shown after the issuance of a
complaint, testimony may be taken by deposition.
(a) Applications to take depositions... shall be made to the regional
director prior to the hearing, and to the trial examiner during and sub-
sequent to the hearing but before transfer of the case to the Board....
The regional director or trial examiner, as the case may be, shall upon
receipt of the application, if in his discretion good cause has been shown,
make and serve upon the parties an order which will specify the name of
the witness whose deposition is to be taken and the time, the place, and
the designation of the officer before whom the witness is to testify....
6. 432 F.2d at 857.
7. On appeal, Interboro also argued that the Board's ruling was (1) not
supported by substantial evidence, and (2) that its motion for adjournment at
the dose of the General Counsel's case had been improperly denied. Id. at 856.
The court found no merit in either of these arguments.
8. Id. at 857.
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In reaching its decision, the court first examined the origin of rule
102.30. Finding it rooted in former Equity Rule 47,9 the court concluded
that rule 102.30 "did not then authorize, and has not since authorized the
taking of depositions for discovery purposes."o In support of this conclu-
sion, the court found that the 1947 amendment of section 10 (b) of the Labor
Management Relations Act" (pursuant to which rule 102.30 is promul-
gated) had imposed no affirmative statutory obligation upon the Board to
adopt pre-trial discovery procedures.12 It was also found that no change in
rule 102.80 was made in response to the Jenkins Memorandum,13 which
9. The forerunner of present rule 102.30 was promulgated in 1935. 1 Fed.
Reg. 278 (1936). It provided that testimony should be taken by deposition only
"for good and exceptional cause." In so providing the rule was directly patterned
after Equity Rule 47, which permitted the deposing of witnesses for the purpose
of preserving evidence for use at trial but not for the purpose of discovery of
evidence in preparation for trial. In 1943 the rule was amended and the standard
for permitting the deposing of witnesses was changed to "for good cause shown."
The present rule remains in substantially the same form. This change in language
from the original has not been considered by the courts as an attempt by the
drafters of the 1943 amendment to bring the rule in line with FED. R. Civ. P. 26,
which was adopted in 1938. Cf. cases cited note 19 infra.
10. 432 F.2d at 858.
11. Labor Management Relations Act § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1947),formerly ch. 372, § 10 (b), 49 Stat. 454 (1935) [hereinafter cited as 10 (b)]. Section
10 (b) of the 1935 Act provided (in pertinent part): "In any such proceeding before
the Board the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not
be controlling." As amended, 10 (b) reads as follows:
Any such proceedings shall, as far as practicable, be conducted in accord-
ance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the
United States under the rules of civil procedure for the district courts of
the United States, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States....
12. The legislative history of the 1947 amendment to 10 (b) dearly indicates
that the thrust of the amendment was directed toward changing the "procedure
as to the introduction of evidence before the Board." 93 CONG. R c. 3529 (1947)(remarks of Rep. Owens). There is no mention of making pre-trial discovery
devices available in labor proceedings and no indication that Congress intended
to make the full panoply of discovery contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure applicable to proceedings before the Board. See NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 13, 67-68, 125, 194,
253, 296, 331, 332, 381, 543, 557, 697, 883, 893, 910, 1542, 1560, 1568, 1584, 1592,
1625 (1948). This publication gives the complete and unabridged history of the
amendment.
13. JENKINS PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN NLRB PRocEDuRES, 45 L.R.R.M. 94,
101 (1960). This working paper was prepared by the NLRB's Committee on
Rules Revision headed by member Joseph A. Jenkins. The text of the Jenkins
Memorandum dealing with the feasibility of pre-hearing discovery in Board
proceedings is as follows:
Should the Board adopt some form of pre-trial discovery?
BACKGROUND
In the Federal court the pre-trial discovery technique is one of the most
effective methods for enabling Counsel to ascertain the truth. The Federal
rule is that in pre-trial depositions you may not only ask for relevant evi-
dence but you may ask for evidence which would be reasonably calculated
to disclose relevant evidence. This particular rule appears at the moment
to be impracticable insofar as the National Labor Relations Board is
concernedbecause of the physical location of Trial Examiners in Wash-
ington and San Francisco and the necessity, if it be a necessity, of having
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suggested the adoption of pre trial discovery by deposition in proceedings
before the Board. From these findings the court concluded that "rule 102.30
does not on its face, or as interpreted by the Board, provide for the taking
of depositions for the purpose of pretrial discovery."1 4
Interboro constitutes an adoption by the second circuit of the Board's
position that under no circumstances can the denial of a request for discovery
by deposition pursuant to rule 102.80 constitute an abuse of discretion, since
10 (b) does not require the Board to provide for discovery procedures in any
form.15 The practical consequence of this interpretation of 10 (b) is to
foreclose judicial review of the propriety of the Board's denial of a request
for discovery, i.e., there can be no abuse of discretion where there is no
statutory duty to act. In this regard, Interboro is in direct opposition to the
fifth circuit's decisions in NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co.16 and
NLRB v. Safeway Steel Scaffolds Co.17 Although upholding the Board's
such depositions taken before them. I can see no reason why such deposi-
tions could not be taken by either party as a matter of right before any
one authorized by the state or Federal Government to take oaths, if some
means could be devised for enforcing this right without having to resort
to the tedious and time-consuming process of obtaining a court order to
enforce the right of deposition. At the moment, I must confess, I have
no suggestions which would resolve this problem.
QUESTION
How can the Board effectively utilize something similar to the pre-
trial discovery procedure, bearing in mind that the Board has no power
to enforce its own orders without court action. In other words, is there
some legal means whereby we could be assured that the pre-trial discovery
procedures would be observed by both sides as a matter of command
without having to resort to protracted litigation before the U.S. District
Courts?
The final draft of the NLRB's Committee on Rules Revision proposals
made no mention of discovery procedures. PRoPosED NLRB RuL.s CHmAGEs SuB-
MrITD BY THE JENKINS GROUP, 46 L.R.R.M. 93 (1960).
14. 432 F.2d at 858.
15. A request for discovery prior to a Board hearing may take various forms
depending upon the type of information the party is seeking to obtain. For
cases involving a request to take discovery depositions, see Winn-Dixie Stores
Inc. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 403 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Safeway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d
273 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968); NLRB v. Gala-Mo. Arts,
232 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748 (9th
Cir. 1951). For cases involving a request for interrogatories, see North American
Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1968); Chambers Mfg. Corp.,
124 N.L.R.B. 721 (1959). For cases involving a request for discovery of Board
investigatory files, see NLRB v. Schill Steel Products, Inc., 408 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.
1969); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 823 (1961); Biazevitch v. Becker, 161 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
16. 403 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1968).
17. 383 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968).
In reaching its decision the court relied upon three premises: (1) That the
1947 amendment of 10 (b) required the Board to provide for pre-hearing discovery;
(2) that the Committee on Rules Revision recommended that Board rules be
revised to adopt pre-hearing discovery procedures; and (3) that rule 102.30 was
thereafter amended to reflect this recommendation. The court in Interboro ad-
dressed itself directly to these "three untenable premises" and found them without
merit in light of the legislative history of the 1947 amendment and the develop-
ment of rule 102.30. See notes 9 and 12 supra.
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denial of the employer's request for discovery pursuant to rule 102.3G on
the grounds that "good cause" had not been shown, the fifth circuit in both
decisions expressly refused to accept the Board's restrictive interpretation.
The court stated:
In light of section 10 (b) and of these new rules ... , we must con-
clude that the examiner was wrong in holding that there is abso-
lutely no provision for pre-trial discovery .... It is within the trial
examiner's discretion to grant or deny a motion for leave to take
depositions .... s18
This interpretation views 10 (b) as imposing an affirmative duty upon the
Board to provide for pre-trial discovery and considers that the purpose of the
Board in promulgating rule 102.30 was to act upon this duty. This inter-
pretation would subject the denial of a discovery request to judicial scrutiny
and possible reversal when prejudicial abuse of discretion can be shown.
Other decisions dealing with the availability of pre-hearing discovery
in proceedings before the Board fall between the broad confines laid down
in Interboro and Safeway Steel.1 9 The ninth circuit's decision in Electromec
Design & Development Co. v. NLRB2o is illustrative of the willingness of
other circuits to subject Board rulings to judicial review without adopting
the fifth circuit's interpretation of 10 (b):
Since there is no specific provision in the National Labor Relations
Act for discovery procedure .... it is within the sound discretion
of the Trial Examiner to grant or deny a request for the taking of
depositions, [but] a reviewing court still determines whether that
discretion has been abused in its exercise.21
Parties to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings are not entitled to pre-
trial discovery as a matter of constitutional law.2 2 And, as a practical mat-
ter, the willingness of a reviewing court to scrutinize Board rulings has not
secured the availability of pre-hearing discovery in labor proceedings. 23
This result stems from the courts' refusal to find an abuse of discretion with-
out a showing that the denial of discovery "clearly prejudiced" the appeal-
18. NLRB v. Safeway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1967).
19. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1969);
Electromec Design & Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
Southern Materials Co., 345 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg.
Co., 287 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Chambers Mfg. Corp., 278 F.2d 715
(5th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Gala-Mo Arts, 232 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1956); and NLRB
v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1951).
20. 409 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1969).
21. Id. at 635.
22. Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641 (1960); Starr v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d
721, 722 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 993 (1955).
23. See cases cited note 19 supra. In none of the cited cases did the court
find a sufficient abuse of discretion to warrant reversal of the Board's denial of
a request for discovery. See also Biazevitch v. Becker, 161 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. Cal.
1958), where an NLRB trial examiner issued a subpoena duces tecum to the
regional director, the Board attorney and the Board field examiner for produc-
tion of documents. The examiner was reversed by the Board; the district court
held that it was without jurisdiction to review.
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ing party.2 4 In short, Board denials of discovery requests carry with them
a heavy presumption of validity.
Interboro has demonstrated that 10 (b) and rule 102.30 do not provide
an affirmative statutory basis for requiring the Board to entertain requests
for discovery by deposition in its proceedings. This seriously undermines
the basic premise of the fifth circuit's decision in Safeway Steel that both
10 (b) and rule 102.30 contemplate discovery. The impact of this well-
reasoned decision can serve only to further insulate Board rulings from
attack by increasing the already substantial reluctance of the courts to find
a prejudicial abuse of discretion. But perhaps the more significant effect of
Interboro will be to convince other circuits of the error in interpreting 10 (b)
as providing a basis for requiring discovery in proceedings before the Board.
Indeed, after Interboro the question of discovery in labor proceedings has
resolved itself into one of policy considerations, i.e., the practical and equita-
ble benefits to be reaped from the application of modem discovery proce-
dures to Board proceedings.
In examining the practical difficulties involved in adoption of discovery
in Board proceedings, 25 it should be noted that Interboro did not interpret
10 (b) as prohibiting the adoption of discovery procedures. Rather, the court
sought only to illustrate that 10 (b) placed no affirmative duty upon the
Board in this respect. Discussing the Board's rule-making power,2 6 the court
stated:
Although section 6 of the Act does give the Board the necessary
rule-making power to carry out the Act..., the circumstances un-
der which discovery will be permitted is a matter committed to the
Board's discretion.2 7
24. The court in Electromec Design and Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631
(9th Cir. 1969), found that the denial of the request to take depositions by the
trial examiner had not been demonstrated to be "dearly [prejudicial to] the
appealing party." Id. at 635. In so holding, the court found that "the appellant
had a full and fair hearing with ample opportunity to cross examine; no show-
ing is made of denial of subpoena power to compel attendance of witness or lack
of opportunity to present rebuttal evidence." Id. It is significant to note here
that the factors used by the court in determing that there was no abuse of discre-
tion have little relationship to the ability of the appellant to adequately prepare
for the hearing. This de-emphasizes the importance of the prehearing discovery
phase and stresses the conduct of the hearing once it is in progress.
25. See Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings: Why Agencies
Should Catch up with the Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 74 (1960); Berger, Discovery in
Administrative Proceedings, 12 AD. L. BULL. 28 (1959); Cox, Adherence to the
Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Means of Expediting
Proceedings, 12 AD. L. BULL. 51, 55 (1959); Gallagher, Use of Pre-Trial Discovery
as a Means of Overcoming Undue and Unnecessary Delay in Administrative Pro-
ceedings, 12 A. L. BULL. 44 (1959); Kaufman, Have Administrative Agencies Kept
Pace with Modern Court-Developed Techniques Against Delay?-A Judge's View,
12 AD. L. BULL. 103, 115 (1959).
26. The Board's rule-making power is embodied in § 6, which provides:
The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and
rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act,
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this subchapter. Labor Management Relations Act § 6, 29 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1947).
27. 432 F.2d at 858.
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At present the Board's rules of procedure make no provision for dis-
covery,28 and the arguments in defense of this refusal to adopt even limited
forms of discovery can be persuasive.2 9 The Jenkins Memorandum 0 viewed
the Board's inability to compel compliance with its orders without resort
to court action as the greatest procedural difficulty involved in adopting
discovery by deposition. At least one authority31 has not seen this as a major
obstacle because of the subpoena powers embodied in the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act3 2 and the Administrative Procedure Act.3 3 But perhaps
the most persuasive fact in rebuttal is that the success of discovery by deposi-
tion under Federal Rule 2634 (which allows the taking of depositions 'with-
out leave of court") has in large part resulted from its good utilization by
adversaries.
Secondly, there is concern that full discovery of the Board's investiga-
tory files could lead to undue intimidation of employees to remain silent.
This would seriously impede the effectiveness of investigations which center
around the statements of employees.3 5 This argument against "full dis-
closure" is not without merit in light of the "particularly delicate situation"
of an employee giving a statement to a Board investigator.38 Should the
Board adopt rules permitting full discovery of its investigatory files, it would
not be without recourse in situations where the scope or purpose of discovery
might become improper. It may assert any common law or statutory priv-
ilege to which other parties would be entitled, 7 and remedy for an em-
28. NLRB R. 102.118, 29 C.F.R. § 102.118 (1970), was amended in .1964 in
response to the decision in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). It pro-
vides (in part):
[A]fter a witness called by the general counsel or by the charging parties
has testified ... the trial examiner shall, upon motion of the respondent,
order the production of any statement.., of such witness in the possession
of the general counsel which relates to the subject matter as to which the
witness has testified.
Such statements are not, however, made available until after the witness has
testified, and the value of this "Jencks-type discovery" is limited to impeachment
purposes.
29. For a complete discussion of the Board's position see Manoli & Joseph,
The National Labor Relations Board and Discovery Procedures, 18 AD. L. REv. 9
(Winter/Spring 1966).
30. 45 L.R.R.M. 94, 101 (1960). See cases cited note 15 supra.
31. See Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings: Why Agencies
Should Catch up with the Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 74, 76 (1960).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1947).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (1946).
34. FmD. R. Civ. P. 26.
35. Manoli & Joseph, supra note 29, at 10-16.
36. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1964). The court
took note of this rationale and stated:
It would seem axiomatic that if an employee knows his statements to
Board agents will be freely discoverable by his employer, he will be less
candid in his disclosures . . . [I]t is essential that the Board be able to
conduct effective investigations and secure supporting statements from
employees. We feel that preserving the confidentiality of employee state-
ments is conducive to this end. Id. at 134.
37. For a discussion of the privileges asserted by the Board, see Manoli &
Joseph, supra note 29, at 17.
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ployer's misconduct during the course of an investigation is provided for in
the Labor Management Relations Act.s s
In the recent case of NLRB v. Schill Steel Products, Inc.,39 the fifth cir-
cuit rejected the Board's argument against full discovery of its files as
applied to statements of employees called to testify. Since such statements
under rule 102.118 must be turned over in any event after the employee has
testified, the court was not persuaded that the moment of disclosure would
add significantly to the possibility of their misuse.40 The court's reasoning
in this regard is persuasive, and while the remedies available to the Board
may not be sufficient to negate the dangers of full discovery of its investiga-
tory files, limited discovery of the type permitted in Schill Steel Products
cannot be reasonably excluded under the Board's present rationale.
The dramatic increase in the number of NLRB cases filed4l lends
support to the Board's continued refusal to adopt the full panoply of dis-
covery devices embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If one can
assume that even good faith utilization of such comprehensive discovery pro-
cedures would add measurably to the time required to bring a dispute to
final decision, the argument against the adoption of full discovery is strength-
ened.42 However, discovery in labor proceedings need not be an all or noth-
ing proposition. Limited forms of discovery, such as the pre-hearing disclos-
38. Labor Management Relations Act § 8(a) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (4)(1964), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discharge or other-
wise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testi-
mony under this Subchapter." Labor Management Relations Act § 10(1), 29
U.S.C. § 160 G) (1964), provides for "appropriate injunctive relief" to enjoin
any unfair labor practice. Taken together, these sections would seem to provide
an adequate means for remedying any misuse of information discovered prior to
the Board hearing.
39. 408 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1969). This case arose on petition of the Board
to adjudge Schill Steel in civil contempt for failure to comply with a cease and
desist order. When the NLRB is a party to a proceeding in a federal court, it is
clear that discovery procedures are controlled by the Federal Rules. See Olson
Rug. Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1961). The Board can become a party
to a suit in federal court by (1) seeking enforcement of its order, or (2) petition-
ing to adjudge a party in contempt for failure to comply with a court order
enforcing a Board decision.
40. See rule 102.118, quoted note 28 supra.
41. The following table gives an indication of the continuing increase in
the number of NLRB cases filed during the years 1936-1966:










R. SMrrH, L. MEP.uFsmrL, & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAw: CASES &i MA-
RLus 71 (4th ed. 1968).
42. But see authorities cited note 25 supra. Generally, these authorities have
taken the position that pre-trial discovery in administrative proceedings would
serve as a means of overcoming unnecessary delay.
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ure of employee's statements now covered by rule 102.118 or the permitting
of discovery by deposition (pursuant to rule 102.30) upon showing of good
cause, have a proper role in the administration of the Labor Management
Relations Act.43
In light of the persuasiveness of the opinion in Interboro, it is not
likely that the courts will play a significant role in the future in securing
even limited forms of discovery in proceedings before the NLRB. The Board
itself is the only body that can extend the right of discovery in its proceed-
ings to all parties equally. Although the policy considerations surrounding
this issue point in conflicting directions, the problem is important enough
to warrant a thorough review of the Board's present position.
DENNIS L. DAVIS
PERJURY AND THE QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE RULE
State v. Burgess"
Defendant was convicted of perjury under section 557.010, RSMo
1959,2 and contended on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury as to the requirements of the so-called "quantitative evi-
dence rule." In order to be able to convict of perjury, this rule requires that
"the falsity of the alleged testimony must be established by either two
witnesses or one witness corroborated by other independent circumstances or
evidence."3 The Missouri Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed
the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Without questioning the
"quantitative evidence rule," the court held that the requirements of the
rule constitute an essential consideration under section 546.070 (4), RSMo
1959,4 in making the determination of "whether the evidence is sufficient
43. For a recent discussion of the proper role of discovery in Board pro-
ceedings, see Note, Labor Law-Pre-Hearing Discovery of Employees" Statements,
48 N.C.L. REv. 368 (1970).
1. 457 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
2. This section, now § 557.010, RSMo 1969, provides:
Every person who shall willfully and corruptly swear, testify or affirm
falsely to any material matter, upon any oath or affirmation, or declara-
tion, legally administered, in any cause, matter or proceeding, before any
court, tribunal or public body or officer, and whoever shall falsely, by
swearing or affirming, take any oath prescribed by the constitution of this
state, or any law or ordinance thereof, when such oath shall be legally
administered, shall be deemed guilty of perjury.
3. 457 S.W.2d at 681.
4. This section, now § 546.070 (4), RSMo 1969, provides:
Whether requested or not, the court must instruct the jury in writing
upon all questions of law arising in the case which are necessary for their
information in giving their verdict; which instructions shall include, when-
every necessary, the subjects of good character and reasonable doubt; and
a failure to so instruct in cases of felony shall be good cause, when the
defendant is found guilty, for setting aside the verdict of the jury and
granting a new trial ....
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in a perjury case to submit it to the jury."5 Thus, in every perjury case, the
defendant, even though he does not request it, is entitled to have the jury
instructed that "impeachment of the alleged false testimony... must be
made by at least two witnesses or one witness and strongly corroborating
circumstances."6
In a separate concurring opinion in Burgess7 Judge Finch noted that
the "quantitative evidence rule" has been criticized by Professor Wigmore8
and that the rule, since it had its origin in English common law, presumably
was being followed in Missouri on the basis of section 1.010, RSMo 1969.9
He further stated that until the rule was changed by the General Assembly
of Missouri he would be compelled to adhere to it. It appears the remainder
of the court, however, reaffirmed the rule because it was considered
sound and, without discussion, declined to abandon it. It is submitted that
the time was appropriate in Burgess for the court to have reexamined this
"quantitative evidence rule" in order to determine its present validity in
our system of justice. This note will briefly discuss this unique rule as well
as note various treatments given to it in other jurisdictions, thereby illus-
trating the desirability of modification or abolition of the rule as it
now stands in Missouri.
It was formerly held that in order to sustain a conviction of perjury
it was necessary to have the sworn testimony of two or more witnesses. 10
This rule was followed in England in the Court of the Star Chamber
which, adopting the ecclesiastical rule, considered all oaths of equal value."
Thus, according to the rule, to convict a defendant of perjury the court
required two oaths against the defendant's one.12 When the Star Chamber
5. 457 S.W.2d at 682.
6. Id. at 681, citing State v. Brinkley, 354 Mo. 37, 859, 189 S.W.2d 314,
325 (1945). In Brinkley, the court upheld jury instructions which omitted the
word "strongly" in defining the "quantitative evidence rule." The court there
found it unnecessary to include this word so long as the jury was told that the
state must impeach defendant's testimony by two credible witnesses or one witness
and corroborating circumstances and to require a finding on the issue beyond
a reasonable doubt. The court in Burgess did not indicate that its inclusion of
the word "strongly" in the definition of the rule was a requirement for a higher
degree of proof of the corroborating circumstances.
7. 457 S.W.2d at 683 (concurring opinion).
8. 7 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2041 (3rd ed. 1940). The author states:
The rule is in its nature now incongruous in our system. The quantitative
theory of testimony, if consistently applied, should enforce a similar rule
for every criminal charge, now that the accused is competent to testify.
"Oath against oath," as a reason for the rule, is indefensible.
9. This section provides (in part):
The common law of England and all statutes and acts of parliament made
prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First, of a general
nature, which are not local to that kingdom and not repugnant to or in-
consistent with the Constitution of the United States, the constitution
of this state, or the statute laws in force for the time being, are the rule
of action and decision in this state ....
10. United States v. Palese, 133 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir. 1943).
11. 7 J. WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2040 (3rd ed. 1940); Whitman, A Proposed
Solution to the Problem of Perjury in Our Courts, 59 Dicn. L. Rav. 127, 141-142
(1955).
12. See Comment, Proof of Perjury: The Two Witness Requirement, 85
S. CAL. L. RtV. 86, 88 (1961). The oath of one opposing witness was sufficient to
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Court was abolished in 1640 and the jurisdiction over the crime of perjury
transferred to the common law court, this two-witness rule was also trans-
ferred.1  It was not until the early seventeenth century that the rule was re-
laxed so as to permit conviction by one witness if sufficiently corrobo-
rated.' 4 This modified version of the rule still involved a quantitative con-
cept of counting and weighing oaths, a principle which was stated by the
Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Heed.'5
[T]he evidence must be something more than sufficient to counter-
balance the oath of the prisoner and the legal presumption of his
innocence. The oath of the opposing witness therefore, will not
avail, unless it be corroborated by other independent circum-
stances.1 6
As a general rule most American jurisdictions follow this "quantitative
evidence rule" and require that proof of the allegedly false testimony of
the defendant be established either by two witnesses or one witness supported
by corroborating circumstances.1 7 In the jurisdictions which follow the
rule, such as Missouri,' 8 a conviction cannot be sustained on the uncorrob-
orated testimony of a single witness.19 As a carry-over from the historical
fiction that all oaths are of equal value and thus carry the same weight,
"the rule has descended the long, narrow path of stare decisis and today
still stands, antiquated but resplendent, as the law."2 0
It is important to note that this rule creates an exception to the general
proposition that evidence which is sufficient to convince a jury of the
accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient.2 ' In addition, such
convict in other driminal prosecutions because the accused could not testify. In
the case of perjury, however, the defendant's oath was always in evidence; there-
fore, more than one oath was necessary to counter-balance it. Id. at 89.
13. 7 J. WIGMORE, EvNmrNc § 2040 (3rd ed. 1940).
14. Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 852, 855-56 (1963).
15. 57 Mo. 252 (1874).
16. Id. at 254.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Marchisio, 344 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1965); Risher
v. State, 418 P.2d 983 (Alas. 1966); Cast v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 3, 296 S.W.2d
269 (1956).
18. See State v. Burgess, 457 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. En Banc 1970); State v. Brink-
ley, 354 Mo. 337, 189 S.W.2d 314 (1945); State v. Kaempfer, 342 Mo. 1007, 119
S.W.2d 294 (1938); State v. Hardiman, 277 Mo. 229, 209 S.W. 879 (1919); State
v. Hunter, 181 Mo. 316, 80 S.W. 955 (1904); State v. Blize, 111 Mo. 464, 20 S.W.
210 (1892); State v. Heed, 57 Mo. 252 (1874).
19. In State v. Hardiman, 277 Mo. 229, 233, 209 S.W. 879, 880 (1919), the
court stated:
It is fundamental that to sustain a charge of perjury, it is necessary that
there should be some substantial evidence, in addition to the testimony of
a single witness. This for the very apparent reason that if the defendant
swears to one thing and the witness to the opposite, there is simply one
oath against the other, and the jury would, in consequence, not be war-
ranted in saying that the testimony of the one is false rather than that of
the other, without some proof tending to show which is true and which is
false.
20. Whitman, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Perjury in Our Courts,
59 Dxc. L. Rnv. 127, 142 (1955).
21. United States v. Palese, 133 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir. 1943).
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a rule runs contrary to the principle followed in our system of justice that
the "ultimate measure of testimonial worth is quality and not quantity.' 22
One reason which helps to account for the continued vitality of the rule is
the fear that innocent witnesses might be subjected to undue harrassment
and even conviction if a less strict rule were adopted.28 It thus appears that
the policy question to be decided is determining whether protection of wit-
nesses counterbalances the occasional inability to convict an apparent per-
jurer.24 Some states have rejected the "quantitative evidence rule" either
by statute25 or judicial decree.26 As a result, these states treat perjury the
same as other crimes in that any type of evidence, no matter what the
source, is sufficient to convict as long as such evidence establishes guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Some courts which allegedly adhere to the "quantitative evidence rule"
relax the strictness of its requirements in certain cases by allowing circum-
stantial evidence alone to be sufficient as long as it proves guilt beyond a
22. Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 608 (1944).
23. In W. BEST, EvmEzcE §§ 606-07 (12th ed. 1922) the author advanced the
argument in this manner:
But when we consider the very peculiar nature of this offense [perjury],
and that every person who appears as a witness in a court of justice, is
liable to be accused of it by those against whom his evidence tells, who
are frequently the basest and most unprincipled of mankind; and when we
remember how powerless are the best rules of municipal law without the
co-operation of society to enforce them; we shall see that the obligation
of protecting witnesses from oppression, or annoyance, by charges, or
threats of having borne false testimony, is far paramount to that of giving
even perjury its desserts.
24. See ABA-ALI MODEL Acr ON PEtJUY, Commissioners' Prefatory Note(1952). In State v. Cinkingbeard, 296 Mo. 25, 36, 247 S.W. 199, 202 (1922), the
court stated that the evident purpose of the lawmaking power in providing
punishment of witnesses who commit perjury was "to keep the fountain of justice
pure." It would appear that if the courts today continue to adhere to the strict
requirements of the "quantitative evidence rule" and make it too difficult to
convict those guilty of perjury, there is danger of causing the "fountain of justice"
to become excessively polluted.
25. ARuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-566 (1956) provides:
Proof of guilt of perjury beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient for
conviction for perjury or subordination of perjury and it shall not be neces-
sary also that proof be by a particular number of witnesses or by docu-
mentary or other type of evidence.
26. In State v. Storey, 148 Minn. 398, 182 N.W. 613 (1921), the defendant
was convicted solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence. The court held that
the "quantitative evidence rule" was not to be followed, and in rejecting the rule,
stated:
[W]e are of the opinion that the rule laid down is out of harmony with
our system of jurisprudence .... [W]ith what consistency can it be said
that a quality of testimony which will justify a court in condemning a
defendant to life imprisonment, or, in some jurisdictions, to be hanged,
is insufficient to sustain a conviction of the crime of perjury for which he
may suffer a penalty of a short term of imprisonment? Id. at 402-03, 182
N.W. at 615.
Following this same reasoning, the Supreme Court of Vermont also found it more
consonant with our system of justice to allow proof of perjury to be made by
circumstantial evidence alone. See State v. Woolley, 109 Vt. 53, 192 A. 1 (1937).
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reasonable doubt.27 Thus the rule sometimes has been held not to apply in
situations where it would be difficult or impossible to prove the falsity of
defendant's testimony by the direct testimony of two witnesses, or by the
testimony of only one witness supported by corroborating circumstances. 28
In conjunction with this, it is interesting to note the recent change regard-
ing the use of circumstantial evidence that has been made in the area of
military law. Formerly, there was no provision existing in military law
which would allow conviction of perjury by circumstantial evidence alone.29
However, as a result of the recent revision of military law by the Military
Justice Act of 1968,30 there is now a recognized exception which allows
proof of the allegedly perjured statement by circumstantial evidence alone
in those cases where such falsity is not capable of direct proof.8 ' Such a
change in the rule has been characterized as being in accord with the
modem trend. 2
In Missouri, it is doubtful whether under the "quantitative evidence
rule" proof of perjury can ever be established by circumstantial evidence
alone. Although this precise issue has apparently not been presented for
determination in any court of this state, it appears that the rule by implica-
tion precludes the possibility of proving the falsity of defendant's allegedly
perjured statement solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence83 It is
clear, however, that the rule does allow use of circumstantial evidence as
a sole means of providing the corroborating circumstances.34 Thus it would
appear that if circumstantial evidence were the only possible way to prove
the falsity of defendant's statement, no conviction could be obtained in
Missouri even if such evidence were sufficient to prove defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. The difference between the treatment of per-
jury and other crimes becomes readily apparent.
27. See, e.g., Marvel v. State, 33 Del. 110, 131 A. 317 (1925); State v. Cerfoglio,
46 Nev. 332, 205 P. 791 (1922); People v. Doody, 172 N.Y. 165, 64 N.E. 807 (1902).
28. Gebhard v. United States, 422 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1970).
29. MANUAL FOR CoURTs-MARTIAL, UNrrED STATES 210, at 376 (1951) had
the following provision regarding perjury:
The falsity of the allegedly perjured statement cannot, without corrobora-
tion by other testimony or by circumstances tending to prove such falsity,
be proved by the testimony of a single witness.
30. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-936 (Supp. IV, 1969).
31. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITE STATES 210, at 28-67 (rev. ed.
1969) now reads as follows (emphasis added):The falsity of the allegedly perjured statement cannot, except with respect
to matters which by their nature are not susceptible of direct proof, be
proved by circumstantial evidence alone, nor can the falsity of the state-
ment be proved by the testimony of a single witness unless that testimony
directly contradicts the statement and is corroborated by other evidence,
either direct or circumstantial....
32. U.S. DEP'T OF Anani PAm. 27-2, at 28-16, 17 (1970).
33. Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 852, 864 (1963). Conviction based on circumstantial
evidence alone has apparently never been allowed in Missouri. In State v. Brinkley,
354 Mo. 337, 189 S.W.2d 314 (1945), the court noted that many states have receded
from the "quantitative evidence rule" by holding that a conviction may rest solely
on circumstantial evidence. The court made no indication that Missouri was among
these states.
34. State v. McGee, 341 Mo. 151, 155, 106 S.W.2d 480, 482 (1937).
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Some authors have recommended that the distinction between perjury
and other crimes be eliminated by requiring that conviction be based on
proof beyond a reasonable doubt without regard to what form the evidence
takes.3 5 The Model Act on Perjury8 provides for this result as follows:
Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient for conviction
under this Act, and it shall not be necessary also that proof be by a
particular number of witnesses or by documentary or other type of
evidence3 7
Under this approach the "quantitative evidence rule" is abolished by
a rule that is more in accord with the treatment given other crimes.
It appears to be at least questionable that the Missouri Supreme
Court is, as suggested in the concurring opinion of Burgess, bound to follow
the "quantitative evidence rule" on the basis of the Missouri statute38
which adopted the common law of England. In State ex rel. Schlueter
Manufacturing Co. v. Beck,3 9 the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
We ave not tied inextricably to the English common law which our
ancestors adopted .... [O]ur courts are at liberty to declare that
any portion of it inapplicable to our conditions and circumstances
does not obtain here.4 0
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in State v. Storey,41 followed this
reasoning when it rejected the rule as inapplicable. The court stated that
"[ij]n our opinion it is one of the rules of the common law inapplicable
to our situation and 'inconsistent with our circumstances,' and hence not
to be followed." 42
Today it seems to be agreed that the quality of a witness' testimony
rather than the quantity of witnesses is most important. It is clear that the
testimony of each witness is no longer accorded the same weight.48 Because
of this, it would appear that the "quantitative evidence rule" is inapplica-
ble to our "conditions and circumstances." Therefore, the court should
consider itself at liberty to either change or abolish this unique rule.
It would seem to follow by necessity that when a court accepts the
"quantitative evidence rule," as the Missouri court did in Burgess, in-
structing the jury as to its requirements is essential and that the holding in
Burgess which makes such instruction mandatory would have to follow.
Without such an instruction, the jury could possibly convict on the uncor-
roborated testimony of a single witness-a result the rule itself prohibits.44
35. See Whitman, supra note 20, and Comment, supra note 12. See also [1985]
NEw YORK LAW REWVEW COMnIMISSION REPORT, No. 60, at 322.
36. ABA-ALI MODEL Aar ON PERJURY (1952).
37. Id. § 4 (1) (emphasis added).
38. See § 1.010, RSMo 1969, quoted note 9 supra.
39. 337 Mo. 839, 85 S.W.2d 1026 (En Banc 1935).
40. Id. at 847, 85 S.W.2d at 1029.
41. 148 Minn. 398, 182 N.W. 613 (1921).
42. Id. at 403, 182 N.W. at 615.
43. Whitman, supra note 20, at 142.
44. Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 610-11 (1945).
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For example, a judge could find the evidence sufficient to go to the jury
and the latter, not being instructed as to the requirements of the rule,
might be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and convict even
though it found the corroborating evidence untrustworthy.45 It is submitted
that the more important issue to which the court in Burgess should have ad-
dressed itself was that of considering the present-day validity of this "quanti-
tative evidence rule" with a view towards its abolition or modification. In
the absence of legislative adoption of the Model Act on Perjury, the court
appears to be justified in holding that this rule is no longer applicable to
our "conditions and circumstances" and not to be followed. Another alter-
native available to the court would be to modify the present rule so as to
allow conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence. Not only would
these alternatives provide adequate safeguards to protect the innocent, but
they would also provide a stronger deterrent against the commission of
perjury in our courts. When next confronted with this unique rule, the
court hopefully will give due consideration to these possibilities.
WFNDELL R. GIDEON
PROSECUTION COMMENT IN MISSOURI ON THE FAILURE
OF THE DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY
State v. Hutchinson'
Appellant was convicted in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis
of stealing an automobile and was sentenced under the provisions of the
Habitual Criminal Act 2 to a term of two years imprisonment. He appealed
to the Missouri Supreme Court, challenging certain alleged irregularities at
the trial. His major allegation of error concerned remarks made by the
prosecution in its closing argument to the jury.3 Appellant contended that
these remarks were comments upon his failure to testify and thus violated
his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 4 The Missouri Su-
preme Court rejected this contention and affirmed his conviction. The
statements objected to were as follows:
45. Id.
1. 458 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
2. § 556.280, RSMo 1969.
3. Appellant also alleged that because the record did not dearly show that
he had been advised of his right to testify in his own behalf, he should be given
a new trial. The court said: "We hold that the record in criminal case need not
affirmatively show that the trial court or counsel advised accused of his right to
testify in his own behalf." State v. Hutchinson, 458 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Mo. En Banc1970).4. "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself ..... " U.S. CONsT. amend V.
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"Mr. Kitchin: What he is saying to you is about the only thing
he can say because he has no evidence on his side.... He can call
any witnesses he wants.
Mr. Sigoloff: ... I don't think that is proper argument.
The Court: Objection Sustained.
Mr. Kitchin: I dosed the case just before lunch... He was free
to offer any evidence he had at that time and he offered nothing.
(Defendant's objection at this point was interrupted by a bench
conference and was not ruled.)
Mr. Kitchin: In other words, the only thing the defense brought
you is a complete lack of evidence, nothing, nil. What he is trying
to say is because there is no witness [who] actually saw the man
remove [the car] that I haven't proved [sic] him guilty ...
There's been no evidence at all to rebut any the State put on, no
evidence at all. He had his chance.
Mr. Sigoloff: ... That is not proper argument.
The Court: Overruled ....
The problem presented was: When does comment by counsel on the
failure of the defendant to present evidence reach the level of a comment
on his failure to testify? As Dean Wigmore said, "The question whether
an inference may be drawn from a person's exercise of his privilege [not to
testify] is one which may well puzzle by its anomalities."'
At common law, the accused, as an interested party in the litigation,
was not allowed to testify at all.7 This was changed by statute in Missouri
in 1877 and the defendant was allowed to testify in his own behalf if he so
chose.8 The statute prohibited any comment by the prosecution on the
accused's failure to take the stand and provided that this was not to be con-
sidered in determining guilt.9 In 1913, a law review comment on the then
current version of the statute noted that "[s]ince the passage of these stat-
utes it has been uniformly held reversible error for counsel for the state to
comment on the neglect, failure, or refusal of the defendant to take the
stand. Such was the dear intent of the statute."10 Between 1913 and today,
Missouri gradually turned to a more complex (and puzzling) analysis.
It is settled that when the defendant is the only one who could testify
and the failure of the defense to present evidence is commented upon, or
when there is clear reference to the failure of the defendant to testify, there
is reversible error.'1 Although Missouri courts earlier held the statute also
5. 458 S.W.2d at 554-55.
6. 8 J. WiGmoR, EvmENcE § 2272 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis added).
7. See Willson, Right of Comment on Testimony of Defendant in a Criminal
Case, 1 U. Mo. BuLL. L. SER. 35 (1913).
8. Mo. Laws 1877, at 356, § 1.
9. The modern statute reads: "If the accused shall not avail himself or
herself of his or her right to testify ... it shall not . . . be referred to by any
attorney in the case .. " § 546.270, RSMo 1969.
10. Willson, supra note 7, at 36. This comment was on § 5243, RSMo 1909[now § 546.270, RSMo 1969], which read substantially the same as the part of the
act of April 18, 1877 relating to comment by the prosecution on the failure of
the defendant to testify.
11. "The appellant did not testify and the fact of his failure to do so was
not and could not be referred to by counsel or considered by the Court and jury."
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applied to comments which "alluded" to the defendant's failure to testify,12
the recent tendency has been to interpret the statute literally and require
an almost direct mention of the defendant's failure to testify before a viola-
tion of the statute occurs.13 Thus, if other witnesses available to defendant
are not called, the courts construe comment by the prosecution as merely
referring to the general lack of evidence presented by the defense, and not
as a specific allusion to the failure of the defendant himself to testify.'4 Com-
ment that the evidence was not disputed (usually because no evidence was
presented by the defense) has also been held not to refer to the defendant's
failure to testify.' 5 In other words, "where it appears that.the prosecution
testimony described as uncontradicted could be denied by a person or per-
sons other than the defendant himself, no improper allusion to the accused's
State v. Phillips, 324 S.W. 2d 693, 697 (Mo. 1959). See also State v. Hampton, 430
S.W.2d 160 (Mo. 1968), and State v. Snyder, 182 Mo. 462, 82 S.W. 12 (1904).
12. The supreme court, construing § 4219, RSMo 1889 [now § 546.270, RSMo
19691, has said:
The words "referred to" evidently mean "alluded to." "Refer" is a
synonym of "allude," and these words are used interchangeably. If the
object of the statute was to prevent the jury from considering the fact
that the defendant has failed to testify, it is easy to see that as much could
be accomplished to defeat that object by an allusion to such fact, as by
reference thereto. State v. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374, 393, 14 S.W. 969, 974
(1890).
13. [T]here is a long line of cases in this state which hold that a reference
to the failure of the defense to offer any evidence is not a violation of
the statute. By its express terms, the statute prohibits a reference to the
failure of the accused to testify.
State v. Hampton, 430 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Mo. 1968). See, e.g., State v. Hayzlett,
265 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1954); State v. Conway, 348 Mo. 580, 154 S.W.2d 128(1941); and State v. McKeever, 339 Mo. 1066, 101 S.W.2d 22 (1936).
14. In State v. Powell, 357 S.W.2d 914 (Mo. 1962), the defendant argued
that the prosecutor's statement that the state's evidence was "unrefuted," "un-
disputed," and "undenied" referred to his failure to testify. The court said:
the argument in this case ... falls within the purview of those cases
which permit the prosecuting attorney to discuss the evidence in general
and refer to the failure of the defense as a whole to combat the facts
adduced by the State tending to prove the guilt of the defendant. Id.
at 918.
In State v. Garcia, 357 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. 1962), the prosecutor, while pointing a
finger at the defendant, stated that the evidence was uncontradicted and un-
disputed. The court held that "[a] comment by a state's attorney that the state's evi-
dence is uncontradicted or undisputed does not violate a defendant's right under the
rule and the statute." 357 S.W.2d at 935. In State v. Reynolds, 345 Mo. 79, 131
S.W.2d 552 (1939), the prosecutor said: "Is there anybody, any living soul [who]
told you that Roosevelt Reynolds [the appellant] did not enter the cab that
night?" The court held the comment did not violate the statute because two other
people "might have known" about the matter and could have testified. 345 Mo.
at 88, 131 S.W.2d at 557. See also State v. Bell, 442 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Mo. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 949 (1970); State v. Dulaney, 428 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Mo.
1968); and State v. Varner, 329 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1959).
15. "We have also consistently held that it was not a violation of the statute
to state that evidence was uncontradicted, undisputed, or uncontroverted." State
v. Hardy, 276 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Mo. En Banc 1955). See State v. Hampton, 430
S.W.2d 160 (Mo. 1968); State v. Varner, 329 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1959); State v.
Gordon, 253 Mo. 510, 161 S.W. 721 (1913); State v. Fields, 234 Mo. 615, 138
S.W. 518 (1911); and State v. Ruck, 194 Mo. 416, 92 S.W. 706 (1906).
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failure to take the stand is established."1 6 This interpretation of the statute
stems from a literal reading that it forbids only comments that the accused
did not testify, not comments on the amount of evidence presented by the
defense.17 The standard in Missouri to judge the propriety of the prose-
cutor's arguments to the jury is whether the jury's attention was directed to
the failure of the defendant to testify.ls The rationale for this seems to be
that "[a] prosecutor has the right and duty to present the strength of the
state's case and the weakness of the defense. A defendant cannot tie the
hands of the prosecutor merely by putting on no evidence at all."19
From the facts present in State v. Hutchinson,20 it appears that the
Missouri Supreme Court may not have followed former Missouri decisions.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Seiler in Hutchinson points out that only
three witnesses had testified at the trial-the owner of the car, her husband,
and the arresting officer.2 ' The only person left who could have shed any
light on the occurrence in question appeared to be the defendant, since he
was the only other person present at the scene of the crime. An early Mis-
souri case already held that when the defendant is the only person who
could testify for the defense and the prosecution points out the failure of
the defense to offer evidence, this is a comment on the failure of the de-
fendant to take the stand which is forbidden.22
It would seem that the Hutchinson jury's attention was directed to the
failure of the defendant to testify because of the comments of the prosecu-
tion. This being so, the Missouri standard for reversible error was met by
these comments and a new trial should have been ordered. The failure of
the Missouri Supreme Court to do so indicates that the previous cases hold-
ing that reversible error was created by comment on the failure of the de-
fense to offer evidence when the defendant was the only one who could have
testified may have been tacitly rejected by the court. Such action by the
court is somewhat questionable since the allowance of such comments may
jeopardize the constitutional rights of the defendant to a fair trial.
The fifth amendment right of freedom from self-incrimination has
been made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.2 8
Griffin v. California24 considered the constitutionality of a California con-
stitutional provision that allowed comment on the failure of the defendant
16. Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 723, 728 (1967).
17. "[T]he prohibition of § 546.270, RSMo 1959 and Criminal Rule 26.08
is against comment that the accused did not testify; not that the defendant did
not offer any evidence." State v. Morgan, 444 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Mo. 1969).
18. "The ultimate test of whether the prohibition has been violated is
whether the jury's attention was called to the fact that the accused did not
testify." State v. Hayzlett, 265 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Mo. 1954). "In order to work
prejudice, it must be demonstrated that the attention of the jury was directed
to the fact that accused did not testify." State v. Murray, 280 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Mo.
1955).
19. State v. Reynolds, 345 Mo. 79, 88, 131 S.W.2d 552, 557 (1939).
20. 458 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
21. Id. at 559 (dissenting opinion).
22. State v. Snyder, 182 Mo. 462, 82 S.W. 12 (1904).
23. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
24. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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to testify by both the prosecution and the court.25 The United States Su-
preme Court said:
[T]he fifth amendment, in its direct application to the federal
government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Four-
teenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on
the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence
is evidence of guilt.26
The Missouri Supreme Court has ruled that Griffin does not directly apply
to Missouri because it construed a California constitutional provision which
permitted such comment by the prosecution and the court. The court has
stated that "in no event could this or any other case in Missouri involve the
same problems presented in Griffin v. State of California."27
However, the Griffin decision appears broader than the Missouri court
has construed it. The Court's intention was apparently "to prevent the
comments of a judge or prosecutor from being converted into evidence of
guilt."28 Griffin makes clear that the Constitution will not tolerate comment
by the prosecution on the failure of the defendant to testify. It would seem
that a prosecutor's direct comment under constitutional authority does
present the same problem as a prosecutor's comment on the lack of evidence
offered that is an allusion to the failure to testify.
While the Missouri decisions seem to indicate that the defendant has
the burden of showing that a comment by the prosecution on his failure to
testify was used by the jury as evidence of his guilt,2 9 the United States
Supreme Court has made it dear that a federal standard is to be applied in
these situations, with the state bearing the burden of proving that the prose-
cutor's comments did not contribute to the conviction.30 In Hutchinson, the
prosecutor's comment that the defendant "had his chance" to present evi-
dence but did not and the entire line of his dosing argument, seem to indi-
cate that the defendant was the only person who could testify for the prose-
cution. The jury could reasonably assume that such comments were on his
failure to testify. It would be hard to show under the federal standard that
these comments did not contribute to the defendant's conviction. In light of
Griffin, it would appear that the comments by the prosecution in Hutchin-
son constituted reversible error.3 1
25. CAL. CONsr. art. I, § 13 provides (in part):
[i]n any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure
to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case
against him may be commented upon by the court or by counsel, and
may be considered by the court or by the jury.
26. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965), noted in 51 A.B.A.J. 680
(1965), 79 HARv. L. REv. 159 (1965), 18 HASTwnGS L.J. 198 (1966), and 17
SYAcusE L. Rxv. 80 (1965).
27. State v. Kennedy, 396 S.W.2d 595, 598-99 (Mo. 1965).
28. 17 SY acusE L. Rnv. 80, 81 (1965).
29. See, e.g., State v. Snyder, 182 Mo. 462, 82 S.W. 12 (1904), and State v.
Hampton, 430 S.W.2d 160 (Mo. 1968).
30. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
31. The application of Griffin to the states may be shown in the following
examples: In Schultz v. Yeager, 293 F. Supp. 794 (1967), the United States Dis-
trict Court for New Jersey granted a writ of habeas corpus for the petitioner on
[VOL 36
41
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
RECENT CASES
If the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Hutchinson, had followed
the prior interpretation of the Missouri statute forbidding comment by
counsel on the failure of the defendant to testify, 2 they would have vacated
the conviction and granted a new trial. The defendant was the only person
who could testify for the defense and the prosecution comment on the
failure of the defense to present any evidence could have led the jury to
believe that the reference was to the failure of the defendant to testify. In
addition, a serious question arises as to whether any comment by the prose-
cutor, even one which has previously been held not to violate the statute,
is allowable in light of Griffin when such comment alludes to the failure of
the defendant to testify.88 Of course, the difficult question is when does
such comment allude to the failure to testify. From the facts in Hutchinson
and the apparent rejection by the Missouri Supreme Court of its earlier
decision therein, it is arguable that Missouri has stepped outside the limits
of the Constitution.3 4
ROBERT M. HILL
the issue of prosecutorial comments (thereby, in essa, reversing the state court's
rejection of an appeal on the same grounds), saying "[B]efore a federal constitu-
tional error can be held harmless, the state court must now be able to declare
a belief that the alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 293 F.
Supp. at 806. In Smith v. Decker, 270 F. Supp. 225 (N.). Tex. 1967), the United
States district court granted a writ of habeas corpus from a conviction in Texas,
and stated the standard as "[Whether (or not) there is a reasonable possibility
that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." 270
F. Supp. at 226. In Mitchell v. Pinto, 438 F.2d 814 (3rd Cir. 1971), the court
reversed the denial of a writ of habeas corpus by the New Jersey district court
because of comment by court and prosecution on the defendant's failure to
testify.
32. § 546.270, RSMo 1969, quoted note 9 supra.
33. There would seem to be four categories of cases involving comment
on the failure of the defendant to testify. Category I involves the situation where
the prosecutor dearly says "The defendant did not testify," and is error both
under Griffin and the Missouri line of cases. Category II involves the prosecutor
saying "The state's evidence on point A is undisputed" and would not be error
under either the Griffin or Missouri rule. Category III involves the prosecutor
saying "The defense offered no evidence." When the defendant is earl e
only one who could testify in his behalf, Griffin and the Missouri cases before
Hutchinson held this to be error. Category IV involves this same statement when
others are available to testify for the defense. This, under both tests, is not error,
although it could be argued that even this comment touches the defendant. He
is engulfed in its scope, and his failure to testify would seem to be pointed out.
Of course, there is not error if the prosecutor remarks on the failure of the defense
to call a specific person if that person is not the defendant.
34. Perhaps of interest is the concurring opinion of Judge Donnelly. If Mis-
souri continues its reasoning in Hutchinson in future cases, judge Donnelly sug-
gests the following instruction be gven to the jury:
The law does not compel aldefendant in a criminal case to take the
witness stand and testify and no presumption of guilt may be raised,
and no inference of any kind may be drawn, from the failure of [the]
defendant to testify.
State v. Hutchinson, 458 S.W.2d 553, 558 (Mo. En Banc 1970) (concurring opinion).
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JOINDER OF OFFENSES-COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Ashe v. Swenson'
The Supreme Court of the United States held in Ashe v. Swenson that
an issue once litigated in the prosecution of a criminal defendant cannot be
relitigated in a subsequent prosecution by the same sovereign government
against the same defendant, thereby elevating the doctrine of collateral
estoppel to a constitutional level. As a result of this embodiment of col-
lateral estoppel into the fifth amendment's guarantee against double jeop-
ardy, a doctrine already recognized by the federal courts, the Missouri Su-
preme Court Committee on Rules has amended rule 24.04 of the Missouri
Rules of Criminal Procedure2 to allow the joinder of offenses which are part
of the same transaction or which constitute parts of a common scheme or
plan.3
Ashe's conviction arose from an armed robbery in which several armed,
masked men broke into a house and took money and jewelry from six men
playing poker inside. Ashe went to trial separately on the charge of robbing
one of the poker players, Knight. Knight and three other victims testified
at the trial, establishing dearly (the defense presented no evidence) that
an armed robbery had occurred and that each poker player had suffered
losses.4 But the state's evidence identifying Ashe as one of the robbers was
not conclusive. The jury was instructed that in order to find Ashe guilty,
they must determine two facts-that something was taken from Knight and
that Ashe participated in the robbery. The verdict was "not guilty due to
insufficient evidence." Six weeks later Ashe was tried for the robbery of
a second victim, Roberts. This time he was convicted.
Ashe appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, contending that the
Knight prosecution was a previous trial for the same offense.5 His argument
was that the Roberts' prosecution involved the same issue decided in his
favor by the Knight jury; however, the court rejected this double jeopardy
plea, and found that the cases involved two distinct issues-whether Ashe
robbed Knight and whether Ashe robbed Roberts.6
A similar analysis was made by the Missouri court in State v. Williams,7
a case involving the armed robbery of five bank messengers. The court there
ruled that a separate and distinct case can be made out for each person
robbed in the same transaction.8 This is the separate or several offense
doctrine,0 which was outlined in State v. Moore'10 as follows: "Distinct and
1. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
2. The amendment became effective July 31, 1971.
3. Supreme Court Orders, 26 J. Mo. B. 608 (1970).
4. As a result of the robbery, not the poker game.
5. State v. Ashe, 350 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1961).
6. Id. at 770.
7. 263 S.W. 195 (Mo. 1924).
8. Id. at 197.
9. Miller, The Plea of Double Jeopardy in Missouri, 22 Mo. L. R.v. 245,
269 (1957).
10. 326 Mo. 1199, 33 S.W.2d 905 (1930).
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separate offenses are not to be held merged because they happen to grow
out of the same transaction."11 In other words, the fact that separate offenses
are part of the same transaction is irrelevant to the issue of double jeopardy.
What is relevant is the evidence needed to prove the various acts. Whether
a defendant's acts comprise the same offense, or separate or several offenses,
is determined by the "same evidence" test enunciated in 1796 in the English
case of King v. Vandercomb & Abbott:12
Unless the first indictment were such as the prisoner might have
been convicted upon by proof of the facts in the second indictment,
an acquittal on the first indictment can be no bar to the second.'3
After a motion to vacate his sentence was denied,' 4 Ashe filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri.' 5 The court denied the writ and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The eighth circuit
applied the "same evidence" test, saying that "[a] robbery of one man
(Roberts) ordinarily requires proof of facts different from those required
to prove a robbery of another man (Knight)."'16
Both the district court and the court of appeals felt compelled to follow
Hoag v. New Jersey,'7 in which the United States Supreme Court held that
the conviction of robbing a fourth victim, after defendant had been ac-
quitted of robbing three other victims of the same robbery, was not a viola-
tion of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although a
majority of the Court doubted that collateral estoppel was a constitutional
requirement,' 8 it did not rule either way on the issue because it felt bound
by the state court's holding that it was impossible to determine the issues
on which the jury based its verdict of not guilty.19
The Hoag case thus appeared to be a substantial obstacle in Ashe's
quest for a writ of habeas corpus. However, on the basis of the intervening
case of Benton v. Maryland,2 6 which held that the fifth amendment guar-
antee against double jeopardy is enforceable against the states through the
fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
and freed Ashe. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Ashe,21 noted
that the due process approach of Hoag was now inapplicable because, under
Benton, "[t]he question is no longer whether collateral estoppel is a re-
11. Id. at 1205, 33 S.W.2d at 907.
12. 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (Ex. 1796).
13. Id. at 461. For a Missouri application of this test, see State v. Hayes, 296
Mo. 58, 246 S.W. 948 (1922).
14. State v. Ashe, 403 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. 1966).
15. Ashe v. Swenson, 289 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
16. Ashe v. Swenson, 399 F.2d 40, 45 (8th Cir. 1968).
17. 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
18. "Despite its wide employment, we entertain grave doubts whether col-
lateral estoppel can be regarded as a constitutional requirement .... However,
we need not decide that .. . Id. at 471.
19. See State v. Hoag, 35 N.J. Super. 555, 114 A.2d 573 (1955).
20. 395 U.S. 784 (1969), applied retroactively, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711 (1969).
21. Chief Justice Burger dissented. See 397 U.S. at 460 (dissenting opinion).
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quirement of due process, but whether it is a part of the Fifth Amendments
guarantee against double jeopardy."2 2
Until the Benton case, Justice Stewart pointed out, this question had
been merely academic.23 The federal courts had already come to recognize
that as the number of statutory offenses increased, the common law situa-
tion of a single course of criminal conduct yielding but a single offense was
being replaced by a situation where, through specificity of draftsmanship
and overlapping of statutory offenses, prosecutors were able to spin out
numerous crimes from a single criminal transaction.2 4 The federal courts
chose to prevent the potential for abuse in re-prosecutions by applying the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. Justice Stewart pointed out that this doctrine
has been recognized at least since the case of United States v. Oppenheim-
er,25 decided in 1916. Whether this federal safeguard was a constitutional re-
quirement did not have to be decided until the guarantee against double
jeopardy was applied to the states. The Court took the opportunity pro-
vided by Ashe to hold that it was.
The mere incorporation of collateral estoppel into the Constitution has
little effect on Missouri, however, because it is one of many states28 which,
like the federal courts, has recognized (in dicta) that the doctrine of res
judicata is applicable to criminal prosecutions if there has been an ad-
judication of the fact or issue in question.2 7 But no Missouri case has been
uncovered where such an adjudication foreclosed a subsequent prosecution
by the state. This may be due to Missouri's hypertechnical determination
of "same offense," which virtually voids the effect of collateral estoppel.
For example, State v. Ashe2B yielded a perfect opportunity to apply collateral
estoppel, but the court did not even consider it-apparently because the
analysis dictated by the separate or several offense doctrine allowed the issue
in each prosecution to be distinguished.2 9
22. 397 U.S. at 442.
23. Id. at 445 n.10.
24. Id.
25. 242 U.S. 85 (1916). Respondent argued in his brief that Oppenheimer
did not apply because its holding that an indictment dismissed on the erroneous
conclusion that it was barred by the statute of limitations cannot be the subject
of a second prosecution was based on res judicata, not collateral estoppel. But
the Court indicated that there was no necessity to distinguish the two related
doctrines. Brief for Respondent at 16, Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
Collateral estoppel has been expressly recognized by the federal courts, however:
Even though there has been no formal acquittal of the particular offense
on trial, a prior judgment of acquittal on related matters has been said
to be conclusive as to all that the judgment determined. The matter is one
of collateral estoppel of the prosecutor. United States v. DeAngelo, 138
F.2d 466, 468 (3d Cir. 1943).
26. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 203, 229 (1966), for a complete list of states
recognizing the doctrine.
27. See State v. Chamineak, 343 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1961).
28. 350 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1961).
29. In addition, the court saw little need for the use of collateral estoppel
to prevent harassment of the accused. Rather, it would place its faith in prosecu-
torial discretion:
Assuredly our prosecutors are aware that the concept of double jeopardy
is designed to prevent the government from unduly harassing an accused,
and we are confident that they will not resort unfairly to multiple indict-
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However, in Ashe v. Swenson the Supreme Court rejected this over-
simplified approach and replaced it with the practical method of the fed-
eral decisions. This method requires a thorough examination of the prior
record to see if a "rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an
issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from considera-
tion." 30 In applying this method to the Knight prosecution, the Court saw
that, according to the jury instructions, there were two issues-was anything
taken from Knight and was Ashe one of the robbers. The evidence as to
the first issue was substantial and uncontradicted, while as to the second
issue it was inconclusive. Thus the Court concluded:
The single rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury
was whether the petitioner had been one of the robbers. And thejury by its verdict found that he had not. The federal rule of law,
therefore, would make a second prosecution for the robbery of Rob-
erts wholly impermissible.31
The Court then found the federal method to be a constitutional require-
ment.3
2
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, accused Missouri of holding
back informations against Ashe in order to have something to fall back
on in case Ashe was acquitted at the first trial.3 3 Actually, however, the
prosecutor had no choice but to hold back informations (prior to the
amendment of rule 24.04), because of the well established Missouri rule that
a defendant may not properly be convicted at the same trial of two distinct
felonies except in instances specifically provided for by statute.3 4 The
corollary to this rule is that there is misjoinder when separate and distinct
offenses are included in one information or indictment.3 5 However, since
such misjoinder is not wrong as a matter of law, the defendant may lose the
benefit of the rule by not making timely objection. 36 When the misjoinder
is called to the court's attention it is within the judge's discretion whether
to force the prosecutor to elect which of the charges he wishes to go to the
jury.37 Nonetheless, if an election is requested, the defendant can be con-
victed of only one crime at any one trial.
This leaves the question of what there was about the Ashe case that
caused the Missouri Supreme Court Committee on Rules to except crimes
ments and successive trials in order to accomplish indirectly that which
the constitutional interdiction precludes.
Id. at 770, 771, quoting State v. Hoag, 35 N.J. Super. 555, 561, 114 A.2d 575, 577
(1955).
30. 397 U.S. at 444.
51. Id. at 445.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 457 (concurring opinion).
34. See State v. Terry, 325 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. 1959). Although Terry stated
the rule, the court actually held that the rule could be waived if the prosecutor
was not asked to elect between the charges. For a later case explaining the cir-
cumstances under which the rule can be waived, see State v. Bursby, 395 S.W.2d
155 (Mo. 1965).
35. State v. Christian, 253 Mo. 382, 161 S.W. 736 (1915).
56. Hunvald, Criminal Law in Missouri, 25 Mo. L. R v. 369, 572 (1960).
37. State v. Huffer, 424 S.W.2d 776 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968).
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arising out of the same transaction from the above stated rules.3 8 Actually
the bare holding of Ashe need not have provoked any change, given the
following premises: Collateral estoppel, as promulgated in Ashe, applies
only when an issue has been previously adjudicated in defendant's favor;
whether an issue is decided in defendant's favor or not depends upon the
evidence (or lack of it); and wholesale joinder of charges will in no way
strengthen the evidence. Thus it would seem that the state has no better
chance of winning on six charges of robbery than on one, and broader
joinder power will not circumvent the decision in Ashe.89
Since the bare holding of Ashe need not have provoked the rule change,
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion40 may well have caused the rules com-
mittee to broaden Missouri's joinder rule. Justice Brennan views the double
jeopardy clause as requiring the joinder of all charges against the defendant
that arise from a single criminal act, occurrence, episode or transaction. In
other words, in defining what "same offense" means in the double jeopardy
clause, Justice Brennan would use a "same transaction" test rather than the
"same evidence" test. This "same transaction" test would allow the state
only one trial for each course of conduct by the defendant, regardless of
how many separate crimes were committed therein and regardless of whether
the first trial resulted in acquittal or conviction. Prior to Benton v. Mary-
land (when each state could have its own double jeopardy standards) the
Supreme Court of Missouri rejected the "same transaction" test, saying:
[Ain offender is not to be exonerated from responsibility for his
acts because his desires or passions persuade or impel him to com-
mit two or more offenses during a transaction .... 41
In order to maintain this policy under the "same transaction" test that
Brennan would constitutionally impose, the amended rule 24.04, allowing
joinder of offenses committed in the same transaction, is a necessity.
But, in deciding Ashe, the majority opinion did not go as far as Justice
Brennan did. The doctrine of collateral estoppel, though not applicable
to very many situations because of the difficulty in determining the issues
on which a jury acquits, was broad enough to cover Ashe. The case merely
held that "[W]hatever else that constitutional guarantee [of double jeop-
ardy] may embrace, it surely protects a man who has been acquitted from
38. Mo. R. CRnI P. 24.04 now reads:
All offenses which are based on the same act or on two or more acts
which are part of the same transaction or on two or more acts or trans-
actions which constitute parts of a common scheme or plan may be
charged in the same indictment or information in separate counts, or in
the same count when authorized by statute. Any indictment or informa-
tion may contain counts for the different degrees of the same offense
or for any one of such degrees.
39. Normally, multiple charges against a defendant might unduly prejudice
a jury against him. But in a situation such as Ashe's, where the multiple charges
arose out of the same transaction, there is no undue prejudice because even if
he was only charged with one crime, evidence of all six would be admissible.
See State v. Millard, 242 S.W. 923, 926 (Mo. 1922).
40. Justices Douglas and Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion.
41. State v. Moore, 326 Mo. 1199, 1205, 33 S.W.2d 905, 907 (1930).
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having to 'run the gantlet' a second time.' 42 The rules committee may have
felt that "whatever else" includes protecting a man who has been convicted
from having to run the gantlet a second time.
Even though the exception carved out by rule 24.04 is not compelled
by the Ashe decision, it is nevertheless quite logical. The rules prohibiting
joinder of distinct crimes and multiple convictions were formulated to pre-
vent a defendant from having to defend more than one charge at a time
and to prevent the jury from using evidence of one offense to convict of
another.43 These benefits to the accused are not needed when the distinct
crimes arise from the same transaction. It seems that when the crimes are
thus related the accused should welcome the chance to dispose of all the
charges at one time rather than having to present the same evidence at sev-
eral different trials. And, in cases of multiple crimes, with or without a
joinder rule evidence of other crimes is admissible to give a complete pic-
ture of the offense charged. 44 Regardless of whether the "same transaction"
test ever becomes constitutionally required or not, the rule change made
as a result of Ashe v. Swenson is a welcome one in terms of judicial economy
and prevention of harassment of the accused.
BARRY M. KATZ
SIMULTANEOUS DEATH: VALUATION OF LIFE
INSURANCE IN THE GROSS ESTATE
Estate of Chown v. Commissioner'
I. THE CHOWN DECISION
Harriet and Roger Chown, husband and wife, died in a commercial
airline crash on February 25, 1964. Harriet was the absolute owner and pri-
mary beneficiary of a $50,000 double indemnity insurance policy on the
life of her husband. Their children were named as the secondary bene-
ficiaries. An Oregon probate court found the deaths were simultaneous,2
and, under Oregon's Uniform Simultaneous Death Act,3 the insurance
42. 397 U.S. at 445-46.
43. Hunvald, supra note 36; at 373.
44. Id.
1. 428 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1970).
2. Id. at 1396.
3. ORE. REV. STAT. § 112.040 (1967) (emphasis added):
Where the insured and the beneficiary in a policy of life or accident
insurance have died and there is no sufficient evidence that they have
died otherwise than simultaneously the proceeds of the policy shall be
distributed as if the insured had survived the beneficiary.
In light of this statute the Chown court stated that "[n]othing became payable
to her as beneficiary by reason of Roger's death." 428 F.2d at 1397. Missouri has
an identical statute, § 471.040, RSMo 1969.
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company paid the proceeds of the policy directly to the secondary bene-
ficiaries.4 Harriet's executor included no part of the proceeds in her federal
estate tax return, but included an amount representing the interpolated
terminal reserve value of the policy5 plus unearned premiums and dividend
accumulations.6 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that
the entire proceeds should have been included in the estate and assessed a
deficiency which was later upheld by the Tax Court.7 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and upheld the executor's valuation.8 The issue
in Chown was the amount to be included in the "gross estate" of an owner-
beneficiary whose death is simultaneous with the insured.
II. VALUATION OF THE OWNER-BENEFICIARY
INTEREST IN A LIFE INsURANcE POLICY
The federal estate tax is an excise on the transfer of interests in prop-
erty, the "gross estate," that results on death.9 The value of a decedents
"gross estate" is defined by section 2081 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 as, "the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal,
4. It should be noted that this statute is not controlling on questions of
federal estate taxation. In Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d
392, 393 n.1 (6th Cir. 1970), the court stated:
Although state property law governs the devolution of the proceeds, it is
not necessarily determinative of federal estate tax liability. Thus the fact
that the Simultaneous Death Act treats Mrs. Goodwin as having pre-
deceased her husband is not decisive here. The economic realities, not
state property law rules, control.
See Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940); Flick's Estate v. Commissioner,
166 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1948).
5. This is not the cash value of the policy, but the reserve entered on in-
surance company books against liability on contracts. It is the insurance com-
pany's estimated valuation of the policy at the time of the owner-beneficiary's
death. The word "interpolated" indicates adjustment to a specific date. Corn-
mssioner v. Edwards, 135 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 1943).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (a) (2) ex. 3, T.D. 6680, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 417, 418-19,
indicates the formula for computing the interpolated terminal reserve is as follows:
Step 1:
A. Terminal reserve at end of year prior to death.
B. minus: Terminal reserve at end of year following death.
C. equals: Increase in terminal reserve.
Step 2:
D. Proportion of C equivalent to the fractional part of year before death.
A. plus: Terminal reserve at end of prior year.
E. equals: Interpolated terminal reserve at date of death.
Step 3:
E. Interpolated terminal reserve at date of death.
F. plus: Proportion of gross premium for the year equivalent to the fractional
part of the year after death.
G. equals: Value of the insurance policy.
6. 428 F.2d at 1397. The total amount included, $8,046.16, represented the
interpolated terminal reserve value of $5,840A0, unearned premiums of $1,078.04,
and dividend accumulations of $1,127.72.
7. Estate of Harriet H. Chown, 51 T.C. 140 (1968).
8. Estate of Chown v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1970).
9. Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 392, 394 (6th Cir.
1970); Aldrich v. United States, 346 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1965).
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tangible or intangible, wherever situated." Section 203810 further provides
that "[t]he gross estate shall include the value of all property to the ex-
tent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death." Al-
though these two sections refer to all property, section 204211 is specifically
directed to life insurance. Under this section, the "gross estate" includes
amounts receivable by the executor as the proceeds of insurance on the
decedent's life or amounts receivable by other beneficiaries if the insured
died possessed with any of the "incidents of ownership." 12 The term "in-
cidents of ownership" refers to the right of the insured, or his estate, to
receive the economic benefits of the policy,' 3 including the right to change
beneficiaries, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy or re-
voke an assignment, and to obtain a loan on the policy.' 4 Furthermore,
even when an owner-beneficiary paid for the policy and retained it physi-
cally, the insured has been held to possess incidents of ownership in flight
insurance when he merely signed the application.15
When an owner other than the insured dies possessed of these "in-
cidents of ownership," section 203310 requires inclusion in his "gross es-
tate" of any ownership interest in the policy.17 The amount included under
this section, as determined by the Treasury Regulations,' 8 is the selling
price of comparable contracts by an insurance company regularly engaged
in the sale of contracts of that character. However, because this value is not
readily ascertainable on contracts in force for some time and on which
further premiums are payable, an alternative method of valuation is pro-
vided whereby the value will be the interpolated terminal reserve value19
at the date of death plus the unused portion of the last premium paid.20
It should be noted that the value determined by this alternative method is
only an approximation and should not be used if it is not reasonably close
to the actual value of the contract.2 1
In light of the above sections, if an owner dies before the insured, the
amount includible in the "gross estate" of the owner is the unmatured
value of the policy, i.e., the replacement value22 or, alternately, the inter-
polated terminal reserve value.2 3 If the owner (who is not the beneficiary)
dies after the insured's death, the amount includible in the owner's estate
will be zero because the "incidents of ownership" will have terminated
10. INT. RLv. CODE Of 1954, § 2033.
11. INT. Ray. CODE Of 1954, § 2042.
12. Id.
13. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (2) (1958).
14. Id. See, e.g., Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929);
Estate of Michael Collino, 25 T.C. 1026 (1956).
15. Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
16. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2033.
17. United States v. Stewart, 270 F.2d 894 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
960 (1959).
18. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (a) (1), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 Ctm. BuLL. 417.
19. See note 5 supra.
20. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (a) (2), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 417.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Goodman v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1946); Estate
of Ethel M. Donaldson, 31 T.C. 729 (1959).
23. See Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 392, 393 (1970).
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when the policy matured upon the death of the insured. If the owner is
the beneficiary and dies after the insured, the entire proceeds of the policy
will be includible in the owner-beneficiary's "gross estate" since the policy
will have matured, causing the full proceeds to be due and payable to the
owner-beneficiary. These rules become difficult to apply in cases such as
Chown where the insured and the owner-beneficiary die simultaneously.2 4
III. THREE APPROACHES TO THE SIMULTANEOUS DEATH SITUATION
In the situation where the owner-beneficiary and the insured die
simultaneously there are three possible solutions to the question of what
amount is includible in the owner-beneficiary's gross estate: (1) An amount
representing the full proceeds of the policy, (2) zero, or (3) an amount
representing the interpolated terminal reserve value.
The first possible solution is to value the owner-beneficiary's interest
at an amount representing the full proceeds of the policy. The government
advances this solution on the theory that at the moment of the death of
the insured there is a split second of time within which the owner-bene-
ficiary is entitled to the full proceeds of the policy.2 5 The taxpayer's position
in rebuttal is that there is no split second of time within which the owner-
beneficiary could have been entitled to the proceeds because the initial
premise is that the deaths were simultaneous.26 An alternative theory sup-
porting the full proceeds valuation (at least when a plane crash is involved)
is based on the idea that, just prior to the death of the insured but after
the plane is in trouble, the death of the insured is so imminent that the
value of the policy to the owner-beneficiary increases to an amount near
or equal to the full proceeds of the policy, and this is its value when the
owner-beneficiary dies moments later.27 Opponents of this "falling plane"
theory point out that as the insured's death becomes increasingly imminent,
the beneficiary's death becomes equally imminent; therefore, any increase
in value attributable to the impending death of the insured is offset by an
equivalent decrease in value to the beneficiary due to his impending
death.28
A second possible solution is to include nothing in the gross estate of
the owner-beneficiary. In support of this valuation, the taxpayer's estate
argues that at the moment of death there is no value by reason of the bene-
24. 23 Sw. L.J. 740 (1969).
25. See Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 392, 394 (6th
Cir. 1970).
26. See Estate of Wien v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 32, 39 (5th Cir. 1971).
27. Estate of Harriet H. Chown, 51 T.C. 140, 143 (1968). This theory assumes
that a "willing buyer," knowing of the insured's impending death, would be will-
ing to pay the owner-beneficiary an amount equal to the proceeds of the policy
to obtain his interest. See note 39 and text accompanying notes 56-59 infra.
28. See Estate of Chown v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir.
1970). See also Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 684 (1965), where
the Court stated:
We hold that estate tax liability for policies "with respect to which the
decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership" depends
on a general, legal power to exercise ownership, without regard to the
owner's ability to exercise it at a particular moment.
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ficiary rights since the beneficiary has not survived, and there is no value
by reason of the ownership rights since the policy has matured, thereby
terminating the incidents of ownership. 29 Another theory supporting the
"zero valuation" is to use the "falling plane" rationale but focus attention
on the impending death of the beneficiary to establish that a "willing
buyer" would not purchase the beneficiary's fleeting prospects in the policy
proceeds; therefore, his interest has no value at the moment of death. 0
Finally, some argue in support of the zero valuation that the estate tax is
a tax on the transfer of property by the decedent at death and is not a tax
on property of the decedent owned at death but not transferred. 1 If this
premise is accepted, then, since the heirs or devisees of the owner-beneficiary
receive nothing of value by reason of the insurance policy, nothing is in-
cludible for estate tax purposes.32 The government might possibly rebut
this contention by refusing to accept the basic premise because there are
arguably other types of property which are includible in the gross estate
of the deceased, but do not involve a transfer of property.3
The third possible solution is to include an amount equal to the in-
terpolated terminal reserve of the policy in the gross estate of the owner-
beneficiary. This is the normal valuation rule where the owner of a life
insurance policy dies before the insured.34 Its application to the simultane-
ous death situation is supported in part by the rebuttal of the underlying
theories for the other two possibilities as outlined above and in part by the
fact that the government's own regulation establishes this valuation
method.3 5 By its terms, this regulation is applicable except in the case of
unusual policies 6 and the supporters of this theory point out that although
this is an unusual death situation, there is nothing unusual about the
policy.37
IV. How THE CouRTs HAviE RESOLVED THE VALUATION PROBLEM
On facts identical to Chown, a federal district court in Old Kent Bank
& Trust Co. v. United States8s held that the value of the ownership interest
in the policy at the time of death was zero. The court reasoned that, since
the policy matured at the instant of the simultaneous death, the "incidents
29. See Estate of Wien v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1971); Old
Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1968),
rev'd, 430 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1970).
30. See Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 48, 53
(W.D. Mich. 1968), revld, 430 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1970). Note the "willing buyer"
test can be argued in support of either the full proceeds or zero valuation. See
text accompanying notes 27-28 supra and 40-46 and 56-59 infra.
31. See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
32. Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 48, 53-54
(W.D. Mich. 1968), revd, 430 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1970).
33. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2038 (revocable transfers).
34. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
35. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (a) (2), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 417.
36. Id.
37. See Estate of Chown v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1970).
See also note 68 and accompanying text infra.
38. 292 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1968), rev'd, 430 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1970).
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of ownership" were worth nothing. Since rights to the proceeds then vested
in secondary beneficiaries, no potential buyer would pay for the interests
held by the owner. Thus, according to the district court, nothing of value
passed through to the estate.8 9 However, the court of appeals reversed,
holding that the interpolated terminal reserve value was the proper amount
includible in the owner's estate.4 0
The Tax Court in Chown held that the entire proceeds of the policy
were includible in Mrs. Chown's estate.4 1 The court reasoned that the
policy matured and the proceeds became payable at the instant of Roger's
death.42 The court considered the interpolated terminal reserve value im-
proper as it was not "consistent with the actual fair market value" 43 of the
policy at Harriet's death. Instead, the Tax Court reasoned that as death ap-
proached the policy neared face value and the entire proceeds were, there-
fore, includible in Harriet's estate. The ninth circuit rejected this valuation,
reasoning that although Mrs. Chown's chances of immediate payment in-
creased as Roger approached death, her chances of exercising control over
the policy or proceeds were correspondingly decreasing at the same time.44
The court stated that inclusion of the entire proceeds "rests on an assertion
that what one at the same instant 'acquires' and 'loses' one has rather than
has not at that instant."4 5 Had Roger died first the entire proceeds would
have been includible in Harriet's estate because she would have become
entitled to the proceeds as beneficiary, not as a result of valuing her owner-
ship interest.4 6 Furthermore, the court rejected the reasoning of the Tax
Court because it was, by implication, based on an unfounded presumption
that Roger died first (since nothing else could "fully mature" the policy). 47
Valuation based on the terminal reserve value of the policy was held
proper on appeal in both Chown and Old Kent Bank. The Chown court
reasoned that the value was other than the interpolated terminal reserve
only between the moment something went wrong in flight and the deaths,
and that there was no reason to determine estate tax liability by focusing
39. Id. at 52-53. Although Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (a) (1), T.D. 6680, 1963-2
CuM. BULL. 417, expresses the valuation in terms of the selling price of com-
parable policies by an insurance company, courts have also spoken of an amount
a "willing buyer" would pay a "willing seller" for the contract. Goodman v. Com-
missioner, 156 F.2d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 1946). "The 'willing buyer and seller' are a
hypothetical buyer and seller having a reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."
United States v. Simmons, 346 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1965). Regardless of the
language employed, the amount required to be included in the gross estate under
§ 2033 of the Internal Revenue Code is the value of the ownership interest
transferred at death.
40. Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1970).
41. Estate of Harriet H. Chown, 51 T.C. 140 (1968).
42. Id. at 143.
43. Id. In Estate of James Stuart Pritchard, 4 T.C. 204 (1944), a case not
involving simultaneous death but a gift in contemplation of death, the court
reasoned that an important element in the value of life insurance is collectibility.
As death approaches, the time of collectibility nears and, therefore, the value
approaches the face value.
44. 428 F.2d at 1399.
45. Id. at 1398. See also note 28 supra.
46. 428 F.2d at 1599.
47. Id. at 1398.
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on this brief instant of time.48 The Old Kent Bank49 court similarly
reasoned that a decedent policy owner's interest at death would ordinarily
be valued at the interpolated terminal reserve value, and to value the in-
terest transferred as the entire proceeds would impose a substantially higher
tax merely because of simultaneous death. The court in Old Kent Bank
stated the essence of the entire valuation problem as follows:
[I]n seeking a proper index for valuation, the Government looks
at the value of the proceeds accruing to the beneficiaries, while the
District Court looked at the value of the rights remaining in Mrs.
Goodwin's estate.50
Both courts agreed that the value of the rights or interest in the policy
transferred must determine the amount includible in the gross estate and the
terminal reserve value most nearly represents the value of the interest trans-
ferred.
In Estate of Ellen M. Wien,51 the Tax Court, shortly after its decision
in Chown, again held the value of the interest transferred for estate tax
purposes equaled the entire proceeds of the policy. This case is particularly
significant in that it involved a husband and wife, each the owner-bene-
ficiary of a life insurance policy on the other's life. The fifth circuit
reversed, holding that the interpolated terminal reserve was the proper
valuation of the interest transferred in both policies. 52 In Estate of Meltzer
v. Commissioner,5 3 the fourth circuit, on facts similar to Chown, reversed
the full proceeds valuation of the Tax Court and held the interpolated
terminal reserve value applicable.
After the decisions in Chown and these subsequent cases, the question
of determining the amount includible in the "gross estate" of an owner-
beneficiary who dies simultaneously with the insured has been resolved
in four circuits by application of the interpolated terminal reserve value.5 4
48. Id. at 1399.
49. Old Kent Bank &c Trust Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 392, 395 (6th
Cir. 1970).
50. Id. at 394.
51. 51 T.C. 287 (1968).
52. Estate of Wien v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1971). Judge
Tuttle's dissenting opinion favored a full proceeds valuation. He considered it
to be a "physical impossibility" that in the same accident the wife could die first
for one purpose and the husband for another. Judge Tuttle concluded his dissent-
ing opinion by stating:
In sum, I think the true facts should be established-that is, that one of
the couple died first (even momentarily) if that be the fact. Alternatively,
I think that if all ownership rights were extinguished at simultaneous
death, if that should be the finding, then all rights merged into the in-
sureds at the moment of their death and all was part of the taxable estate.
Id. at 44 (dissenting opinion).
53. 439 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1971).
54. The four circuits following the interpolated terminal reserve valuation
are as follows: Estate of Wien v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1971); Estate
of Meltzer v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1971); Old Kent Bank &c Trust
Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1970); Estate of Chown v. Commis-
sioner, 428 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1970). It should also be noted that the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act was in effect in similar form in all four cases.
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All four circuits apply this method of valuation notwithstanding criticisms
of it and the availability of other valuation methods. A comparison of this
method with possible alternative valuation methods indicates that the ter-
minal reserve value most accurately represents the interest transferred in
the simultaneous death situation.
V. How VALID Is THE TERMINAL RESERVE METHOD OF VALUATION?
Analysis of the practical effects of the three possible valuations in si-
multaneous death situations strongly supports application of the interpolated
terminal reserve method. Valuation of the interest transferred as the amount
of the full proceeds of the policy, or as zero, results in greater or lesser tax
liability in simultaneous death cases than in otherwise similar non-simul-
taneous death cases. 55 The interpolated terminal reserve valuation neither
discriminates for nor against simultaneous death, and thus provides the
most practical and fairest solution to the valuation problem.
As previously mentioned, some people have argued that a valuation
based upon a "willing buyer" test should be applied.56 This test would value
the ownership interest transferred as the amount a "willing buyer" would
pay a "willing seller" for the insurance contract at the moment of the in-
sured's death. The district court in Old Kent Bank employed such a test in
finding that, at the moment of simultaneous death, "a potential buyer would
have paid nothing for the interest transferrd to the heirs."57 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected application of the "willing buyer"
test to provide either a zero or full proceeds valuation. The court reasoned
that the buyer would not know the sequence of death and this uncertainty
would make the value of the policy highly speculative. Accordingly, there
is no assurance that a hypothetical arm's length buyer would be willing to
pay the amount of the full proceeds for the interest transferred.58 Proper
application of the "willing buyer" test requires knowledge by the buyer
of the exact instant and sequence of death.5 9 These facts were not proven in
Chown and evidence of them is doubtful in cases based on similar circum-
stances. Thus, because the "willing buyer" test must be applied after the
fact to the moment of death, it is of little analytical benefit in the simul-
taneous death situation. The interpolated terminal reserve method of valu-
ation is far less speculative than the "willing buyer" test in computing the
value of the interest transferred.
The interpolated terminal reserve value has, however, been subjected
55. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
56. See note 39 and text accompanying notes 27 and 30 supra.
57. Old Kent Bank 8: Trust Co. v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 48, 53 (W.D.
Mich. 1968), rev'd, 430 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1970).
58. Old Kent Bank &c Trust Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 392, 394 (6th
Cir. 1970).
59. Id. at 395 states:
As the District Court pointed out, there is no showing that such a buyer
could depend on the deaths occurring simultaneously. "Will the deaths
be treated as simultaneous? Will the decedent die first? Will the insured
die first? The value of the policy depends on the answers to these ques-
tions-answers which can only be given after death, again making the
value of the policy highly speculative ...."
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to criticism in the simultaneous death situation. It has been argued that
one reason for not applying this valuation is the exception to Treasury Reg-
ulation 20.2031-8 (a) (2). This exception states the interpolated terminal re-
serve value should not be applied if, because of the unusual nature of the
contract, the approximation resulting from the terminal reserve method is
not reasonably dose to the full value of the contract. 60 The Tax Court in
Chown relied on this exception in rejecting the interpolated terminal re-
serve valuation. Treating the policy as fully matured, the Tax Court stated
that the terminal reserve value was "not consistent with the actual fair
market value of the policy at the time of Harriet's death .... ."61 However,
the Tax Court held the interpolated terminal reserve value inapplicable
not because of the unusual nature of the contract but because the deaths
were simultaneous. 62 The court of appeals said this was a misapplication
of the exception and applied the terminal reserve valuation. 63
The use of the interpolated terminal reserve valuation has also been
criticized because it requires reliance on the presumption that the insured
survived at least momentarily,64 whereas the deaths of the owner-benefi-
ciary and the insured were in fact simultaneous. However, the finding of
simultaneous death under the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act is itself a
presumption that arises only in the absence of evidence to the contrary.65
The valuation problem is, in essence, the problem of selecting an assumed
sequence of death that will be fairest for estate tax purposes, when evidence
as to the moment of death is unavailable. Therefore, it appears that the
criticism is actually directed at the assumed sequence of death implicit in
the use of the interpolated terminal reserve method of valuation, rather
than at the method per se. Since the probability of both deaths occurring at
precisely the same instant is very small,66 in most cases where the sequence
of death is not provable a finding of simultaneous death may be an unwar-
ranted assumption. An assumption that either the insured survived or the
60. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (a) (2), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 Cmri. BULL. 417.
61. Estate of Harriet H. Chown, 51 T.C. 140, 143 (1968).
62. Id.
63. Estate of Chown v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1970).
The court of appeals in Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 892(6th Cir. 1970), noted similar misconstruction of the exception in rejecting the
governments argument that the interest transferred should be valued as the
amount of the full proceeds. The court, after noting the exception, stated:
This latter regulation does not apply when the insurance contract is of
an "unusual nature," and the Government contends that it is for that
reason inapplicable here. We disagree. In this case, it is the circumstance
of simultaneous death which is unusual, not the character of the contract(which, for all that appears, is a perfectly ordinary life insurance policy).
Id. at 394.
64. See 23 Sw. L.J. 740, 744 (1969).
65. § 471.040, RSMo 1969.
66. In Estate of Wien v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 32, 44 (5th Cir. 1971) (dis-
senting opinion), Judge Tuttle refers to the probability of simultaneous death as
follows:
I think the likelihood of absolute simultaneous death is so remote that
I think both taxpayer and the Commissioner are entitled to have the fact
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owner-beneficiary survived may well be factually more correct; but to base
valuation on one or the other of these assumptions may lead to unfairness.
Uniform state statutes, although not controlling on questions of estate tax
liability,67 assume simultaneous death in absence of evidence to the con-
trary, but distribute insurance proceeds as if the insured had survived. An
interpolated terminal reserve valuation is logically consistent with this
type of distribution. Thus, the interpolated terminal reserve results in the
most practical taxation of an "ownership interest" in cases where evidence
of the moment of death is unavailable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The interpolated terminal reserve value has been the traditional means
of valuing the decedent's interest in the policy when the insured survived.
Such valuation is definite, easily determined and represents the value placed
on the policy by the insurance company at the moment of death. When
weighed against the speculative nature of a "willing buyer" test or reasoning
which places an unwarranted advantage or burden on an estate merely be-
cause of a simultaneous death, the terminal reserve method of valuation is
the most rational solution to the valuation dilemma.
JOHN R. LONGLETr
LIABILITY OF DRUG MANUFACTURER
UNDER FAILURE TO WARN NOTIONS
Stahlheber v. American Cyanamid Co.'
On April 5, 1964, Mrs. Stahlheber, age 41, attended a "feeding station"
in order to take an oral polio vaccine. She was given Trivalent Orimune,2
which contains attenuated live polio virus that combats polio strains types
one, two and three. The vaccine was a prescription items manufactured un-
der federal regulation by the Lederle Laboratories Division of defendant
manufacturer, American Cyanamid. Nineteen days later, the plaintiff was
afflicted with a paralysis which spread over her lower trunk, limbs and ex-
tremities. The plaintiff and her husband 4 filed suit against defendant alleg-
67. See note 4 supra.
1. 451 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1970).
2. Id. at 51. Trivalent Orimune is the trade name for the defendant's
"trivalent" vaccine, in which all three types of attenuated polio virus are used.
Originally, an oral live virus vaccine was administered separately for each of the
three types of polio virus. These vaccines are termed monovalent.
3. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 122 (9th Cir. 1968).
Oral polio vaccine is a prescription item.
4. Mo. R. Crv. P. 66.01 (c) provides:
(c) Consolidation-Injury to Spouse. If an injury, not result-
ing in death, is inflicted upon the person of one spouse, and causes
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ing that defendant was negligent in failing to warn persons receiving its
vaccine of the possibility that adult persons doing so might become afflicted
with poliomyelitis. The circuit court awarded a $130,000 judgment to Mrs.
Stahlheber and a $20,000 judgment to her husband. The Missouri Supreme
Court, on appeal, affirmed Mrs. Stahlheber's judgment, and reversed the
judgment in favor of Mr. Stahlheber on the grounds of inadequacy of the
damage award. 5
It is significant that Stahlheber was tried on a negligence theory (failure
to warn) rather than a strict liability theory as seemingly sanctioned by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A.6 Strict liability under the
Restatement (Second) would require only a finding that the product was
"defective," which has been construed to mean unreasonably dangerous
when put to reasonably contemplated uses and having qualities inconsistent
with the normal consumer's expectations. 7 In comment k to section 402A,
however, there is a caveat to the main body of the section which concedes
that some products (e.g., drugs and vaccines) are incapable of being made
safe for their intended and ordinary use, given the present state of human
knowledge.8 Such products, where accompanied by an adequate warning
of action therefor accrue to the injured spouse and also to the other
spouse for loss of consortium and services, or either, they shall be enforced
in one action brought by both spouses. The cause of action of a spouse
so required to join in an action as a party plaintiff under this Rule shall
be barred by failing to join therein after the defendant has given to
such spouse thirty days' notice in writing of the pendency of the action
and of the necessity to join therein; such notice shall be given either by
personal service within or without the state and proof thereof by the
return of an officer or by affidavit, or by the filing of a United States
Post Office Registry receipt signed by such spouse. If such service cannot
be obtained, then the Court may in its discretion stay the pending
proceeding.
5. 451 S.W.2d at 48.
6. RSrATEmEr (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965). This section reads as
follows: (I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
7. See Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Davis
v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); and Grinnel v. Charles
Pfizer &c Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969).
8. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 402A, comment
k at 353-54 (1965). The comment reads:
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in
the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made
safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common
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of their risks, are not defective, nor unreasonably dangerous. Conversely, if
the warning is absent or inadequate, regardless of the product's desirable
benefits, strict liability attaches. It will be assumed, for purposes of this
discussion, that comment k incorporates some requirements traditionally
associated with "negligence." (In Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,9 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made this assumption.) While
some difference in approach may exist, comment k deals in terms of "norms"
and "departures" which are substantially analogous to the basic theory of
negligence.
Whether assessing liability arising out of prescription drug or vaccine
use in terms of traditional negligence theory, or under the transfigured fault
notions implicit in comment k, some basic questions typically are presented.
The first question involves when it becomes necessary for a drug man-
ufacturer to give a warning. The warning should be given, as the jury
instruction in Stahlheber demonstrates, when the drug manufacturer knew
or, by using the skill of an expert in the defendant's business, could have
known of the dangerous potentiality of said product.10 Excepted from this
rule are obvious dangers such as a knife cut and some allergenic reactions.11
Johnston v. Upjohn Go.,1 2 a Kansas City Court of Appeals case, recognized
the above rule, and held that no evidence was presented that defendant
drug manufacturer could have had knowledge that the administration of
in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the
Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious
and damaging consequences when it is enjected. Since the disease itself
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use
of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high
degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared,
and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs,
vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally
be sold except to physicians, or under prescription of a physician. It is
also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experi-
ence, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of
ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and
use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller
of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation
calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with
a known but apparently reasonable risk.
9. 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969), citing Kessler, Products Liability, 76
YAa L.J. 887, 931 (1967).
10. 451 S.W.2d at 61; see Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143, 152
(Mo. 1967); Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Mo. 1958); La-
Plant v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d 231, 240-41 (Spr. Mo. App.
1961); and Krauskopf, Products Liability (part 2), 33 Mo. L. REv. 24, 40-42 (1968).
11. Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956), noted in
Larison, Negligent Manufacturer's Liability for Injuries to Persons with Peculiar
Susceptibility to Substance in Product, 22 Mo. L. REv. 223 (1957).
12. 442 S.W.2d 93 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
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its antibiotic might cause the reaction plaintiff experienced. Hence, no
warning was required.' 3
The second question is whether some warning was in fact given by the
pharmaceutical company. This is a fact question for the jury as declared
in Stahlheber.14
The third question is whether the warning was adequate. In Brown v.
H. K. Mulford Co.,' 5 a case involving injuries from allegedly defective hog
cholera serum, the plaintiff claimed that defendant negligently failed to
divulge to the treating veterinarian, or to the plaintiff, the serum's dan-
gerous character. The court reversed a jury verdict for plaintiff on appeal,
holding that the following warning given by defendant was adequate:16
It is only with the greatest care and best judgment on the part of
skilled and qualified veterinarians that the Serum-Virus... may
be safely used.... If the dose of serum is too small in proportion
to the dose of virus, or serum weak in potency is used, or the ani-
mals are unusually susceptible, hog cholera may insue.... This
disadvantage... must be considered seriously.17
Another example of an adequate warning is found in Carmen v. Eli Lilly
& Co.,'1 an Indiana case centering on the use of rabies vaccines by humans.
The warning given in that case read:
REMOTE ILL EFFECTS OF TREATMENT
Occasionally, in addition to the local reactions observed dur-
ing treatment, there have been disturbances ascribed to the treat-
ment, such as "treatment paralysis" coming on during the treat-
ment or immediately afterward, and in a very few cases a fatal
paralysis has occurred. Remlinger in the study of 107,712 cases
found forty cases of paralysis, two resulting fatally....
It is well for the physicians to have these facts in mind although
the dangers are very remote and do not affect the value or necessity
of treatment.
There are no contraindications .... 19
The judgment entered for defendant manufacturer was sustained, the court
holding that "any reasonably prudent adult person would be fully informed
from it [the warning] as to the results that might flow from the use of the
vaccine so that he could thereby decide whether or not he would submit
himself to the treatment .... " 20 In holding the foregoing admonition dis-
positive on the adequacy issue the court disregarded plaintiff's argument
that the expression in the pamphlet that the "treatment is harmless.
13. Id. at 96-97.
14. 451 S.W.2d at 50.
15. 198 Mo. App. 586, 199 S.W. 582 (Spr. Ct. App. 1917).
16. 1d. at 592, 199 S.W. at 584.
17. Id. at 590-91, 199 S.W. at 583-84.
18. 109 Ind. App. 76, 32 N.E.2d 729 (1941).
19. Id. at 83, 32 N.E.2d at 731.
20. Id. at 87, 32 N.E.2d at 733.
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and the ambiguity in the pamphlet considered as a whole prevented a sub-
missible case on adequacy of warning from being made.
While this precise issue of "adequacy" of warning did not reach the
jury in Stahlheber, for purposes of comparison, the defendants pointed to
a warning from a pamphlet accompanying the vaccine which read as follows:
Printed in U.S.A., Oct. 1968
Only in adults receiving type 3 has a question of safety been raised
following administration of the vaccine during the summer season
of 1962 when less than one per million vaccinees developed a
neurologic disease resembling poliomyelitis.... Critical analysis
did not prove that any of the illness could be attributed to the vac-
cne virus and their true significance is still under study....
There are no known contraindications to oral poliovirus vaccine.;'
This statement closely resembles the warning in the Carmen case referred
to earlier. However, the presence of two Surgeon General's Reports on the
vaccine in Stahlheber22 would seem to provide a firmer basis for doubt
about the polio vaccine's safety than the mild disclaimer indicated by the
defendant's pamphlet. For example, the Surgeon General's reports stated
that type three vaccine should be restricted to pre-school and school-age
children and to adults in high risk groups such as those traveling in epidemic
areas.21 Moreover, the second and more recent Surgeon General's report
recommended that in the case of adults, especially above the age of 30,
potential risks are inherent in the vaccine. This conclusion was supported
by the observation that the need for immunization diminishes with ad-
vancing age.24
Since reasonable care in conveying a warning rather than actual notice
is the usual test,25 a fourth question concerns the mode to be used to convey
the warning. The manner chosen to announce the alleged warning in
Stahlheber (a pamphlet accompanying vaccine bottles) satisfies the stand-
ards set by Missouri case law.26 Despite this recognition of the adequacy
of warning inferred from accompanying written matter, in Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Yarrow27 (a negligence theory case) a federal court held that de-
fendant manufacturer's "detail men" (sales representatives who frequently
visited customer physicians) should have personally advised physicians of the
drug's harmful effects, instead of relying upon letters or announcements2 8
21. 451 S.W.2d at 61-62.
22. Id. at 58. See REPORT OF THE SPECI ADVisORY CoMnrrxz ON ORAL
PoLIOMYELrIS VACCINE TO TnE SURGEON GENERAL (Sept. 20, 1962), and the sup-
plementary report dated Dec. 18, 1962.
23. 451 S.W.2d at 58.
24. Id.
25. RE TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). The relevant portion
reads: "(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous con-
ditions or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous."
26. See Johnston v. Upjohn Co., 442 S.W.2d 93 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969) (in-
sert on package); Brown v. H. K. Mulford Co., 198 Mo. App. 586, 199 S.W. 582
(Spr. Ct. App. 1917) (bottle label).
27. 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969) (applying South Dakota law).
28. Id. at 993.
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In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,29 the federal court chose to use the
legal theory outlined in comment k, instead of the traditional theory of
negligence. Davis held that warnings on the labels of vaccine bottles are
not enough since many consumers would not notice such warnings.30 The
opinion recommended the use of advertisements, posters, written releases or
verbal statements.3 ' However, the opinion did not indicate if the use of one,
a combination, or all of the above means would be required by the court.
The notions of reasonable care and actual notice raise an additional
problem, subsidiary to the adequacy of the warning. The usual rule for
non-prescription drugs requires the manufacturer to use reasonable care in
warning consumers of its product's risks.3 2 In contrast, for prescription
drugs, according to Missouri case law, the manufacturer must make reason-
able efforts to warn the patient's doctor of the drug's risks.83 In support of
this rule, it is reasoned that prescription drugs (and vaccines) by definition
encompass greater inherent risks than non-prescription items. Consequently,
a doctor should act as a "learned intermediary" between the producer and
the patient to advise and better protect the patient.8 4 The issue of who
should receive the warning was not reached in Stahlheber. The legal theory
relied upon in Stahlheber, however, was "failure to warn persons" rather
than "failure to warn the plaintiff's doctor."3 5 Hence, the facts and legal
theory of Stahlhebers s suggest a final question: For prescription drugs, to
whom should an adequate warning be aimed when the manufacturer and
"consumer-patient" have no "learned intermediary" between them, as in
mass-immunization programs similar to the one in Stahlheber?
It is submitted that Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.37 [the Restate-
ment (Second) comment k case] contains an appropriate answer to this
question. The Davis opinion recommends that, in a "mass immunization
situation" where prescription items are dispensed without a doctor's direct
supervision, the consumer-patient should be the target of the warning 8
It would seem almost certain that the Missouri courts will adopt the require-
ment that a warning be given to the consumer in this situation, for other-
wise the law would be in the anomolous position of requiring a warning to
29. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968). Applying Idaho law, the court reversed
a lower courts dismissal and remanded with instructions to try the case under
comment k notions.
30. Id. at 131.
31. Id.
32. Arnold v. May Dep't Stores Co., 337 Mo. 727, 737, 85 S.W.2d 748, 753-54
(1935).
33. See Bine v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 628, 626-27 (Mo. 1968); Krug
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143, 146-47 (Mo. 1967); and Johnston v. Up-
john Co., 442 S.W.2d 93, 95 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
34. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1967).
35. 451 S.W.2d at 48.
36. The author is referring to a school "feeding station" dispensing oral
polio vaccine, a prescription item, apparently without the presence of a physician
to receive the manufacturer's warning and to advise and protect the people
receiving the vaccine.
37. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
38. Id. at 131.
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the consumer for non-prescription drugs and not requiring one for certain
prescription drugs.
The appropriate mode or manner by which a warning must be con-
veyed has not yet been made clear in cases of this type. However, the gen-
eral rule governing the effectiveness of contractual terms printed on bills.
letterheads and tickets to the effect that such terms must be called to the
attention of the other party or so laid before him that he may reasonably,
and is in fact, believed to have been made aware of such terms,39 may pro-
vide an influential analogy.
V. KENNETH RoHmR
THE ARKANSAS PRISON SYSTEM-AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL OUTRAGE
Holt v. Sarver'
Arkansas has the best prison
system in the United States2
Eight class actions were brought by inmates of the Arkansas Peniten-
tiary System against the members of the State Board of Corrections and the
State Commissioner of Corrections, in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Arkansas. Petitioners alleged that Arkansas prison
conditions and practices were a violation of the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment in the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution,3 and prayed for a declaratory judgment as to
the truth of these allegations and for appropriate permanent injunctive re-
lief. The court was satisfied that federal jurisdiction properly existed under
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,4 and that conditions and practices
in the Arkansas Penitentiary System were such that confinement of persons
therein amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The court also sus-
tained the claim that racial discrimination existed and had to be elim-
inated.5
39. 1 A. CoRIN, CoNrRAcrs § 33 (1963).
1. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
2. Quotation attributed to Knox Nelson, Arkansas state senator and chair-
man of a legislative committee appointed to study the Arkansas prisons. T. MURTON
& J. HYAMS, AccoMPLIcEs To THE CmuEru, THE ARKANsAS PRISON SCANDAL 14 (2d
ed. 1969).
3. The petition also claimed that racial segregation of the inmates existed
in contravention of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution,
and that the use of convicts to do forced, unpaid labor was prohibited by the
thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 309 F. Supp. at 364.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) allows a civil action for deprivation of rights
by a person acting under color of law, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1964) vests originaljurisdiction in these suits in the federal district courts.
5. The allegation that uncompensated work done by the prisoners violated
the thirteenth amendment was rejected. Reference was made to Heffin v. Sanford,
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The court observed that this was the first time the constitutionality
of an entire penal system had ever been attacked.6 Evidence presented to
the court from motion pictures and the testimony of penal experts, inmates,
and free world employees of the penitentiary demonstrated why the Arkan-
sas system quite properly earned such a nefarious distinction. In reaching
its decision, the court was particularly influenced by evidence relating to
the trusty system, the conditions in the prison barracks, intolerably unsani-
tary and psychologically damaging isolation cells,7 and the failure to pro-
vide any sort of rehabilitation program.8
A brief description of the dehumanizing existence of the inmates
graphically illustrates why an entire prison system could be held to violate
the eighth amendment.9 With the exception of inmates in isolation cells,
all prisoners were housed in 100-man dormitories, affording the individual
inmate no privacy. Prisoners high on smuggled drugs and alcohol ran wild
142 F.2d 798, 799-800 (5th Cir. 1944), where the court noted that there is a
difference between "involuntary servitude" and "uncompensated service," and
that the thirteenth amendment forbids the former, with the exception of punish-
ment for criminal offenses, but does not prohibit the latter. The Holt court
reached the same conclusion in spite of evidence that showed the convicts were
made to labor long hours six days a week, in all kinds of weather, doing the
particularly harsh and tedious work of harvesting crops. Arkansas is one of a
very few states that pays a convict nothing for his work. Literally the only way
the men can earn money is to sell their blood at $5 a pint. 309 F. Supp. at 370-71.
6. This certainly was not the first time that Arkansas prisoners had attempted
to lay their grievances before the federal courts. Since 1965 there have been five
published opinions of cases dealing with specific practices found to be in violation
of the Constitution. See Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969); Jack-
son v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967), rev'd in part, 404 F.2d 571 (8th
Cir. 1968); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969); and Talley v.
Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965). Talley and Jackson outlawed corporal
punishment by the use of a whipping strap and two devices known as the "Tucker
telephone" and the "teeter board." The "Tucker telephone," a particularly grisly
torture, involved the connection of electrodes to a convict's penis and big toe.
An electric shock was then generated. In Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D.
Ark. 1969), it was held that a state had a constitutional duty to use ordinary care
to protect the lives and safety of prisoners, and that Arkansas had failed in this
duty. In addition, that court ruled that the overcrowded conditions of the Cum-
mins Unit isolation cells were unconstitutional.
7. The prisoners in the isolation cells were mistreated by their trusty guards.
They were ill-fed and had nothing to do. The Cummins Unit's cells were overrun
by rats. Periodically, emotionally disturbed inmates went on rampages and destroyed
what little fixtures they had in their cells. The court noted that many of the
problems are caused by these hardened prisoners themselves. Specifically, with
respect to this problem, the court ordered that the diet of these prisoners be im-
proved; that they be allowed to dine in the dining hall; and, further, that they
be supervised more closely by civilians rather than by trusties alone. 309 F. Supp.
at 384-85.
8. The Tucker Unit officials had started an educational program for the
men prior to the district court's opinion. Nothing had been done at the Cum-
mins Unit. Although the court said that absence of a program of training or
education by itself is not constitutionally impermissible, the failure to provide
any sort of rehabilitative plan was a factor which contributed to the overall un-
constitutionality of the operation. 309 F. Supp. at 378-79.
9. For a more complete description of the life of an Arkansas Penitentiary
inmate, see T. MURTON & J. HYAms, supra note 1.
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at night. The weaker men were victims of stabbings and sexual assaults.10
Sanitary conditions were deplorable, and medical and dental facilities were
very inadequate. Those inmates not fortunate enough to be trusties were
forced to work long hours in the fields in all kinds of weather. All of these
conditions were compounded by the fact that, quite simply, the trusties
ran the prison.1 Testimony indicated that 90 percent of all prison duties
were performed by trusties, including the armed guarding of other inmates.
The trusty system and the conditions in the barracks were the two most
significant factors which caused the court to hold as it did.
No specific individual relief was granted. Instead, the court ordered
injunctive relief for the prisoners as a class. Because it recognized that states
have a duty and right to imprison convicted criminals and maintain order
and discipline within their prisons, the court moved cautiously in fashioning
a remedy. The commissioner was ordered to make a prompt and reasonable
start towards elimination of the unconstitutional evils of the system. This
effort was required to be vigorous, prompt, and in good faith as funds be-
came available.' 2 However, the allowable period to bring about this reform
was to be measured in months, rather than years.
Respondents were required to submit periodic reports showing the
steps being taken to the court and to counsel for the petitioners. The court
also required that certain minimum steps be taken immediately. High pri-
ority was given to overhauling the trusty system. The court ordered that
the trusties be stripped of their authority over other inmates. Equally im-
portant was the critical need for change in the overcrowded condition of
the barracks. The court ordered the barracks divided into smaller, more
easily controllable units, so that order could be established and inmates
could be protected from assaults by other inmates. The court warned that
if it believed its orders were not being heeded the present remedies would
10. It is estimated that approximately 80% of the inmates at Tucker were
either homosexuals or had had homosexual experiences. Id. at 75.
11. The penologists testified that it is desirable to give prisoners trusted
positions, but that excessive reliance on the trusty system, such as that allowed in
Arkansas, is bad. At the Cummins Unit, thirty-five free world employees were in
charge of 1,000 men. The trusties could have easily taken over the prison, but
they did not-perhaps because trusties had great power and many privileges. A
clever trusty can earn a great deal of money for himself by dealing in drugs, food,
medicine, and liquor, and by selling coveted jobs to the other prisoners. They
also had the power to punish and could enforce their orders because they were
armed. The Holt court heard evidence that a trusty gate-guard had recently killed
another prisoner whom he felt was escaping. No one questioned the guard'sjudgment or true intentions. The court felt that eventually the trusties must be
stripped of their wide authority, but for the present, complete elimination of the
system would not be practical. Due to the fact that gate-guards control the move-
ment of contraband into the prison, the court ordered trusty gate-guards replaced
with free world personnel. It was also decided that supervision of the prisoners
in the field should no longer be done by armed trusties. It was ordered that
civilian personnel take over this duty immediately, for the protection of the in-
mates. 309 F. Supp. at 373-75, 384.
12. 309 F. Supp. at 383. The court noted that appropriations by the Arkansas
Legislature had increased over the past several years, and that the Governor had
issued a call for the legislature to meet in special session to consider the problems
of the prison system. Id.
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have to be reviewed and revamped for the simple reason that, one way or
another, Arkansas was going to have a prison system compatible with the
United States Constitution.'3
The protection afforded by the cruel and unusual punishment dause
of the eighth amendment has been given a broader and broader ambit by
the courts. It is fairly clear that the term "cruel and unusual punishment"
is not subject to an inflexible definition, but, instead, moves with the mood
of society's concept of decency.14 At first the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment was used to ban specific practices which amounted to
torture, seemed unnecessarily cruel, or shocked the sensibilities of the com-
munity.' 5 This included drawing and quartering a convicted offender,
burning him at the stake, cutting off parts of his body, or disemboweling
him.'6 Later, it was suggested that a punishment wholly out of proporidn
to the offense might be constitutionally invalid.17
The Holt decision does not mark the first time that the Arkansas
prisons have come under the scrutiny of the federal courts. The disciplining
of Arkansas inmates by shocking them with electrical devices or whipping
them with four-foot long, four-inch wide straps has previously been de-
dared cruel and unusual punishment.'3 By contemporary standards such
tortures would seem to be blatantly objectionable. However, until just re-
cently, they were still in use in Arkansas. 19 How such a situation could exist
13. The district court's decision was affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
The appellate court found the lower court's findings to be supported by "over-
whehing substantial evidence." Id. at 307-08. Further, on remand, the lower
court was ordered to continue to require up-to-date reports to be submitted by
prison officials to insure that the constitutional deficiencies were being cured.
Id. at 309. However, the eighth circuit noted that supervision of state prisons by
federal courts should not exist for any longer than is necessary to rectify conditions
violative of constitutional rights. Id.
14. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 890 n.3 (dissenting opinion), denying
cert. to 275 Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d 662 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th
Cir. 1965); Goss v. Bomar, 33 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1964); Hancock v. Avery, 301
F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Austin v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 304 (W.D. Mo.
1964).
15. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-36 (1878). "This amendment was
adopted to prevent inhuman, barbarous, or torturous punishment or some punish-
ment unknown at common law." Rosenberg v. Carrol, 99 F. Supp. 630, 632
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
16. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878).
17. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144
U.S. 323, 331 (1892). In Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the eighth amendment bars execu-
tion for a rape in which the victim's life was neither taken nor endangered, since
death is an excessively disproportionate penalty for such an offense.
18. See note 6 supra.
19. Efforts to use the Arkansas state courts as a means of halting these prac-
tices and prosecuting those prison employees responsible were largely unsuccessful.
Following a 1966 investigation by the Arkansas Criminal Investigation Division,
several former employees at the Tucker Unit were charged with having violated
Aim. STAT. ANN. § 46-158 (1947). This statute made it a felony for any penitentiary
employee to inflict a punishment on a convict in excess of the punishment pre-
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can be explained in part by the courts' traditional reluctance to head the
complaints of convicts regarding prison conditions.
It is dear today that federal courts are open to a state prisoner alleging
an obvious violation of federally guaranteed constitutional rights.20 This
was not true in years past. At one time, it was a well established principle
that a convict serving a valid sentence lost all his individual rights and was
"for the time being a slave of the State."2 1 Gradually, largely through liti-
gation in federal courts, it was accepted that a convict retained all his
rights "except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him
by law." 22 Two avenues became available to the prisoner seeking review-a
writ of habeas corpus28 and a suit under the Federal Civil Rights Act of
1871.24
Inspite of these readily available procedural tools, prisoners were still
hampered in their quest for redress by several judicially created doctrines.2 5
The most persuasive and potent of these was the principle that the admin-
istration of prisons is an area where the courts should maintain a "hands-
off policy." 26 In recent years this arbitrary rule has been relaxed in favor
of an examination by the courts of the merits of each specific complaint;
scribed by the Penitentiary Board. The Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Arkansas
held the statute to be unconstitutional under article 4 of the Arkansas Constitu-
tion, and the information against the employees was dismissed. The Supreme
Court of Arkansas affirmed that ruling. State v. Bruton, 246 Ark 293, 437 S.W.2d
795 (1969). In all fairness to the Arkansas judiciary, it must be noted that the
highest Arkansas court is on record as deploring the whipping of convicts. Werner
v. State, 44 Ark. 122 (1884).
20. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 441 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Wilwording v. Swen-
son, 439 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1971); Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771, 775 (8th Cir.
1970).
21. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). For a more
lengthy discussion, see Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of
Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
22. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 887 (1944).
23. Under the federal habeas corpus statute, federal courts are allowed to
grant the writ when a person shows that he is unlawfully in custody. 28 U.S.C.
§2241 (c) (3) (1964).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964); 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) (1964). The decisions rarely
differentiate between the two sections as separate causes of action, probably because
most petitions either meet the requirements of both or neither. Both sections allow
injunctive relief and civil damages. See Dodd v. Spokane County, 393 F.2d 330 (9th
Cir. 1968) and Mizell v. North Broward Hospital Dist., 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970).
25. See Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55
VA. L. Rnv. 795 (1969).
26. Startti v. Beto, 405 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1969); Cole v. Smith, 344 F.2d 721
(8th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir.
1956); Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955);
Oreta v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954); Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954); Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.
1950); United States ex rel. Hoge v. Bolsinger, 211 F. Supp. 199 (W.D. Pa. 1962);
Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Banmiller, 194 Pa. Super. 566, 168 A.2d 793 (1962).
The term "hands-off policy" probably first appeared in R. FITCH, CIVIL RIGHTs OF
PRIsON INMATEs 31 (1961). Even the Holt court felt the need to state that it recog-
nized and gave deference to the right of a state to make and enforce its criminal
laws and maintain a prison system. 309 F.Supp. at 382.
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but, of course, this injury takes place only when it is alleged that a civil
right has been abused.2 7
In the past, the federal courts required a petitioner to take complete
advantage of remedies afforded by state courts before federal suit could
be brought under the civil rights statute23 or by a writ of habeas corpus. 29
This obstacle was partially eliminated by the Supreme Court's ruling in
Monroe v. PapesO that exhaustion of state remedies is not a condition
precedent to bringing suit in federal court under the civil rights statute. As
a result of that decision, jurisdiction of most complaints alleging uncon-
stitutional prison conditions is asserted under the statutes' rather than
through the use of a writ of habeas corpus.3 2 The effectiveness of a writ of
habeas corpus is still hampered by contentions that state remedies were
available.33
Finally, a major impediment to petitions alleging eighth amendment
violations in state prisons was set aside by the United States Supreme Court
in Robinson v. California.84 The Court ruled that the prohibition against
27. Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970); Nolan v. Scafati, 430
F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970); Howard v. Swenson, 426 F.2d 277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 948 (1970); Panigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.C.R.I. 1970).
The federal courts will not interfere in internal operations and administration of
prisons unless there is a clear abuse of the prisoner's civil rights. To this extent
the "hands-off policy" still exists. Haggerty v. Wainwright, 427 F.2d 1137 (5th
Cir. 1970).
28. Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Siegel v. Ragen, 180
F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950).
29. Ryan v. Louisiana, 314 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. La. 1970); McCutcheon v.
Beto, 252 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
30. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Court strengthened this holding in the sub-
sequent case of McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
31. In the instant case, jurisdiction was asserted by petitioner Holt under
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1964) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). For a lengthy list of
cases, see Annot., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, notes 103-19, 189, 231, 298, 317, 341, 376,
387, 430, 437 (1970). For recent decisions see Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497
(S.D. Ga. 1970), affd, 439 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F.
Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Hamilton v. Schiro, Civil No. 69-2443 (E.D. La.,
June 26, 1970); Note, Penal Institutions and the Eighth Amendment-A Broadened
Concept of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 31 LA. L. REV. 395 (1971).
32. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S.
546 (1941); Glenn v. Ciccone, 370 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1966); Sutton v. Settle, 302
F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1962); United States ex rel. Turnbaugh v. Bibb, 252 F.2d 217
(7th Cir. 1958); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 887 (1945); Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966)
rev'd on other grounds, 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413
(S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1917).
33. See McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Dodd v. Spokane
County, 393 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1968). However, in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), the Supreme Court further broadened the habeas corpus jurisdiction
of the federal judiciary by holding that federal courts have the power to grant
relief despite the applicant's failure to have sought a state remedy which was
no longer available to him at the time he petitioned for the writ of habeas corpus.
34. 370 U.S. 660, rehearing denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1962). See Ruark v. Schooley,
211 F. Supp. 921 (D. Colo. 1962); Blythe v. Ellis, 194 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Tex.
1961); Bryant v. Harrelson, 187 F. Supp. 738 (S.D. Tex. 1960) (decisions dis-
missing suits because the eighth amendment was not binding on the states).
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cruel and unusual punishment had been extended to the states by the
fourteenth amendment.3 5
At the present time, therefore the judiciary seems willing to open the
courts to prisoner-petitioners. Many of the previously discussed devices
which stalled prisoners' efforts to bring their grievances before the courts
have been eliminated or modified. Logically, the next question that must
be asked is: How far will these courts be willing to go in protecting the
prisoner now that they have agreed to hear him?
Given the unique conditions in certain units of the Arkansas system,
the Holt court showed that it was prepared to take bold steps to insure
that the civil rights of Arkansas prisoners were not abused. This dramatic
decision is illustrative of the fact that cruel and unusual punishment is an
illusive concept. At least it is clear that it is not a static constitutional prin-
ciple. 0 It is possible that Holt heralds a broader use of the eighth amend-
ment as a vehicle for court-initiated prison reform.37 Thus, it may be bene-
ficial to speculate as to what ultimately could be accomplished through its
use.
The subject of prison reform is controversial because people disagree
on the objectives of penal institutions. Four theories are generally recog-
nized: Prisons should (1) rehabilitate, (2) punish, (3) isolate the criminal,
or (4) deter future wrongdoers.3 8 In Holt it was said that most penologists
feel very strongly that their primary purpose is to rehabilitate the inmate so
that he can be returned to society as a useful citizen. 39 But it is also agreed
that the first duty of any prison official is to secure the prisoner and prevent
his escape.40 Not surprisingly, the rehabilitative effort must suffer by neces-
sity.41
The Holt court talked in some detail about the program of rehabili-
tation at the Arkansas Penitentiary.42 While it did not feel that the failure
to provide educational or vocational training is unconstitutional per se, the
lack of such a program was a factor in its decision. The court concluded
its discussion of rehabilitation with the observation that today's sociological
theories are tomorrow's constitutional law.43 Reasoning from that signifi-
cant prophecy, it might be argued that a prison system which fails to make
an affirmative effort to rehabilitate inmates is constitutionally suspect under
35. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
36. See cases cited note 14 and accompanying text supra.
37. Prison reform is a timely and controversial national issue. Many people
are questioning the entire theory behind penology. See PRESIDENT'S CoMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE RE oRT (1967).
38. Gardiner, The Purposes of Criminal Punishment, 21 MODERN L. R.v.
117, 122-25 (1958).
39. 309 F. Supp. at 379.
40. For a more detailed discussion of correctional goals, see Hall, Williams
& Tomaino, The Challenge of Correctional Change: The Interface of Conformity
and Commitment, 57 J. CPhf. L.C. &c P.S. 493 (1966).
41. Comment, Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 9 WM. & MARY
L. Rxv. 178, 179 (1967). The author of this article is of the opinion that the
complexities of the prison administrator's task contributes greatly to the "hands-
off" attitude of the courts.
42. See note 8 supra.
43. 309 F. Supp. at 379.
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the eighth amendment. The logic of such a proposition is not so unreason-
able if the following hypotheses are accepted. First, in the absence of reha-
bilitation, conditions and practices may surface which in and of themselves
are unconstitutional. In other words, the failure to affirmatively provide a
meaningful program of work and study may cause a prison to degenerate
to a point where imprisonment there becomes violative of the Con-
stitution.4 4 Secondly, it is not unreasonable to say that lengthy incarcera-
tion behind prison walls can affect a man's mind. With nothing construc-
tive to do and no hope that his imprisonment will benefit him in any way,
a prisoner's mental health could be adversely affected. Arguably, any punish-
ment which could undermine the sanity of a prisoner or destroy his spirit
would be cruel and unusual.45
The preceding argument would not necessarily be difficult for a court
to accept. This is not the problem. The real problem with using the courts
as a vehicle for prison reform lies in finding a workable remedy.46 This
difficulty may have influenced the courts in developing a "hands-off policy"
towards penal institutions. It is rather a simple matter to enjoin specific
practices like whipping or electrical shock devices, 47 but, as the court ob-
served in Roberts v. Pepersack,48 there is a very tenuous distinction between
the need for secure and orderly prisons and the civil rights of inmates. 49
Obviously, when a court declares an entire penitentiary system illegal, the
men can not be set free. Still, that irrational remedy must not be dismissed
out of hand in light of the tough, threatening stance of the Holt court
when it said: "However constitutionally tolerable the-Arkansas system may
44. This is not at all unreasonable when the example of the Arkansas Peni-
tentiary System is considered. A good argument can be made that the conditions
at Tucker and Cummins were partly a product of a failure to provide the con-
victs with anything worthwhile to occupy their time. The work the men were
made to do did not motivate them to prepare for their eventual release. Men
who are forced to live with no purpose conceivably create conditions among them-
selves which may make their imprisonment unconstitutional. Note the heavy
use of drugs and liquor and the constant rapes and assaults. These very factors
weighed heavily in the Holt court's holding that the Arkansas system provided
cruel and unusual punishment. Id at 377-79.
45. The loss of sanity argument has always been advanced when prisoners
have attacked the constitutionality of solitary confinement. Courts have not said
that such isolation is unconstitutional per se. Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771
(8th Cir. 1970). However, in Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967),
the court ruled that subjecting a prisoner to a situation which provided a very
real possibility of loss of his mind was cruel and unusual. That court limited
the maximum period in solitary confinement to 15 days. In Holt the conditions
in the isolation cells were a factor, although not a critical one, in the ultimate
holding. See note 7 supra.
46. The Holt decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. See note 13 supra. During the course of the oral argument before the
eighth circuit one of the appellate judges remarked that finding an appropriate
remedy is the most difficult problem that must be solved in dealing with the
rights of prisoners.
47. See note 6 supra.
48. 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966).
49. Id. at 427.
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have been in former years, it simply will not do today as the Twentieth
Century goes into his [sic] eighth decade." 50
Despite this warning, the Holt court was not at all ready to dose down
a prison system. Instead, an attempt was made to find some sort of middle
ground to the dilemma of decreeing an appropriate remedy. As previously
stated, the district court required Commissioner Sarver to submit periodic
reports to the court and to counsel for the petitioners. To date, three such
reports have been made. These reports indicate that the State of Arkansas
is making commendable progress towards correcting conditions at the pris-
on units. Following the district court's decree the legislature met in an
extraordinary session and voted a $4 million appropriation for the penal
system. This money has been used to hire additional free world guards and
to construct new buildings, including a new maximum security unit. A
report, filed on May 8, 1970 and approved by the district court on May 28,
1970, detailed steps taken to disarm the trusties and to protect inmates from
attacks by other inmates. (This information was obtained from two
sources- (1) counsel for the petitioners, 51 and (2) the opinion of the ap-
pellate court, which upheld the lower court's decision.52) The contents of
subsequent reports and the court's reaction to them are unknown to this
writer.
The appellate court's affirmance of Holt v. Sarver was not unexpected.
The court realized that the facts dearly sustained petitioners' claim that
they were victims of cruel and unusual punishment. The court found
nothing wrong with the remedy prescribed by the district court and in-
dicated that the lower court had the go ahead to continue to enforce its
holding in the same manner as it had previously.
50. 809 F. Supp. at 381. In another part of the opinion the court grimly stated
that "[ulnless conditions at the Penitentiary farms are brought up to a level of
constitutional tolerability, the farms can no longer be used for the confinement
of convicts." Id. at 383.
51. The writer of this note corresponded with the attorneys for the petition-
ers and also met them personally the day Holt was argued before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. During these oral arguments, counsel
for the petitioners showed motion pictures of the Tucker and Cummins Units,
and commented on the efforts that had been taken following the lower court's
decision.
52. Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). See note 13 supra. On appeal,
the State's Assistant Attorney General, representing Commissioner Sarver, argued
that what was really involved in the case was a suit against the state, not against
an individual state official, in contravention of the eleventh amendment to the
United States Constitution. This amendment gives a state sovereign immunity
against suits brought against it in federal courts without its consent. Great N.
Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944). The eleventh amendment has been
further interpreted to bar a suit against an officer of a state, even though the
state itself is not made a party defendant. In such cases the courts have ruled that
the state is nevertheless the only real party against which the relief is asked. Cooper
S.S. Co. v. Michigan, 194 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1952). However, this argument was
made in civil rights actions and rejected. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of
Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.), afrd, 358 U.S. 101 (1958); Cook v. Davis, 178
F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950). In In re Ayres, 123
U.S. 443, 506 (1887), the Supreme Court ruled that the eleventh amendment does
not impinge upon actions under the civil rights statutes which allow relief against
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The appellate court seemed confident that it had not created a prec-
edent that was too sweeping.58 It is doubtful that there are many prisons
in this country administered in as objectionable a manner as the Arkansas
System was administered prior to Holt. For that very reason counsel for
the petitioners, in his oral argument before the court of appeals, suggested
that Holt would have little effect on future litigation involving prisoners.
His contention must be weighed in the face of his zeal in advocating his
case, and his attempts to calm the fears the appellate court may have had
about the repercussions of declaring a prison system unconstitutional. As
earlier passages of this casenote have attempted to show, imaginative and
conscientious lawyers can see the possibilities of Holt as a vehicle for prison
reform.54 However, regardless of the eventual impact on other prison sys-
tems, it is not necessary to speculate as to the effect of Holt on the victims
of the Arkansas system.55 For them the value of the case lies in the action
taken to rectify a clearly shameful situation.
RicHARD B. SCHER mR
individual defendants who act under color of law. The Attorney General's argu-
ment was rejected by the appellate court for the same reason. Quoting from an
earlier eighth circuit opinion, Board of Trustees of Ark. A. &c M. College v. Davis,
396 F.2d 730, 732 (8th Cir. 1968), the court noted that when a state official violates
federally guaranteed constitutional rights, he loses his status as an official and
is instead accountable for his acts as any individual would be. The state can
not protect such a person from immunity under the eleventh amendment. Holt
v. Sarver, supra at 306.
53. An indication of this confidence can be found in the court's warning
that it was only concerned with legislative and administrative matters and prac-
tices in so far as they are questionable from a constitutional viewpoint, not from
a sociological viewpoint. Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 308 (1971). This is a typical
reaction by federal courts when dealing with problems in the area of prison
reform. It shows that the remnants of the old "hands-off policy" are still lurking
about.
54. County and city jails may be subject to the same standards announced
in Holt. In the recent case of Hamilton v. Schiro, Civil No. 69-2443 (E.D. La.,
June 26, 1970), it was held that confinement in the Orleans Parish Prison under
the conditions existing there constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
55. At the oral argument, counsel for the petitioners, in response to the
court's inquiry about the effect of the Holt decision, was of the opinion that "a
significant alteration has been made in the prisoners' lives."
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THE STANDING TRAIN DOCTRINE-AN
OUTMODED STANDARD OF CARE
Houghton v. Atchison, T. & S. Fe R.R.1
Plaintiff's automobile struck the defendant's train as the train moved
slowly over a public highway crossing. Prior to the plaintiffs accident, the
defendant's train had been involved in a collision with a stalled automobile.
Because of this situation, defendant's crewmen had been flagging highway
traffic coming in either direction toward the crossing. The train was un-
coupled, and the engine was moved across the track to dear the highway.
After several minutes, the engine backed over the crossing, picked up the
freight cars and proceeded on its way at a very slow speed. In the meantime,
the crew members who had been flagging traffic boarded the train. Plain-
tiff, not having had the benefit of the warnings of the crewmen, struck the
rear of the train with his automobile. In addition, the following facts were
part of the record: (1) the accident occurred on a dark night; (2) the high-
way was heavily traveled; (3) the train was unscheduled; and (4) (perhaps
most importantly) the plaintiff showed that because of the severe angle at
which the track crossed the road, the unlighted rear of plaintiff's train was
practically moving along plaintiff's line of travel when the collision occurred.
On the basis of this evidence, plaintiff won a jury verdict in the circuit
court.
A four-to-three majority of the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and
held, as a matter of law, that the defendant was not negligent. The court
relied on the rule of law, well established in Missouri and many other juris-
dictions, that a railroad is never guilty of negligence for failure to warn
when it obstructs a highway crossing unless the plaintiff can show that there
were some special circumstances rendering the crossing peculiarly hazard-
ous.2 The court held that plaintiff failed to make a submissible case for the
jury on this issue of the hazardousness of the crossing.S Three members of
the court dissented, arguing that it would be possible for reasonable men
to differ as to the railroad's negligence, and that the evidence presented
would support a jury verdict for the plaintiff.
The Houghton decision does not break new ground or overturn existing
doctrines. On the contrary, the standing train doctrine, as it has become
known, is a firmly established principle of law.4 But the opinion does
1. 446 S.W.2d 406 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
2. Id. at 408. For more cases setting forth the rule in Missouri and in otherjurisdictions, see State ex rel. Thompson v. Cave, 358 Mo. 414, 215 S.W.2d 435
(En Banc 1948); Dimond v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 346 Mo. 333, 141 S.W.2d 789
1940); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Goldenbaum, 269 A.2d 229 (Del. 1970); Ward v.
Louisville & N. R.R., 439 S.W.2d 315 (Ky. 1969); Kansas, 0. & G. Ry. v. Painter,
333 P.2d 547 (Okla. 1958); Murphy v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Ore. 522, 355 P.2d
236 (1960); and Fort Worth &c D. Ry. v. Williams, 375 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1964).
3. 446 S.W.2d at 410.
4. See State ex rel. Thompson v. Cave, 358 Mo. 414, 215 S.W.2d 435 (En
Banc 1948), where the court observed:
In this jurisdiction it is established law that a railroad is not guilty of
negligence in blocking a public road crossing without providing warnings
or signals, unless there are special circumstances which make the cross-
ing peculiarly hazardous .... Id. at 417-418, 215 S.W.2d at 436.
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illustrate, rather dramatically, a judicial philosophy originating in the early
days of negligence law which looks toward a continuing reduction of the
role of the jury.5 This philosophy is based upon the assumption that, since
"the same or similar circumstances" continually recur in litigation, standards
of care applicable to such circumstances can be fixed as a matter of law so
that certain types of conduct can be classified as "negligent" or "not negli-
gene' as a matter of law.6 On appellate review these standards of care can
be further refined, with the result that triers of fact in subsequent litigation
can resolve disputes purely in terms of principles of law.7
Beginning with Justice Holmes' development of the stop, look and
listen rule in the now famous case of Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman,8 acci-
dents at railroad crossings became a chief area in which courts were moved
to take certain factual situations and reduce from them standards of care
equivalent to rules of law. Basic to all litigation in this area is the common
fact of a moving object coming into contact with a train. Justice Holmes
recognized this common fact when he developed his rule in Goodman. It
was his contention that it would someday be possible to apply a standard of
care to all sets of circumstances, and consequently lessen the need for a jury's
view on the matter.9 Not too many years later, Justice Cardozo rejected this
rule in Pokora v. Wabash Ry.,10 and advised the use of "caution in framing
standards of behavior that amount to rules of law."-" Although Goodman
5. Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation,
3 LAw & CoNEmm. PRoB. 476, 478 (1936). But see Grand Trunk Ry. v. Ives, 144
U.S. 408, 417 (1892), where the Court stated:
There is no fixed standard in the law by which a court is enabled to
arbitrarily say in every case what conduct... shall constitute ordinary
care, under any and all circumstances .... The policy of the law has
relegated the determination of such questions to the jury, under proper
instructions from the court.
See also Toledo &: W. Ry. v. Goddard, 25 Ind. 185 (1865); Baltimore & O.R.R.
v. Owings, 65 Md. 502, 5 A. 329 (1886); and Bradley v. Boston & M.R.RL, 56
Mass. (2 Gush.) 539 (1848).
6. Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YA=. LJ. 482, 485-86 (1956).
See Herbert v. Southern Pac. Co., 121 Cal. 227, 230, 53 P. 651 (1898), where the
Supreme Court of California stated:
[T]he cases arising from injuries suffered at railroad crossings have been
so numerous, and upon certain points there has been such absolute accord,
that what will constitute ordinary care in such a case will have been pre-
cisely defined, and, if any element is wanting, the courts will hold as a
matter of law that plaintiff has been guilty of negligence.
7. Green, supra note 6, at 485-86. The author notes that this process tended
to erode the jury's power and strengthen the power of the judges, especially the
authority of those men sitting on the appellate bench.
8. 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
9. Id. at 70. See also 0. HOLMES, Tn COMMowN LAw 110-11, 120-24 (1881).
10. 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
11. Id. at 105. Justice Cardozo's warnings were graphically illustrated in the
case of Torgeson v. Missouri-K.-T. R.R., 124 Kan. 798, 262 P. 564 (1928), when
it appeared that it was safer to approach a crossing slowly and drive straight across
than it was to stop and get out. For an extreme example of an unbending appli-
cation of the duty to stop, see Benner v. Philadelphia & IL Ry., 262 Pa. 307, 311,
105 A. 283, 284 (1918), where it was said the duty to stop "is not a rule of evidence
but a rule of law, peremptory, absolute and unbending; and the jury can never
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was only binding on federal courts,12 several state judicial bodies made an
effort to expressly reject the Holmesian rule.13
While it would be safe to conclude that most judges and legal scholars
realized the shortcomings of standards such as the one promulgated in
Goodman,'4 there is disagreement about possible alternatives. Basically,
there are two distinct approaches. The first evaluates a litigant's conduct
by the standard of care of a reasonable man under the same or similar cir-
cumstances. Lying somewhere between this test and the Holmesian ap-
proach is a view adopted by some courts whereby certain minimum stand-
ards of conduct are fixed.15 These rules tend to be confined to a very narrow
set of circumstances. When these facts alone are present in a case, the judge
is able to rule as a matter of law that a certain verdict must be reached. No
one jurisdiction has adopted either of these tests in its entirety. Instead, the
two alternatives tend to be applied piecemeal throughout the various areas
of negligence law.'8
The standing train doctrine is an example of a judicially defined min-
imum standard of care. Upon colliding with an immobile train obstructing
a crossing, an automobile driver is held to this standard. If no other rele-
vant evidence is offered by the plaintiff-driver, the courts hold he may not
recover as a matter of law. However, if the plaintiff can show that' the
crossing was unusually hazardous, the jury may be allowed to decide the
issue of the railroad's negligence. Whether the plaintiff makes a submissible
case for the jury on this issue is a question of law and, accordingly, within
the court's power to decide.' 7
Houghton is illustrative of the problems that may occur through the
use of such judicially defined standards of care. It is submitted that the ulti-
mate result of the case is incorrect and that the dissents contention that
reasonable men could disagree on the issue of the railroad's negligence has
more validity. When applied to fact situations in actions for negligence, in
the remote confines of an appellate hall of justice, these standards may cease
to be consistent with common sense. In borderline or close cases, such rules
12. See 26 MicH. L. R.xv. 582, 583 (1928).
13. See Georgia R.R. & Bank. v. Stanley, 38 Ga. App. 773, 145 S.E. 530 (1928);
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Sarman, 38 Ga. App. 637, 144 S.E. 810 (1928); Big
Sandy & Ky. R. Ry. v. Blair, 224 Ky. 367, 6 S.W.2d 453 (1928); Miller v. New York
C.R.R., 226 App. Div. 205, 234 N.Y. Supp. 560 (1929); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry., 134 Misc. 6, 234 N.Y. Supp. 293 (Man. Mun.
Ct. 1929); Key v. Carolina & N.W. Ry., 150 S.C. 29, 147 S.E. 625 (1929); St. Louis,
B.&M. Ry. v. Cole, 4 S.W.2d 1019 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Mattingley v. Oregon-
W.R.R. & Nav., 153 Wash. 518, 280 P. 46 (1929).
14. See F. BOHLEN, STmuDs OF THE LAw oF TORTS 612 (1926); 2 F. HARPER &
F. JAmEs, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 17.2 (1956); 8 B.U.L. Rav. 81 (1928); 16 CALU.
L. REv. 238 (1928); 76 U. PA. L. REv. 321 (1928); and 4 Wis. L. R.v. 467 (1928).
15. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAm s, THE LAw OF ToRTS § 17.2 (1956).
16. Id. Theoretically, this process looks to be quite reasonable and practical.
But it must be remembered that superficially the Holmesian philosophy appeared
to be equally as rational and workable. Just as it had its flaws, so may the more
flexible standards of care, although the deficiencies may be less readily apparent
and a bit more subtle.
17. For a lengthy explanation of this judicial process, see Comment, Extra-
hazardous Railroad Crossings, 7 BAYLOR L. REv. 170 (1955).
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are often applied in what may seem to be an arbitrary manner. Courts are
conscious of this problem, and in order to see that justice is done, may
resort to stretching the rules or molding the facts to fit the rule. Their pur-
poses are laudable, but such tenuous technicalities do little to instill faith
in the legal system. What may be even more unjust is the possibility that
a court will conclude that since liability can not be established under a
certain legal doctrine, it can not be established at all.18
A further shortcoming of judicially defined standards of care is their
inability to keep pace with changes in technology, new life styles, and re-
versals in societal priorities. When standards are judicially defined they
are rendered inflexible by the grip of stare decisis. The standing train doc-
trine developed decades ago.19 It can be traced back to an era when judges
saw wider applications of their role in negligence litigation.20 Personal
injury cases involved more than a controversy between two individuals.
Policy considerations played a large part in the ultimate disposition of this
type of lawsuit. Appellate judges, in their written opinions, frequently re-
ferred to the need for a well integrated transportation system. This need
was often emphasized when railroads were the object of a lawsuit.21 The
practical result of this was that many of the standards of care formulated
to deal with accidents at railroad crossings favored railroads.2 2 This is not
meant to suggest that such a development was unlawful. On the contrary,
the courts, in recognizing the need, reflected the community's desire to favor
a developing public-service industry.23 However, it is quite possible that the
policy considerations which moved an appellate judge to rule as he did
thirty years ago may no longer be appropriate to the conditions of the day.2 4
The desire to formulate minimum standards can be explained in part
by the stability which is achieved by adherence to precedent. However, the
area of negligent conduct presents special problems. Each cause of action
is different; each has its peculiar set of circumstances. Strict rules of law do
not always lend themselves well to this type of litigation. It is submitted
that the better approach is to apply general tests of negligence based upon
the conduct of the hypothetical but contemporary reasonable man acting
under the same or similar circumstances.
18. Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and
Trespassers, 69 L.Q. Rxv. 182, 186 (1958).
19. See Annots., 161 A.L.R. 111, 189 (1946), 99 A.L.R. 1454 (1985), 56 A.L.R.
1114 (1928), 15 A.L.R. 901 (1921).
20. L. GREEN, TRAFFIC VIcriMs: TORT LAw AND INsURANCE 27-31 (1958).
21. See Lund v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 25 Cal. 2d 287, 296, 158 P.2d 705, 709(1944); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Watson, 108 Fla. 477, 488, 187 So. 719, 722
(1931); Lockett v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 272 Mich. 219, 225, 261 N.W. 806, 808
(1935); and State ex rel. Kurn v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 177, 185, 153 S.W.2d 46, 52
(1941), where the courts noted the priority of the railroad at crossings based
on the public service railroads perform and the demand from the public for
good service and speedy travel.
22. L. GREEN, supra note 20, at 18-19.
23. Id. at 31-34.
24. See W. PROsSOR, THE LAw or ToRTs § 58 at 868 (3rd ed. 1964), in which
the author points out the continuing evolutions of a more favored position of an
injured occupier of land as opposed to early common law emphasis on the right
of a landowner to use his land in a free and unrestricted way.
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A recent California decision is illustrative. In the case of Rowland v.
Christian,25 the California Supreme Court discarded the strict judicially
defined common law standards of care owed by a landowner to visitors. The
test substituted was whether a person, in the care and use of his property,
has acted as a reasonable man in view of the foreseeability of injury to
others.20 In the future, therefore, the traditional classification of the plain-
tiff as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee will, in California, be merely a cir-
cumstance bearing on the reasonableness of the defendant-landowner's con-
duct.
In justifying its landmark holding, the Rowland court systematically
discussed each of the main criticisms of the old common law rules. First, the
court noted that the old rules were developed in an era when it was felt
that the dominance and prestige of the landowning class in England had
to be preserved; an era when the courts were especially receptive to argu-
ments advocating the supremacy of property rights. Today, society recog-
nizes the need of an individual to be compensated for his injuries. The
common law doctrines fail to satisfy these humanitarian impulses. Through-
out the opinion, the majority cited the criticisms generally made of strict
standards-the tendency to apply them in an arbitrary manner in close
cases, with the result that an unjust decision may be reached, and the danger
that when the strict rules prohibit recovery courts may fail to consider other
theories under which recovery could be allowed.27
Although not a recent development in the law, the standard of care
assumed by a bailee is another example of an area of negligence law where
some jurisdictions have repudiated common law distinctions.28 At common
law, the duty of care owed by a bailee was determined by whether the bail-
ment could be characterized as "gratuitous, '29 "mutual,"8 0 or for the "sole
benefit" of the bailor 3' The landmark case in this area is Peet vo. Roth
Hotel Co., 2 in which the Minnesota Court stated that until a better stand-
ard can be devised that of "ordinary care should be followed in every
case ....
The Michigan judiciary has shown some recognition of the dangers of
25. 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
26. Id. at 104, 443 P.2d at 568.
27. The dissent in Rowland was concerned about the failure of the majority
to account for the need for predictability and stability in the law and the possi-
bility that the new decision would result in unlimited liability to landowners.
The two dissenting justices also felt that major changes in the common law should
be carried out by the legislature. Id. at 105, 443 P.2d at 569.
28. See Kubli v. First Nat'l Bank, 199 Iowa 194, 200 N.W. 434 (1924); Peet
v. Roth Hotel Co., 191 Minn. 151, 253 N.W. 546 (1934); Garbark v. Newman,
155 Neb. 188, 51 N.W.2d 315 (1952).
29. Peters v. Thompson, 42 So.2d 91 (Fla. 1949); Industrial Lumber Co. v.
Strickland, 71 Ga. App. 298, 30 S.E.2d 792 (1944); Lowney v. Knott, 83 R.I. 505,
120 A.2d 552 (1956).
30. Home Ins. Co. v. Board of County Commrs, 88 Ohio App. 91, 97 N.E.2d
231 (1949); Miller v. Hand Ford Sales, Inc., 216 Ore. 567, 340 P.2d 181 (1959).
31. Hargis v. Spencer, 254 Ky. 297, 71 S.W.2d 666 (1934); Curlee Clothing
Co. v. Robinson, 130 Okla. 1104, 265 P. 108 (1928).
32. 191 Minn. 151, 253 N.W. 546 (1934).
33. Id. at 155, 253 N.W. at 548.
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fixed standards and the right of juries to make the ultimate finding on the
negligence issue. In Emery v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 3 4 the Michigan Supreme
Court stated that the common law duty of railroads to use "ordinary care
and prudence commensurate with all the circumstances"35 should be
applied without hindrance by "the analysis-crippling semantics of 'special
conditions' and the like ....
The familiar rule that it is always negligence to drive at a speed that
makes it impossible to stop within the range of visional is another example
of a standard that has been under attack in recent years. The standard
seems reasonable enough, but it proves to be unworkable in the face of un-
usual fact situations.3 8 Accordingly, some courts have concluded that it can
now be afforded status merely as evidence for a jury.3 9 The same problems
have arisen with respect to the so-called ordinary traffic "rules of the road" 40
that a pedestrian must look before crossing a street,41 that a passenger must
34. 372 Mich. 663, 127 N.W.2d 826 (1964). See also Bauman v. Grand Trunk
W.R.R., 376 Mich. 675, 138 N.W.2d 285 (1965); Barnum v. Grand Trunk
W.R.R., 148 Mich. 870, 11 N.W. 1036 (1907); Freeman v. Duluth S.S. &= A. Ry., 74
Mich. 86, 41 N.W. 872 (1889); Guggenheim v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 66 Mich.
150, 33 N.W. 161 (1887); and Staal v. Grand Rapids &c I.R.R., 57 Mich. 289, 23
N.W. 795 (1885).
35. Emery v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 372 Mich. 663, 680, 127 N.W.2d 826,
835 (1964).
36. Id.
37. The leading case is Lauson v. Town of Fond du Lac, 141 Wis. 57, 123
N.W. 629 (1909). Accord, Haines v. Carroll, 126 Kan. 408, 267 P. 986 (1928);
Russell v. Szczawinski, 268 Mich. 112, 255 N.W. 731 (1934); Fridley v. Brush, 161
Neb. 318, 73 N.W.2d 376 (1955); Metro v. Long Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 354, 127
A.2d 716 (1956); Harris v. Hendrixson, 25 Tenn. App. 221, 155 S.W.2d 876(1941). See 25 FowH.m4r L. R.v. 371 (1956); 27 N.C. L. Ray. 153 (1948); and 12
Wyo. L.J. 116 (1958).
38. In the case of DeVoto v. United Auto Tranp. Co., 128 Wash. 604, 223 P.
1050 (1924), the court pointed out that fog on the road was so thick that the
defendant-motorist would have had to come to a complete halt if he obeyed the
"range of vision" rule. Such action would have increased the danger that he
would be hit from the rear, unless every motorist adhered to the rule, in which
case traffic would have been completely halted. The court felt the better rule
to be that in driving through a fog bank, each driver must do so in a careful and
prudent manner with due regard for the safety of others, and what is careful and
prudent under the particular circumstances is a question for the jury. See also
Watson v. Southern Bus Lines, 186 F.2d 981 (6th Cir. 1951); Rabenold v. Hutt,
226 Iowa 321, 283 N.W. 865 (1939); Langill v. First Natl Stores, Inc., 298 Mass.
559, 11 N.E.2d 593 (1937); Marek v. City of Alpena, 258 Mich. 637, 246 N.W. 793(1982); Johnson v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 261 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1953);
Schassen v. Columbia Gorge Motor Coach Sys., 126 Ore. 363, 270 P. 530 (1928);
Morehouse v. City of Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 252 P. 157 (1926); and Ryan v.
Cameron, 270 Wis. 325, 71 N.W.2d 408 (1955).
39. Kendall v. City of Des Moines, 183 Iowa 866, 167 N.W. 684 (1918);
Burchette v. Davis Distrib. Co., 243 N.C. 120, 90 S.E.2d 232 (1955); Tresise v.
Ashdown, 118 Ohio St. 307, 160 N.E. 898 (1928).
40. Carlin v. Haas, 124 Conn. 259, 199 A. 430 (1938), strictly applied the
rule, while the following decisions afforded it mere evidentiary status: Kimball
v. Bauckman, 131 Me. 14, 158 A. 694 (1932); Primock v. Goldenberg, 161 Minn.
160, 200 N.W. 920 (1924); George Ast Candy Co. v. Kling, 121 Ohio St. 362, 169
N.E. 292 (1929); Richards v. Warner Co., 311 Pa. 50, 166 A. 496 (1933).
41. Plaintiff-pedestrian's failure to look before crossing the street barred his
recovery in Knapp v. Barrett, 216 N.Y. 226, 110 N.E. 428 (1915). The following
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never board or leave a train while it is moving,42 and that a driver is negli-
gent if he takes his eyes off the road.43
As a general proposition, when the law sets specific standards, the role
of a jury is limited and liability is less expansive.4 4 Conversely, when liabil-
ity is determined by the ordinary principles of negligence, the jury has a
more dominant and persuasive position and recovery may be more readily
allowed.4 5 The merits of the jury have often been extolled.4 6 Because
jurors are members of the community, they reflect current thought. Argu-
ably, their verdicts will be more in harmony with modem trends than might
be a decision based on a fixed, antiquated standard of care developed in a by-
gone day. Perhaps even more important is the ability of a jury to adapt and
temper a verdict where the black letter law may demand an unjust result.47
Ultimately, in questions dealing with the liability of one man for another
man's injury, it must be asked whether it can be said with any sort of cer-
tainty that a judge is better equipped than a jury to make a decision, and
whether one judge or a panel of appellate justices actually has a better
notion of the conduct of a reasonable man than the twelve men of a jury.
In at least one area of the law the United States Supreme Court does
not believe so. Although it required an intensive effort, the Court did much
to establish the right of a jury to decide issues of negligence arising under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. 48 By constantly granting writs of certiorari,
the Court was able to free this limited area of railroad law from suffocating
common law doctrines which lower courts were continually invoking to deny
recovery to plaintiffs. 4 9 From the very first, contributory negligence was
cases concluded that the plantiff's failure to look is one of the circumstances the
jury must consider: Hempel v. Hall, 136 Md. 174, 110 A. 210 (1920); Lundberg
v. Zimmer, 159 Minn. 179, 198 N.W. 407 (1924); and Baker v. Close, 204 N.Y.
92, 97 N.E. 501 (1912).
42. Gavett v. Manchester & L.R.R., 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 501 (1860). Cf. Guidry
v. Morgan's La. & T.R. & S.S., 140 La. 1007, 74 So. 534 (1917); Gunn v. United
Ry., 270 Mo. 517, 193 S.W. 814 (1917); and Eppendorf v. Brooklyn City 8c N.R.R.,
69 N.Y. 195 (1877).
48. Baldwin v. City of Norwalk, 96 Conn. 1, 112 A. 660 (1921); Kendall
v. City of Des Moines, 188 Iowa 866, 167 N.W. 684 (1918); and Duby v. Colum-
bia County, 194 Wis. 172, 215 N.W. 819 (1927), all reject the rule. For a com-
plete discussion of these cases see W. PaossER, THE LAW oF TORTS § 37 (3rd. ed.
1964)44. James, Functions of Judge and Juiy in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J.
667, 689 (1949).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Bishop v. New York C.R.R., 848 Mich. 345, 862, 88 N.W.2d 278,
284 (1957).
47. Lambert, In Defense of the Civil Jury, 29 NACCA L.J. 27, 32 (1962).
Lambert labels this prerogative "the legitimate lawlessness of the jury."
48. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964). See DeParcq, The Supreme Court and the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 1956-57 Term, 86 TExAs L. Rxv. 145, 154, 156
(1957).
49. See Dice v. Akron, C. 9: Y.R.RL, 342 U.S. 859 (1952); Affolder v. New
York, C. & St. L.R.R., 339 U.S. 96 (1950); Carter v. Atlanta & St. A. B. Ry., 338
U.S. 480 (1949); O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 38 U.S. 884 (1949); Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 36 U.S. 53 (1949);
Coray v. Southern Pac. R.RL, 35 U.S. 520 (1949); Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry., 838 U.S. 821 (1948); Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947); Myers v.
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never allowed as a defense. However, it was suggested that the courts then
substituted for this defense by allowing the defense of assumption of the
risk.5 0 When Congress amended the act to bar assumption of the risk as a
defense, 51 the courts again were equal to the challenge. Subsequently, plain-
tiffs were denied recovery as a matter of law by the use of the defense of
no evidence of any negligence on the part of the defendant,52 and the de-
fense that the defendant's actions were not the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's misfortune. 53 Some may argue that the very nature of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act makes the jury's power greater than under other
tort actions. Professor Green rejects this notion and notes that the fact that
such an argument could be made is proof of the degree to which courts have
usurped the jury's right to decide questions of negligence. 54
Ironically, the standing train cases have been singled out as an area of
railroad law where courts have been particularly unreceptive to recognition
of the desirability of ordinary negligence tests-and the logical aftermath
of a wider role for juries. 55 However, there is evidence that in recent cases
Reading, 331 U.S. 477 (1947); Ellis v. Union Pac. R.R., 329 U.S. 649 (1947);
Jesionowski v. Boston & M.R.R., 329 U.S. 452 (1947); Lavender v. Kurn, 327
U.S. 645 (1946); Blair v. Baltimore & O.RR., 323 U.S. 600 (1945); Tennant v.
Peoria & Pekin Un. Ry., 321 U.S. 29 (1944); Baily v. Central V. Ry., 319 U.S.
350 (1943); Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943); and Lilly
v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 317 U.S. 481 (1943).
50. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
51. See 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1964).
52. See DeZon v. American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660, 672 (1943)(dissenting opinion of Justice Black). See also Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 340
U.S. 573 (1951); Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania R.R., 335 U.S. 329 (1948).
53. See Reynolds v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 336 U.S. 207 (1949); Lavender
v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946); Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Un. Ry., 321 U.S. 29
(1944); and Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476 (1943).
54. Green, supra note 6, at 490 n.17. Professor Green is a sharp critic of what
he characterizes as the appellate courts' assault on the jury's right to decide ques-
tions of fact. He points to the action of the Supreme Court in FELA cases as
evidence of the tremendous effort needed to convince courts of review that they
do not have the right to determine questions of fact on appeal. Because he has
little faith in the higher courts' ability or desire to give up what amounts to a
retrial of negligence cases on appeal, Green proposes a five point "realignment
of the judicial process." The most important part stresses the need to reinstate
the authority and upgrade the quality of the trial judge, and that the jury and
the trial judge should be the center of the judicial process. He further suggests
that within a few days of the conclusion of a trial, a local hearing by a group
of judges be held, with their only purpose being to determine whether, as a
whole, justice has been done. As to the role of the appellate court, he would
restrict their power to that of reviewing questions involving statutory and con-
stitutional interpretation, questions of jurisprudential policy, matters of due process,
and finding ways to make the administration of justice more successful and efficient
at the trial court level. Id. at 488.
55. L. G=N, supra note 20, at 49. The author makes an interesting and
critical generalization about such cases:
In cases of collision with the side of a standing or moving train, the
courts have generally held that the victim is contributorily negligent as
a matter of law. "The train," they say, "gives notice of its presence." The
logic of the clicha is that the victim is bent on suicide. It but illustrates
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the standing train doctrine is not being applied in its strict traditional
sense.56 Instead, the findings of juries are being upheld and legal arguments
that a minimum standard of care precludes recovery are being rejected on
appeal.57 Unfortunately, as Houghton clearly shows, Missouri has not fol-
lowed this trend. The standing train doctrine appears to be a fixture of the
law in this state. For reasons already stated, it should be rejected. Verdicts
in negligence actions, where the only basis of appeal is the verdict itself,
should enjoy a higher degree of respect. Appellate courts should resist the
impulse to re-try cases in which a jury has already made its position known.
It is submitted that if fixed standards of care are abandoned, the temptation
to do so will be considerably lessened.
RicIAmw B. SCHmRRER
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCER]NING CHANGES IN
CONDITION AFTER THE ACCIDENT
Grothe v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 1
On December 21, 1967, Clifford Grothe's automobile was struck by
defendant's train at the intersection of Old State Road and defendant's
tracks in Imperial, Missouri. Grothe was killed. It was a windy, rainy day
and the train was running five and one-half hours behind schedule. At the
time of the accident, there was a crossarm warning signal and a bell signal
at the intersection. However, the bell could not be heard inside an auto-
mobile if the windows were closed, and was difficult to hear on a windy day
even with the windows open. The engineer did not see the car until the
engine was seventy-five feet from the crossing, and it was not clear whether
he blew the train's whistle before the accident.
Grothe's wife and children brought an action for wrongful death against
the railroad. During the course of the trial, plaintiff called Garland Lowry,
a surveyor, who testified about the physical layout of the crossing.2 Lowry
56. See Finn v. Spokane P. & S. Ry., 189 Ore. 126, 134, 214 P.2d 354, 357,
affd on rehearing, 189 Ore. 143, 218 P.2d 720 (1950), where the majority notes
that courts differ in their application of the standing train doctrine, depending
upon whether "horse and buggy" rules are used to deny liability in any situation,
or whether railroads have been practically made insurers against injury. In
Atlantic Coast Line LR. v. Kammerer, 239 F.2d 115, 117-18 (5th Cir. 1959), the
court warns that the "standing train" doctrine ceases to be common sense if
applied "with ritualistic absolutism ... ." and emphasizes that questions of fact
are rightly within the power of the jury under seventh amendment considerations.
57. See Gross v. Southern Ry., 414 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1969); Arrasmith v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 410 F.2d 1311 (6th Cir. 1969); Golfinos v. Southern Pac. R.R.,
86 Ariz. 315, 345 P.2d 780 (1959); and Van v. Union Pac. ILR., 83 Idaho 539,
366 P.2d 837 (Idaho 1961). Early annotations under the standing train doctrine
show that a submissible case for the jury was held to have been made in only a
very few cases. See Annots. cited note 19 supra. The latest annotation indicates
that in almost one-half of the cases decided after 1946 the courts have ruled that
the plaintiff made a submissible case for the jury. See Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 813,
823 (1962).
1. 460 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1970).
2. Brief for Appellant at 6.
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made repeated reference to plaintiffs' exhibits 5, 6, and 7.3 The purpose of
exhibit 7 was to show the view an engineer would have of the crossing in
question at a distance of 260 feet from the crossing.4 This exhibit, a photo-
graph, was taken after the installation of flashing lights at the intersection.
While explaining the picture to the jury, Lowry was permitted to testify
that "defendant installed flasher lights subsequent to the collision in ques-
tion."5
The case was submitted to the jury on the "theory of failing to sound
a warning signal under the humanitarian doctrine." 6 The jury returned a
verdict of $50,000 in favor of plaintiffs. Defendants appealed,
contending, inter alia, that the admission of Lowry's testimony regarding
the installation of flasher lights was error.7 The Missouri Supreme Court
ruled that admission of this testimony was not error.8
The rule that evidence of subsequent changes in condition 9 is inadmis-
sible to prove negligence' 0 is well imbedded in the law." Not only is this
type of evidence inadmissible on the issue of negligence, but, unless it is
admissible on certain other issues in the case, it "should be rigorously ex-
cluded" and its admission into evidence is reversible error.' 2
3. Exhibit 5 was a plat of the crossing and sight distance. 460 S.W.2d at
718. Exhibit 6 was an aerial photograph of the crossing, and exhibit 7 was a
ground level photograph. Brief for Appellant at 6.
4. Brief for Respondent at 25.
5. 460 S.W.2d at 718.
6. Id. at 714. The opinion discusses the application of the humanitarian
doctrine to the facts in this case, but the discussion is beyond the scope of this
note.
7. Id. at 717-18. Defendant also asserted "that the wrongful death act, Sec-
tions 537.080 through 537.100, Laws 1967, is unconstitutional." Id. at 713. The
court said that defendant did not have standing to make this challenge. Id. at
713-14.
Defendant also contended that (1) an instruction on aggravating circum-
stances was improperly given; and (2) testimony concerning Grothe's reputation,
and testimony concerning requests made to the railroad (before the accident) to
improve the crossing should not have been admitted. The court did not agree
with any of these contentions. Id. at 717-18. Discussion of these issues is beyond
the scope of this note.
8. Id. at 718.
9. McCormick includes in this category
Repairs, changes in construction, installation of new safety devices such
as lights, gates, or guards, changes in rules and regulations, changes in the
practice of the business, or the discharge of an employee charged with the
injury.
C. McComiucn, THE LAw OF EvEnuNcE § 252, at 544 (1954).
10. In Alcorn v. Chicago & A.R.R., 108 Mo. 81, 90, 18 S.W. 188, 189 (1891),
the court said that changes cannot be construed as a "tacit admission of prior
negligence."
11. See, e.g., Columbia R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892); Atcheson
v. Braniff Int'l Airways, 327 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. 1959); Moore v. Quality Dairy Co.,
425 S.W.2d 261 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); Nuckols v. Andrews Inv. Co., 364 S.W.2d
128 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962); Wright v. Hines, 235 S.W. 831 (Spr. Mo. App. 1921).
See also Annots., 64 A.L.R.2d 1296 (1959), 170 A.L.R. 7 (1947).
12. Bailey v. Kansas City, 189 Mo. 503, 512, 87 S.W. 1182, 1185 (1905). But see
Moore v. Quality Dairy Co., 425 S.W.2d 261, 267 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968), where
the court said the "change was secondary or ancillary to the main charge of
negligence ...." and was therefore harmless error.
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Several reasons have been advanced for the rule excluding evidence
of changes in condition made after the accident. It has been said that this
evidence confuses the issues,' 3 is misleading,14 brings in irrelevant and
collateral matters,'1 and is prejudicial against the defendant.' 6 One of the
strongest arguments against its admissibility is that it has no legitimate
tendency to prove negligence. 17 In Mitchell v. City of Plattsburg'8 the court
said: "The question of negligence should be determined by what was
known, or reasonably should have been known, before the accident."' 9 The
most important reason for the rule of exclusion has nothing to do with
finding truth in the trial of the case, but establishes the rule as one of
privilege.20 The fear is that this kind of evidence will be construed as an
admission of prior negligence and that an individual faced with such a
possibility will not make needed changes and repairs after the dangerous
condition has been discovered. 2 1
This policy of exclusion presupposes that negligence is an issue in the
case. When it is not, the danger of prejudice to the defendant is not present.
Even when negligence is an issue, the evidence is sometimes admissible. For
example, if plaintiff has alleged that the defendant should have maintained
safer premises, evidence that the suggested changes were in fact made after
the accident is admissible to prove the practicability of the repairs when
the defendant has responded that plaintiff's suggestions are impossible2 2 or
impracticable to carry out.23 Similarly, when the defendant has denied his
relationship to the premises the fact that defendant made repairs is admis-
sible to show that the defendant had a duty to repair the premises,24 owned
the premises, 25 or that the premises were under the defendant's management
or control.2 6 Also, while evidence of repairs is not admissible to show the
13. Columbia R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892); Gignoux v. St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co., 180 S.W.2d 784 (St. L. Mo. App. 1944).
14. Alcorn v. Chicago &c A.R.R., 108 Mo. 81, 18 S.W. 188 (1891).
15. Gignoux v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 180 S.W.2d 784 (St. L. Mo. App.
1944).
16. Columbia R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892).
17. Id. McCormick contends, however, that in view of the standards normally
applied to admissions by conduct, evidence of subsequent changes "seems relevant
(though rebuttable, of course) as a circumstance tending to show consciousness
that the situation called for additional safety-precautions." C. McCoRMICK, supra
note 9, § 77, at 159.
18. 33 Mo. App. 555 (K.C. Ct. App. 1889).
19. Id. at 560.
20. C. McCoRmicK, supra note 9, § 77, at 159.
21. Alcorn v. Chicago & A.R.R., 108 Mo. 81, 18 S.W. 188 (1891).
22. Hickey v. Kansas City S. Ry., 290 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1956).
23. Wagner v. Gilsonite Constr. Co., 220 S.W. 890 (Mo. 1920); Bujalo v.
St. Louis Basket Sc Box Co., 227 S.W. 844 (St. L. Mo. App. 1921).
24. Brennan v. St. Louis, 92 Mo. 482, 2 S.W. 481 (1886); Bowles v. Kansas
City, 51 Mo. App. 416 (K.C. Ct. App. 1892); Mitchell v. Plattsburg, 33 Mo. App.
555 (K.C. Ct. App. 1889).
25. Tetrick v. Kansas City, 128 Mo. App. 355, 107 S.W. 418 (K.C. Ct. App.
1908).
26. Nuckols v. Andrews Inv. Co., 364 S.W.2d 128 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962);
Brule v. Mayflower Apartments Co., 113 S.W.2d 1058 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938);
Wright v. Hines, 235 S.W. 831 (Spr. Mo. App. 1921). In Brule v. Mayflower
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existence of defects at the time of the accident,27 a plaintiff will be allowed
to introduce evidence of repairs to prove location when a defendant's witness
puts the location of an acknowledged defect into dispute.28
Evidence of changes cannot be used to impeach a defendant's witness
unless it is admissible on other grounds.29 The same seems to be true when
the evidence is used for rebuttal of one of defendant's contentions. 30 How-
ever, in Orr v. Shell Oil Co.s1 the plaintiff was injured by a chemical, and
was allowed to introduce evidence of protective measures taken
after the accident when defendant denied that the chemical was dangerous.
It is also possible for defendant to waive the privilege of exclusion.
In Ernst v. Union Depot Bridge & Terminal Ry.32 defendant objected to
the introduction of evidence that span wires had been replaced after the
accident. On cross examination of plaintiff's witness, defendant raised a
doubt as to whether or not new span wires had been installed. The court
said that since this was the same line of questioning that plaintiff had fol-
lowed, defendant waived his prior objection.
In general, the admissibility of evidence of repairs is determined by
some action or inaction on the part of the defendant. The defendant, by
controlling the issues and making proper objections,33 can prevent the ad-
mission of the evidence if he so desires. If the evidence is admitted, the
defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction. 4
It is not submitted that the court erred by admitting Lowry's testimony
concerning the flasher lights. The problem is that the Missouri Supreme
Court's language may suggest to the reader that it is permissible for a plain-
tiff to introduce into evidence an otherwise accurate and relevant photo-
Apartments Co., supra at 1060-61, the court said that when the evidence has
already been received and the defendant then admits that he controls the premises,
the defendant is entitled to an instruction that the evidence cannot in any way
be considered in reaching a verdict.
27. Bailey v. Kansas City, 189 Mo. 503, 87 S.W. 1182 (1905). Contra, Union
Pac. R.R. v. Edmondson, 77 Neb. 682, 110 N.W. 650 (1906).
28. Crockett v. City of Mexico, 336 Mo. 145, 156, 77 S.W.2d 464, 468 (1934).
29. Frechin v. Thornton, 326 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1959).
30. Some cases do not fit into specific categories like denial of duty to repair
or denial of ownership. See, e.g., Tetherow v. St. Joseph &c D.M. Ry., 98 Mo. 74,
11 S.W. 310 (1889). In this case, when defendant claimed that no other accident
had ever occurred at the place in question, plaintiff was allowed to show that
the place had been repaired after the accident.
31. 352 Mo. 288, 295, 177 S.W.2d 608, 613 (1943).
32. 256 S.W. 222, 225 (Mo. En Banc 1923). See also Derrington v. Southern
Ry., 328 Mo. 283, 291, 40 S.W.2d 1069, 1072, cert. denied, 284 U.S. 662 (1931),
where defendant's witness, on cross examination by plantiff, volunteered evidence
that a change had been made since the accident. The court's position in admitting
the evidence was strengthened by the fact that defendant did not object until
an answer to the question had been given.
33. Where the evidence is wholly inadmissible, a general objection is suf-
ficient. Alcorn v. Chicago Sc A.R.R., 108 Mo. 81, 18 S.W. 188 (1891). Where the
evidence is admissible on some issue, e.g., control, a special objection is required.
Brennan v. St. Louis, 92 Mo. 482, 2 S.W. 481 (1886).
34. Brule v. Mayflower Apartments Co., 113 S.W.2d 1058 (St. L. Mo. App.
1938); Bujalo v. St. Louis Basket Sc Box Co., 227 S.W. 844 (St. L. Mo. App. 1921);
Wright v. Hines, 235 S.W. 831 (Spr. Mo. App. 1921). But see Derrington v. South-
ern Ry., 328 Mo. 283, 40 S.W.2d 1069, cert. denied, 284 U.S. 662 (1931).
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graph which also contains evidence of repairs, and to point out the repairs
in order to clarify the picture for the jury. Such a rule would defeat the
purpose of the subsequent repairs doctrine.
In regard to defendant's contention in the Grothe case that the court
erred in admitting Lowry's reference to the flasher lights, the court said:
The testimony with respect to installation of flashing light
warnings at the crossing subsequent to the collision came from wit-
ness Garland Lowry, a surveyor. He had made a plat, Exhibit 5,
of the crossing and sight distance and was relating it to a ground
level photograph, Exhibit 7, of the crossing. The photograph had
been made subsequent to installation of the flashing lights and the
testimony was received to explain how the pictured scene differed
from the scene at the time of the collision, and admission for that
purpose was proper. 5
In support of this statement the court cited four cases:36 Henwood v.
Chaney;3 7 State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Eilers;3 s Brock v.
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R.;39 and Reed v. Coleman.40 In Henwood, the
defendant sought to introduce a photograph of the scene of the accident.
The alleged negligence was that oil and mud had caused plaintiff to slip
and fall when he stepped from defendant's railroad car. After questions by
plaintiff aimed at challenging the accuracy of the photograph, the witness
testified that since the accident, and before the picture was taken, the de-
fendant had changed to diesel engines which did not leak oil. The testi-
mony was admitted "to establish that conditions were different at the time
of the accident than they were at the time of the taking of the photograph
which defendant proposed to exhibit to the jury."4 1 In Eilers, a con-
demnation case, negligence was not an issue. Thus, during a challenge to the
accuracy of the photograph, there was no danger in allowing testimony that
changes had been made. The defendant in Brock, challenging the accuracy
of a photograph introduced by the plaintiff, introduced evidence that "some-
one had placed boards around there at the bottom of the pipes .. . which
boards were not there at the time of the accident." 42 Reed v. Coleman was
an automobile collision case in which defendant objected to the introduction
of pictures of the intersection because the shrubs and trees were different
at the time of the accident. Negligence was an issue in Reed, but there was
no allegation that the defendant had made any changes at the intersection.
The evidence was admitted.4 3
The problem with the language in the Grothe opinion is that the cir-
35. 460 S.W.2d at 718. This quotation contains all that was said by the
court about this testimony and exhibit 7.
36. Id.
37. 156 F.2d 392 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 760 (1946).
38. 406 S.W.2d 567 (Mo. 1966).
39. 270 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. 1954).
40. 167 S.W.2d 125 (K.C. Mo. App. 1942).
41. Henwood v. Chaney, 156 F.2d 392, 396 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
760 (1946) (emphasis added).
42. Brock v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 270 S.W.2d 827, 833 (Mo. 1954).
43. Reed v. Coleman, 167 S.W.2d 125, 133 (K.C. Mo. App. 1942).
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cumstances surrounding the admission of exhibit 7 are not set forth. It is not
clear from the opinion who called Lowry as a witness or who asked him
the questions that prompted the testimony about the flasher lights. Nor is
it dear who introduced exhibit 7. Even assuming that Lowry was plaintiffs
witness and exhibit 7 was plaintiff's exhibit, the court does not indicate how
the defendant reacted to the introduction of either exhibit 7 or Lowry's
testimony. Resort to the respondent's brief discloses that the first objections
made to the admission of Lowry's testimony came only after several ques-
tions and answers concerning the flasher lights,44 and the transcript dis-
closes that plaintiff's exhibit 7 was admitted without objection by the de-
fendant.45 Absent these facts, the court's opinion may suggest to the reader
that even if defendant had made the proper objection, exhibit 7 and Lowry's
reference to the flasher lights would have been admissible. Such a holding
would be directly contrary to the accepted rule excluding evidence of sub-
sequent repairs and there is no indication that the court intended such a
result.
None of the cases cited by the court in Grothe support the proposition
that, when the alleged negligence concerns the condition of the premises,
plaintiff, without waiver of objection by defendant, can introduce a picture
of the scene containing changes made by defendant and then point out these
changes to the jury in establishing the accuracy of the photograph. The
cases cover only three situations: (1) When negligence is not an issue in the
case;46 (2) when the defendant introduces the contaminated photograph or
in some way waives his right to object;47 and (8) when defendant's only
objection to plaintiff's photograph is on grounds of accuracy.48 In any of
these situations, changes may be pointed out to the jury in order to make
the photographs admissible as long as the photograph portrays the scene
substantially the same as it was at the time of the occurrence in question.4 9
44. Brief for Respondent at 26.
45. After the reporter marked exhibits 6 and 7 for identification, the follow-
ing occurred:
Plaintiff's Counsel: Mr. Lowry, I'd like to show you this large picture,
which has been marked for identification as Plaintiffs Exhibit 6 and this
colored photo, which has been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 7, and
ask if you can identify what these are pictures of?
Lowry: This is a picture of a vehicle, taken at this-
Plaintiffs Counsel: Is the color picture a ground level picture of the
crossing?
Lowry: Yes.
Plaintiff's Counsel: Do they correctly reflect the conditions of the cross-
ing?
Lowry: Yes.
Plaintiffs Counsel: I'd like to ask that these pictures be admitted into
evidence.
The Court: Hearing no objection they will be received in evidence.
Record at 82.
46. State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Eilers, 406 S.W.2d 567 (Mo. 1966).
47. Henwood v. Chaney, 156 F.2d 392 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 829 US 760
(1946).
48. Brock v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 270 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. 1954); Reed v. Cole-
man, 167 S.W.2d 125 (K.C. Mo. App. 1942).
49. Cases cited notes 46-48 supra.
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In arguing for strict standards regarding the admission of subsequent re-
pairs evidence, McCormick states:
[T]he extrinsic policy of encouraging remedial safety meas-
ures is the predominant reason for holding evidence of such meas-
ures to be privileged. It is apparent that the free admission of such
evidence for purposes other than as admissions of negligence is
likely to defeat this paramount policy. It is submitted that before
admitting the evidence for any of these other purposes, the court
should be satisfied that the issue on which it is offered is of sub-
stantial importance and is actually, and not merely formally in
dispute, that the plaintiff cannot establish the fact to be inferred
conveniently by other proof, and consequently that the need for
the evidence outweighs the danger of its misuse.5 0
This language can be applied to the Grothe case. Without a knowledge
of the facts surrounding the admission of exhibit 7, the Grothe opinion
seems to say that photographs taken after repairs have been made are not
subject to objection on that ground. Such a rationale opens the back door
to the admission of evidence of changes in condition made by defendant.5 '
The fact that the defendant in Grothe had installed flasher lights at the
intersection after the collision had nothing to do with the line of sight of
the engineer. Exhibit 7, although probative on the line of sight issue,
also contained evidence that the flasher lights had been installed subse-
quent to the accident. There was no issue in the suit on which this
evidence was probative. Because the alleged negligence in this case was
failure to provide a proper warning, the evidence of the installation of
the flasher lights -was undoubtedly prejudicial. Although exhibit 7 was
probably plaintiff's most illustrative method of proving that the engineer,
when 260 feet away, could have seen a car approaching the crossing, this fact
could have been established by other evidence, i.e., by oral testimony, by
reference to the plat or, if available, by a photograph that did not show
subsequent repairs.
It is not submitted that Lowry's challenged testimony was improperly
admitted. When plaintiff introduced exhibit 7, the defendant did not object
to its admission into evidence. 52 Probably the best rationale for allowing
Lowry's testimony is that defendant, by failing to object to the admission of
the photograph, waived his right to object to future testimony concerning
the flasher lights. It was "then necessary that the changes be eliminated by
50. C. McCoamaicn, supra note 9, § 252, at 545.
51. In Gignoux v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 180 S.W.2d 784 (St. L. Mo. App.
1944), the court found such an attempt. The court noted that the picture could
not give a clearer understanding of the physical facts than oral testimony could
and said that the picture would only bring confusion into the case. Id. at 786.
See also Donovan v. Connecticut Co., 84 Conn. 531, 80 A. 779 (1911). Photographs
taken before a new guard rail was installed were admitted, but those taken after
the installation of the guard rail were excluded. The court said: "Had the photo-
graphs been admitted, the plaintiff would have been permitted to accomplish by
indirection what was forbidden to him by direct processes." Id. at 538, 80 A. at 781.
52. See note 45 supra.
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explanatory testimony."5 3 However, this contention was not made by
plaintiff on appeal. The other possible rationale for the admission of Lowry's
testimony is that defendant failed to make timely objections. 54 This argu-
ment was made by plaintiff.55 When an answer is directly responsive to a
question and there is time to object between the question and answer, the
objection "comes too late when not made at the first opportunity."58 Al-
though the first rationale is preferable to the second, either would have
been better than the one used by the court. The reason given in the Grothe
opinion, without explanation, is misleading. Had the court added "because
defendant waived his right to object" to its statement that the admission
was proper for the purpose of explaining how the pictured scene differed
from the scene of the collision, the statement would have been unambiguous.
However, the actual statement made by the court can only cause confusion.
RANDALL C. WEPDrz
53. Brillhart v. Edison Light &c Power Co., 368 Pa. 307, 315, 82 A.2d 44, 49(1951). In this case, several photographs of the scene of the accident, portraying
changes made after the accident, were admitted without objection. After admis-
sion, plaintiff pointed out the changes to the jury so that they would under-
stand how the scene looked at the time of the accident. Defendant let this testi-
mony come in and did not object until near the close of the witness' examina-
tion. The court noted that the logical place for objection would have been at
the time the photograph was offered into evidence.
54. The record shows that no such timely objection was made:
Plaintiff's Counsel: Garland, on this ground level picture, were you out
there at the time before this ground level picture was taken?
Lowry: Yes.
Plaintiff's Counsel: The time that you were out there before, were these
lights here in the picture?
Lowry: No. No, the first time I was out there the lights were not in the
picture.
Plaintiff's Counsel: So, they are not out there. Were you out there after
December of 1967?
Lowry: Yes.
Plaintiffs Counsel: And at that time the lights were not there?
Lowry: That's right.
Plaintiff's Counsel: They have just recently been added is that right?
Lowry: Yes, sir.
Plaintiff's Counsel: I'll make an X here because they weren't there at
the time, originally?
Lowry: No.
Plaintiff's Counsel: It's been replaced?
Lowry: Yes.
Defendant's Counsel: If the court please, I object to any testimony regard-
ing installations at this crossing after the occurrence of this collision and
move that all the testimony with reference to that be stricken.
Plaintiff's Counsel: We are just trying to show . . . the crossing [as it]
existed at the time. We can explain the picture.
The Court: All right, overruled.
Record at 91, 92.
55. Brief for Respondent at 26.
56. Doherty v. St. Louis Butter Co., 339 Mo. 996, 1008, 98 S.W.2d 742, 747(1936). See also Mavrakos v. Mavrakos Candy Co., 359 Mo. 649, 223 S.W.2d
383 (1949); Young v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 92 S.W.2d 995 (K.C. Mo. App. 1936);
Wilson v. Blick, 60 S.W.2d 673 (St. L. Mo. App. 1933).
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